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KennethJ. Vandevelde*
The Bilateral Investment Treaty
Program of the United States
The Senate is currently considering ten bilateral investment treaties
("BITs") which the United States recently signed with Egypt,' Panama, 2
Cameroon,3 Morocco, 4 Zaire,5 Bangladesh, 6 Haiti,7 Senegal, 8 Turkey,9
and Grenada. 10 The purpose of these agreements is to protect the
* From 1982 to 1988, the author was a member of the Office of the Legal
Adviser of the Department of State and served as counsel to United States Bilateral
Investment Treaty negotiating teams. He currently practices with the firm of
Sullivan, McWilliams, Lewin and Markham in San Diego, California. The views
expressed in this Article are those of the author and not necessarily of the United
States Government.
1. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ments, Sept. 29, 1982, United States-Egypt, S. Treaty Doc. No. 24, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Egypt BIT].
2. Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments, Oct. 27,
1982, United States-Panama, S. Treaty Doc. No. 14, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)
[hereinafter Panama BIT].
3. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ment, Feb. 26, 1985, United States-Cameroon, S. Treaty Doc. No. 22, 99th Cong. 2d
Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Cameroon BIT].
4. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments, July 22, 1985, United States-Morocco, S. Treaty Doc. No. 18, 99th Cong. 2d
Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Morocco BIT].
5. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ment, Aug. 3, 1984, United States-Zaire, S. Treaty Doc. No. 17, 99th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1986) [hereinafter Zaire BIT].
6. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ment, Mar. 12, 1986, United States-Bangladesh, S. Treaty Doc. No. 23, 99th Cong.
2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Bangladesh BIT].
7. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ment, Dec. 11, 1983, United States-Haiti, S. Treaty Doc. No. 16, 99th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1986) [hereinafter Haiti BIT].
8. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ment, Dec. 6, 1983, United States-Senegal, S. Treaty Doc. No. 15, 99th Cong. 2d
Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Senegal BIT].
9. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ments, Dec. 3, 1985, United States-Turkey, S. Treaty Doc. No. 19, 99th Cong. 2d
Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Turkey BIT].
10. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ment, May 2, 1986, United States-Grenada, S. Treaty Doc. No. 25, 99th Cong. 2d
Sess. (1986) [hereinafter Grenada BIT].
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investments of each party's nationals and companies in the territory of
the other. The BITs establish minimum standards of treatment for
investments and mechanisms for enforcement of rights arising under the
treaties or investor-to-state agreements. This Article traces the develop-
ment of the BIT, describes the BIT's principal provisions, and analyzes
how negotiations of the ten signed BITs modified those provisions.
The Article is intended to serve two purposes. The first is to assist
in the task of interpreting the text of a particular BIT. It analyzes the
ten signed BITs based on the author's personal experience with BIT
negotiations and a review of the BIT negotiating history contained in
State Department files."' This Article is, however, the author's own
analysis and is in no sense an official statement of the United States Gov-
ernment's interpretation of the BITs.
The Article's second purpose is to address the general problem of
treaty interpretation, particularly in the case of multiple agreements
which, like the BIT's, were negotiated from a single model text.' 2
Although the Article does not provide a theoretical framework for inter-
preting all such agreements, it does provide one source of data from
which to develop such a framework. 13
Four provisions form the core of the BIT. The first of these is the
"treatment provision."' 4 This provision imposes both relative and
absolute standards on the host state's treatment of foreign investment.
The absolute standards require the host state to provide covered invest-
ment with fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, and
treatment which in no case is less than that required by international
law. The absolute standards also prohibit arbitrary and discriminatory
treatment. The relative standards generally require the host state to
treat covered investment no less favorably than investment of its own
nationals ("national treatment") or of nationals of any third country
("most-favored-nation treatment" or "MFN treatment").
The second core provision is the "expropriation provision." 15 This
provision prohibits expropriation of covered investment unless the
expropriation meets the following criteria. It must be for a public pur-
pose, nondiscriminatory, in accordance with due process of law, consis-
11. Unfortunately, the negotiating history is silent on a number of the more curi-
ous changes found in the BITs. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 173-76. In
addition, much of it remains classified and cannot be cited or directly referred to in
public documents.
12. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
13. For some comments on this subject generally, see Vandevelde, Treaty Interpre-
tation from a Negotiator's Perspective, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281 (1988).
14. See infra notes 107-99 and accompanying text. The author uses the term
"treatment provision" to refer collectively to certain specific clauses of the BIT.
Other clauses relating to the treatment of investment are not considered for reasons
of space.
15. See infra notes 200-88 and accompanying text. The author uses the term
"expropriation provision" to refer collectively to certain specific clauses of the BIT.
Other clauses related to the expropriation of investment are not considered for rea-
sons of space.
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tent with any agreements between the expropriating state and the
expropriated investor, and accompanied by prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation.
The third core provision is the "transfers provision."1 6 This provi-
sion guarantees the investor the right to transfer freely in and out of the
host country payments related to an investment.
The final core provision is the "disputes provision."' 7 This provi-
sion gives investors the right to binding arbitration of disputes between
the investor and the host State regarding the investment. Although the
other three core provisions all have some antecedents in earlier U.S.
bilateral treaty practice, the BITs represent the first United States bilat-
eral treaty series to provide for arbitration of investment disputes
between investors and host states.18
I. The Development of the BIT
A. Early FCN Treaties
The United States first obtained treaty protection for United States
investment abroad through brief provisions inserted in a long series of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties ("FCNs"). 19 Until
recently, however, purposes of investment protections were merely inci-
dental to the FCNs, which focused upon trade and navigation. 20
FCN agreements date from the founding of the Republic. Benjamin
Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Silas Deane negotiated the first FCN, with
France, shortly after the signing of the Declaration of Independence. 2 1
The treaty, signed in 1778, established trade between the two countries
on a most-favored-nation basis and adopted certain principles of mari-
time trade related to war. The United States concluded similar agree-
ments with the Netherlands in 1782,22 and with Sweden in 1783.23
In 1784, following the end of the War of Independence, Congress
established a commission consisting of Benjamin Franklin, John Adams,
and Thomas Jefferson to negotiate additional FCNs and renegotiate the
16. See infra notes 289-380 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 381-490 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 381-389 and accompanying text.
19. The term "FCN" is a generic one. Not all the treaties in this series bear that
title. The earliest agreements, for example, typically were called treaties of "amity
and commerce." See 20 I.L.M. 565 (1981) (State Department compilation of FCNs
still in force as of December 1980).
20. See S. BEMIs, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 25-29, 65-84,
10 1-10 and 200-02 (1965) (describing the early history of FCN agreements). See also
J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, § 734 (1906).
21. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, United States-France, 8 Stat.
12, T.S. No. 83.
22. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Oct. 8, 1782, United States-Netherlands, 8
Stat. 32, T.S. No. 249.
23. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Apr. 3, 1783, United States-Sweden, 8 Stat.
60, T.S. No. 346.
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three existing treaties. 24 The United States signed agreements with
Prussia in 1785,25 and Morocco in 1787.26 In 1794 the United States
signed an FCN with England, 27 and a comparable agreement with Spain
in 1795.28
From the beginning of the nineteenth century until the mid-1960s
the United States negotiated several additional waves of FCNs. 29 Typi-
cally, these agreements provided for MFN treatment with respect to
trade, mutual guarantees against discrimination, exchange of consuls,
and duties of parties with respect to neutral trade in time of war.
Investment protection provisions did not play a prominent part in
these early FCNs. Of the four principal provisions of the BIT, only the
treatment provision is found in early nineteenth century FCNs. The
early FCNs imposed an absolute standard of treatment for the property
of the other party's nationals 30 by guaranteeing "special protection" 3'
or "full and perfect protection."
3 2
24. S. BEMIS, supra note 20, at 66.
25. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, May 17, 1785, United States-Prussia, 8 Stat.
84, T.S. No. 292.
26. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Jan. 1787, United States-Morocco, 8 Stat.
100, T.S. No. 244-1.
27. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, United States-
England, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105. This was the infamous "Jay Treaty."
28. Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation, Oct. 22, 1795, United States-
Spain, 8 Stat. 138, T.S. No. 325.
29. The earliest trade agreements were with the European powers, then the
United States' primary trade partners. As trade expanded in other directions, the
United States tried to negotiate FCN agreements establishing a bilateral treaty basis
for advantageous commercial relations. S. BEMIS, supra note 20, at 65-66.
Thus, in the early nineteenth century the United States negotiated a long series of
FCN agreements with the newly formed Latin American republics following their
break from Spain. Agreements were negotiated with the Central American Confed-
eration in 1824, Colombia in 1825, Brazil in 1828, Mexico in 1831, Chile in 1832,
Venezuela in 1836, Ecuador in 1849, New Granada in 1846, Peru-Bolivia in 1851,
Argentina in 1853 and Bolivia in 1858. Id. at 201.
Similarly, the opening of trade with the Far East was accompanied by an FCN
agreement with China in 1844 and with Japan in 1854. Id. at 345, 356. Among the
earliest forays of United States diplomacy into the affairs ofsub-saharan Africa was an
FCN agreement in 1884 with the International Association of the Congo, an organi-
zation established by Belgium for the purpose of securing an empire on the conti-
nent. Id. at 575.
30. These early FCNs also included a right of access to courts, a provision which
appears in the BITs as well. See infra note 89. The development of that right, in the
FCNs or in the BITs, is beyond the scope of this Article.
31. See, e.g., General Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Consular Privileges, Dec. 6,
1870, United States-El Salvador, art. XIII, 18 Stat. 725, 730, T.S. No. 310, at 1554
[hereinafter 1870 El Salvador FCN]; Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, May 13, 1858, United States-Bolivia, art. XIII, 12 Stat. 1003, 1010, T.S.
No. 32, at 8 [hereinafter 1858 Bolivia FCN]; General Convention of Peace, Amity,
Navigation and Commerce, Oct. 3, 1824, United States-Colombia, art. X, 8 Stat. 306,
310, T.S. No. 52, at 295 [hereinafter 1824 Colombia FCN].
32. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 4, 1859,
United States-Paraguay, art. IX, 12 Stat. 1091, 1094, T.S. No. 272, at 8 [hereinafter
1859 Paraguay FCN]; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, July 27,
1853, United States-Argentina, art. VII, 10 Stat. 1005, 1008, T.S. No. 4, at 22 [here-
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By the mid-nineteenth century, antecedents of the BIT's expropria-
tion provision prohibited the seizures of "vessels, cargoes, merchandise
and effects" of the other party's nationals without payment of "equitable
and sufficient compensation."13 3 Later treaties broadened this guarantee
to "property" generally. 34 The FCNs also forbade the confiscation of
debts or other property during hostilities.3 5
Toward the end of the century, FCNs began to address currency
transfer restrictions. An 1881 FCN with Serbia guaranteed the right to
"export proceeds of the sale of property" without paying higher duties
than nationals of the host state or any third state.36 Protection against
currency restrictions thus was relative rather than absolute. FCNs of
that period also began to include relative standards of treatment for
investment.3 7 FCNs concluded in the late nineteenth century guaran-
teed either national treatment, MFN treatment, or both for commercial
activities in each party's territory.3 8
During the 1920s and 1930s, the United States negotiated a series
of FCNs containing a uniform protection of investment provision.3 9
The absolute treatment standard language guaranteed "the most con-
stant protection and security" and the protection "required by interna-
tional law."'40 The relative treatment standard language guaranteed
MFN treatment, national treatment, or both for commercial activity.4 1
The expropriation provision provided that "property [of the other
party's nationals] shall not be taken without due process of law and with-
inafter 1853 Argentina FCN]; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, July
10, 1851, United States-Costa Rica, art. VII, 10 Stat. 916, 920, T.S. No. 62, at 343
[hereinafter 1851 Costa Rica FCN].
33. See, e.g., 1870 El Salvador FCN, supra note 31, art. VIII; General Treaty of
Peace, Amity, Navigation and Commerce, Dec. 12, 1846, United States-New Gra-
nada, art. VIII, 9 Stat. 881, T.S. No. 54, at 304 [hereinafter 1846 New Granada FCN].
34. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 24, 1891, United States-
Congo, art. III, 27 Stat. 926, T.S. No. 60, at 4 [hereinafter 1891 Congo FCN].
35. 1870 El Salvador FCN, supra note 31, at art. XXVII; 1846 New Granada FCN,
supra note 33, at art. XXVIII.
36. Treaty of Commerce, Oct. 14, 1881, United States-Serbia, art. II, 22 Stat.
963, 964, T.S. No. 319, at 1614 [hereinafter 1881 Serbia FCN].
37. See id.
38. 1891 Congo FCN, supra note 34, at art. 1; 1881 Serbia FCN, supra note 36, at
art. 1.
39. See, e.g, Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 8, 1938,
United States-Liberia, art. 1, 94 Stat. 1739, T.S. No. 956 [hereinafter 1938 Liberia
FCN]; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Feb. 13, 1934, United
States-Finland, art. 1, 49 Stat. 2659, T.S. No. 868, at 1; Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Consular Rights, June 19, 1928, United States-Austria, art. 1, 47 Stat.
1876, T.S. No. 838, at 2; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights,June
5, 1928, United States-Norway, art. 1, 47 Stat. 2135, T.S. No. 852, at 1; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Apr. 20, 1928, United States-Latvia, art.
1, 45 Stat. 2641, 2641, T.S. No. 765, at 1; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Con-
sular Rights, Dec. 7, 1927, United States-Honduras, art. 1, 45 Stat. 2618, 2618, T.S.
No. 764, at 1; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Dec. 23, 1925,
United States-Estonia, art. 1, 44 Stat. 2379, 2379. T.S. No. 736, at 1.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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out payment of just compensation."-42 Although currency transfer pro-
visions were not common, at least one of the FCNs in this series
provided MFN or national treatment for certain transfers.
43
The Trade Agreements Act of 1934,4 4 authorizing negotiation of a
series of reciprocal trade agreements, diminished the FCN's importance
as the United States's primary instrument of international trade policy.
The United States's signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT"), 4 5 which obliged all contracting parties to afford MFN
treatment with respect to trade, further eroded the FCN's importance.
4 6
The GATT's multilateral provisions largely obviated the need for the
FCN's bilateral trade obligations.
B. The Modern FCN Treaty Series
Following World War II, the United States negotiated a new series of
FCNs ("the modern FCNs"). 4 7 This was the first series of United States
treaties in which the protection of United States investment abroad was
a primary goal.4 8 The United States negotiated these treaties using a
model text derived from the FCNs concluded during the 1920s and
1930s. The earlier FCNs served as the model because they provided an
existing framework into which new provisions for investment protection
could be inserted and they were demonstrably acceptable to potential
treaty partners. 49 Moreover, the FCNs covered a diverse range of sub-
jects with respect to which concessions could be made in return for
investment protection. 50 Indeed, contemporary commentators believed
that a treaty limited to investment-specific provisions would be "unreal-
istic and inadequate."' 5 1 They also believed that the FCN trade provi-
sions helped establish a generally favorable investment climate,
42. Id.
43. See 1938 Liberia FCN, supra note 39, at art. 10.
44. Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48 Stat. 943 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-54 (1982)).
45. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 3689,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188.
46. Id. at art. I.
47. See generally H. HAWKINS, COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS: PRINCI-
PLES AND PRACTICE (1951) (discussing the modem FCNs); R. WILSON, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW STANDARD IN TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES (1953); R. WILSON, UNITED
STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1960); Walker, Modern Trea-
ties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1958); Walker, Treaties
for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United States Practice, 5
AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1956) [hereinafter Walker, Protection of Foreign Investment]; Wil-
son, A Decade of New Commercial Treaties, 50 AM.J. INT'L L. 927 (1956); Wilson, Property-
Protection Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (1951);
Wilson, Postwar Commercial Treaties of the United States, 43 AM.J. INT'L L. 262 (1949).
48. See generally Walker, Protection of Foreign Investment, supra note 47.
49. Id. at 230.
50. Id. at 243-44.
51. E.g., id. at 244. Walker recognized a need for special-purpose agreements on
topics too specialized for FCNs, specifically taxation and government guarantees of
certain investments. Id.
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furthering the protection of United States investment abroad. 5 2
The modem FCNs contained antecedents to three of the four BIT
core provisions. 53 First, both aspects of the treatment provision were
largely anticipated. As a relative standard of treatment, they guaranteed
that certain types of investment of a national of one party would be
given national and MFN treatment by the other party with respect to
certain types of transactions, 5 4 a protection that the BITs broadened. 55
The modem FCNs contained antecedents to all but one of the absolute
standards present in the BIT treatment provision.5 6
Second, the modem FCNs contained an expropriation provision
that guaranteed prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.
Although the BITs revised and expanded the wording of this provision,
the protection afforded remains essentially the same.5 7
Finally, the modem FCN continued protection against exchange
controls, 58 although not as extensive as that provided by the BITs. 59
Nevertheless, the modem FCNs marked the first time that the United
States had negotiated a series of bilateral agreements that protected
investors from exchange controls.
The United States successfully negotiated modem FGN agreements
with major developed countries but had difficulty concluding them with
third world states. The United States ultimately negotiated twenty-one
such agreements, 60 beginning with Taiwan in 1946,61 and concluding
52. Id. at 244.
53. Although the modem FCNs did not guarantee to investors the right to third-
party arbitration of disputes with the host states, they did provide that state-to-state
disputes over the agreement's interpretation or application be submitted to the
International Court ofJustice. This provision has a counterpart in the BITs. See, e.g.,
Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 23, 1962, United States-
Luxembourg, art. XVII, 14 U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306, at 12 [hereinafter Luxem-
bourg FCN]; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 28, 1956, United
States-Korea, art. XXIV, 8 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947, at 17 [hereinafter Korea
FCN]; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951, United
States-Israel, art. XXIV, 5 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948, at 26 [hereinafter Israel
FCN]; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and NavigationJan. 21, 1950, United States-
Ireland, art. XXIII, 1 U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155, at 18 [hereinafter Ireland FCN];
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, United States-Italy,
art. XXVI, 63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965, at 42 [hereinafter Italy FCN].
54. See infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 119-36 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 129-41 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 200-32 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 303-12 and accompanying text.
60. See Luxembourg FCN, Korea FCN, Israel FCN, Ireland FCN, and Italy FCN,
supra note 53. See also Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, May 29, 1966,
United States-Thailand, 19 U.S.T. 5843, T.I.A.S. No. 6540 [hereinafter Thailand
FCN]; Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, United States-Togo, Feb. 8, 1966,
18 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 6193 [hereinafter Togo FCN]; Treaty of Amity and Eco-
nomic Relations, Apr. 3, 1961, United States-Viet-Nam, 12 U.S.T. 1703, T.I.A.S. No.
4890 [hereinafter Viet-Nam FCN]; Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Naviga-
tion, Feb. 21, 1961, United States-Belgium, 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432 [here-
inafter Belgium FCN]; Convention of Establishment, Nov. 25, 1959, United States-
Cornell International Law Journal
with Togo and Thailand in 1966.62
C. Initiation of the BIT Program
Just as the United States's FCN program was winding down, several
European countries were commencing negotiation of new bilateral
investment protection agreements ("BIPAs") 63 with a large number of
developing and developed countries. 64 Between 1962 and 1972, for
example, West Germany entered into forty-six BIPAs, and Switzerland
twenty-seven. 65 During that same period, the United States negotiated
only the two FCNs with Togo and Thailand.6 6 The European BIPAs
differed from the modem FCNs in that they were concerned solely with
investment protection.
The active BIPA programs contrasted sharply with the moribund
American FCN program. Increasingly, the United States business com-
munity and Congress agitated for an investment protection treaty pro-
gram comparable to that of the Europeans. 67
France, 11 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S. No. 4625 [hereinafter France FCNJ; Treaty of
Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Dec. 20, 1958, United States-Mus-
cat and Oman Dependencies, I 1 U.S.T. 1835, T.I.A.S. No. 4530 [hereinafter Muscat
and Oman FCN]; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 27, 1956,
United States-Netherlands, 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942 [hereinafter Nether-
lands FCN]; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United
States-Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024 [hereinafter Nicaragua FCN];
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United
States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 [hereinafter Iran FCN]; Treaty of
Friendship and Commerce, Nov. 12, 1954, United States-Pakistan, 12 U.S.T. 110,
T.I.A.S. No. 4683 [hereinafter Pakistan FCN]; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States-West Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No.
3593 [hereinafter Germany FCN]; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,
Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter
Japan FCN]; Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, Sep. 7, 1951, United States-
Ethiopia, 4 U.S.T. 2134, T.I.A.S. No. 2864 [hereinafter Ethiopia FCN]; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 1, 1951, United States-Denmark, 12
U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797 [hereinafter Denmark FCN]; Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 3, 1951, United States-Greece, 5 U.S.T. 1829,
T.I.A.S. No. 3057 [hereinafter Greece FCN]; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946, United States-Taiwan, 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871
[hereinafter Taiwan FCN].
61. Taiwan FCN, supra note 60.
62. See supra note 60.
63. As used herein, "BIPA" refers to non-United States investment protection
agreements, whereas "BIT" refers only to the United States bilateral investment
treaty program.
64. From 1962 to 1977, West Germany entered into forty-six BIPAs, the Swiss
twenty-seven, and the Netherlands sixteen. See generally INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPTrES, INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION
TREATIES (1983).
65. See id.
66. See supra text accompanying note 62.
67. A GAO report noted that the United States had modem FCNs with only two
African countries, while the Federal Republic of Germany, as ofJune 30, 1974, had
signed BIPAs with twenty-six African countries. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
NATIONALIZATION AND EXPROPRIATION OF U.S. DIRECT PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT:
PROBLEMS AND ISSUES (1977). Aware of the European success, groups like the Inter-
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New developments in international law also encouraged the devel-
opment of an investment treaty program. In 1974, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States.68 Article 2.2(c) of the Charter provided that each state has the
right "[t]o nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign
property in which appropriate compensation should be paid by the State
adopting such measures, taking into account ... all circumstances that
State considered pertinent." 69 This standard of appropriate compensa-
tion under the circumstances conflicted with the United States belief
that traditional international law required full compensation for expro-
priations. The United States hoped, however, that a network of recently
negotiated bilateral investment treaties would show that, despite states'
political statements in fora such as the General Assembly, actual state
practice as embodied in treaties conformed to the traditional standard of
compensation. 70 Moreover, a series of expropriations of U.S. invest-
ment during the 1960s and 1970s underscored the need for strong
investment protection, 7 ' while the rapid growth of United States over-
seas investment put more wealth at risk of expropriation. 7 2
In 1977 the State Department responded to these considerations by
proposing a new series of bilateral investment treaties. 73 Unlike the
modern FCNs, which were directed primarily at developed countries,
the BITs were targeted at developing countries. The BITs had three
national Chamber of Commerce and the State Department's Advisory Committee on
Transnational Enterprises encouraged initiation of a bilateral investment treaty pro-
gram during the 1970s. In Congress, Senators Claiborne Pell and Frank Church
both wrote to the State Department in 1977 urging negotiation of additional invest-
ment protection agreements. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, though prior to
the BIPAs, also provided a Congressional mandate to negotiate additional invest-
ment protection agreements. The Act provides in pertinent part that "the President
shall ... accelerate a program of negotiating treaties for commerce and trade, includ-
ing tax treaties, which shall include provisions to encourage and facilitate the flow of
private investment to, and its equitable treatment in, friendly countries and areas
participating in programs under this chapter .... Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
22 U.S.C. §§ 2151, 2351(b) (1982).
68. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), at 50, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1975).
69. Id. at art. 2.2(c).
70. For a treatment of the conflict in expropriations law, see Dolzer, New Founda-
tions of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 553 (1981).
71. Gantz reports 87 instances of expropriatory acts during a two year period in
the early seventies. See Gantz, The Marcona Settlement. Vew Forms of Negotiation and
Compensation for Nationalized Property, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 474 n.2 (1977). See generally
Rogers, Of Missionaries, Fanatics, and Lawyers: Some Thoughts on Investment Disputes in the
Americas, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1978).
72. From 1975 to 1985, the book value of United States direct investment in the
Less Developed Countries increased from $19 billion to almost $75 billion (testi-
mony of Harvey E. Bale,Jr., Assistant United States Trade Representative before the
Senate Foreign Relations Comm., Aug. 11, 1986) (unpublished testimony).
73. During the Carter Administration, these proposals took the form of memo-
randa circulated in the State Department. After the election of Ronald Reagan in
1980, the State Department moved out of the drafting stage and became increasingly
involved in negotiations.
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purposes: (1) to provide greater protection for United States invest-
ment in those countries with which the United States negotiated BITs,
(2) to reaffirm that the protection of United States foreign investment
remained an important element of United States foreign policy, and (3)
to establish a body of practice to support the United States view of inter-
national law governing the protection of foreign investment.
The first step was to develop a model negotiating text through
interagency consultations. The drafters began with a model text used to
negotiate modern FCNs, which they stripped of provisions unrelated to
investment protection. This core was expanded to strengthen or add
greater specificity to the FCN formulations. The drafters also drew
upon the successful example set by the European BIPAs.
Stripping the modern FCN to its core investment provisions
reflected a change in philosophy. In the 1950s, the FCN negotiators
believed it necessary to use non-investment concessions to entice treaty
partners.7 4 The BIT negotiators of the 1980s believed that potential
treaty partners would perceive investment protection to be mutually
beneficial and thus non-investment incentives would not be necessary. 75
Indeed, far from regarding the non-investment provisions of the FCNs
as inducements, the negotiators regarded them as unnecessary compli-
cations which would increase the difficulty of negotiating new
agreements.
Developing a model text was a difficult process. Significant inter-
agency differences over the scope and content of the BIT program
emerged almost immediately. Efforts to resolve these differences and to
produce a draft negotiating text were not successful until 1980, when
the United States commenced BIT negotiations with Singapore. These
negotiations were unproductive and were eventually abandoned. In
December 1981, an interagency team completed a significantly revised
model negotiating text, which was in use weeks later in ultimately suc-
cessful negotiations with Egypt and Panama.
Developing a model text was also a continuous process. Experience
in the early rounds of negotiations, primarily with Egypt and Panama,
suggested the need for improvements in the December 1981 model text.
The United States negotiating team produced a series of revised models
through 1982, resulting in a model dated January 21, 1983 ("the 1983
draft"). 76 Each new model became available for use in existing negotia-
tions and served as the principal text for negotiations commenced after
its completion. The 1983 draft became available in the course of, or
74. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
75. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. The U.S. government believed
that BITs should be negotiated only with countries which already perceived them as
desirable reflections of an existing policy in favor of foreign investment, obviating
the need for inducements.
76. "Treaty between the United States of America and Concerning
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment" (Jan. 21, 1983) (on file
at the office of the Cornell International Law Journal).
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served as the principal negotiating text for, negotiations for eight of the
ten7 7 signed BITs.
Experience with the 1983 draft revealed the need for further
improvements, particularly to simplify some of its wordier passages.
Accordingly, United States negotiators developed a streamlined model,
dated February 24, 1984 ("the 1984 draft"). They used the 1984 draft
as a supplementary text in several existing negotiations, and as the pri-
mary negotiating text for the Turkey and Grenada BITs. 78 Although
much shorter, the 1984 draft is similar in organization to the 1983 draft
and essentially identical in the protections it affords. 79 As this Article is
written, the 1984 draft remains the current negotiating text, although
the revision process continues.
D. Negotiation of the BITs
After developing a model text, United States negotiators approached
friendly developing countries which they believed might be interested in
concluding a BIT. Those expressing interest were provided with a copy
of the current model text. If the other country remained interested after
reviewing the text, a round of face-to-face negotiations generally fol-
lowed. In some cases, the other nation's negotiating team appeared at
the first round with a completely revised counter-draft. More often, the
negotiations proceeded entirely from the United States model, with dis-
cussion confined to those provisions which the other country found
unclear or objectionable."0
The United States negotiating stance throughout was low key.
Although the United States briefed potentially interested countries
about the BIT program, it exerted no pressure to start negotiations.
The United States did not want the BITs to be an instrument for chang-
ing the investment policies of a developing country, but rather a reflec-
tion of existing policy. For that reason, the United States did not offer
to make concessions in other areas to entice a country into signing a
BIT. Similarly, the United States was willing to make few concessions in
the BIT itself.8 ' If a potential BIT partner was unwilling to accept the
77. The exceptions were the BITs with Turkey, supra note 9, and Grenada, supra
note 10, which used the 1984 draft as the primary negotiating text.
78. "Treaty Between the United States of America and Concerning
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment" (Feb. 24, 1984) (on
file at the office of the Cornell International Law Journal). The Panama BIT, supra
note 2, aptly illustrates the use of new 1984 draft in existing negotiations. The BIT
follows the 1983 draft's organization but in many respects is worded more closely to
the 1984 draft. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
79. See infra text accompanying note 101.
80. For further elaboration upon the process of BIT negotiations, see Vande-
velde, supra note 13.
81. Where concessions were made, United States policy was generally to place
them in a protocol, annex, or agreed minute appended to the main text of the BIT.
Concessions often were in the form of exceptions to a general principle, and the
negotiators thought it desirable to highlight the principle in the main text, while
accumulating exceptions, qualifications and explanations in a single place outside the
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substance of the agreement as proposed, then in the United States view
it did not have the policy toward foreign investment that the BIT was
intended to reflect, and negotiation of a BIT with such a country would
therefore be undesirable.
This negotiating stance was reflected in candor by the United States
concerning the potential benefits offered by BITs. The primary United
States interest in concluding BITs was to protect existing investment
while reaffirming the United States understanding of traditional interna-
tional law on foreign investment.8 2 Developing countries saw BITs as a
means of attracting new United States investment. United States negoti-
ators were candid, however, about the lack of evidence that BITs actu-
ally would attract new investment.8
3
This divergence of interests between the United States and its nego-
tiating partners gave rise to a difficult problem during BIT negotiations.
Negotiators from other countries repeatedly sought to limit various BIT
protections to new investment. They believed that extending such pro-
tections to existing investors would constitute a "windfall" to those
investors who came to the host country without any such guarantees.
The United States resisted any distinctions in the protection afforded
existing and new investment. The United States did not want to create
two classes of overseas investors, some with greater protection than
others. First, it was thought that this would give later investors a kind of
government-induced competitive advantage. Second, in the absence of
any certainty that future investment would occur, the United States con-
sidered a BIT that did not apply to existing investment to be in one
sense illusory. Finally, the State Department also thought that the Sen-
ate would be far less likely to give its advice and consent to a BIT lacking
the enthusiastic support of existing investors.
Another problem during negotiations arose from the structure of
the BIT. The drafters had developed the BIT by expanding upon sim-
pler provisions in the modern FCNs as well as borrowing language from
successfully negotiated European BIPAs. 84 Although the drafters usu-
ally added new language in order to broaden the protections of the
modern FCNs, in some instances their purpose was simply to clarify the
protections already present in modern FCNs. As the drafters identified
potential ambiguities, they sought to eliminate them by inserting still
main text. These addenda nevertheless are integral parts of the BIT. In some
instances, the parties either explicitly or implicitly signaled the importance of the
protocols. Thus, article XIII(5) of the Egypt BIT provides that "[t]he attached
Annex and Protocol are integral parts of this Treaty." In the case of the Zaire and
Senegal BITs, the parties signed the protocol as well as the treaty text, while the case
of the Morocco BIT they signed once, at the end of the protocol.
82. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
83. Factors other than legal considerations, such as the lack of supporting infra-
structure or the small size of domestic markets, may deter new investment in devel-
oping countries. The United States generally refused requests by various BIT
partners to include provisions requiring the parties to promote investment by their
nationals and companies in the territory of the other party.
84. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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more, often redundant, language. Longer provisions, however, were
more likely to raise objection from potential treaty partners, due either
to redundancy or to confusing or inelegant language. Although these
objections were purely formal, the United States negotiators were reluc-
tant to accept changes because of their concern that any modification,
even the elimination of redundancy, might be interpreted as a substan-
tive concession. In effect, the BIT's "improvements" on the modern
FCN's language occasionally could prove counterproductive. The draft-
ers alleviated this problem in part by the preparation of the 1984 draft,
which considerably shortened many BIT provisions without altering
their substance.8 5
Where changes were necessary, the United States negotiators pre-
ferred to use existing language, particularly that with an established
meaning in international practice. They commonly took language from
earlier BIT models or previously-signed BITs. They avoided novel lan-
guage when possible because it might be perceived as weaker.
The sequential negotiations of several treaties from a single model
text caused a final set of problems. Once the United States made a con-
cession to one country, it became difficult to deny that concession to
countries in subsequent negotiations.8 6 United States negotiators
feared that each new BIT negotiation would begin with demands for all
previous concessions. In some instances, the United States could rebuff
a country's demand for a previously-made concession by pointing out
that the United States had made the first concession in return for a con-
cession the later party considered unacceptable. 87 In general, however,
the best remedy was not to make the concession in the first place.
H. The Substance of the BIT
Although different model texts were in use during the BIT negotiations,
the 1983 draft served as the principal text during the most active negoti-
ation period. It differed from its immediate predecessors only in minor
respects. The successor 1984 draft significantly revised the language,
but not the substance, of the 1983 draft. Thus, the 1983 and 1984 drafts
are the primary reference points for analyzing the ten signed BITs.
The 1983 draft contains thirteen articles. Article I defines certain
85. Compare the 1983 draft treatment provision, infra note 119, with the 1984 draft
treatment provision, infra note 125. Compare also the 1983 draft expropriation provi-
sion, infra note 208, with its 1984 counterpart, infra note 208.
86. This point should be kept in mind when considering the analysis of the signed
BITs. Analyzing particular BIT provisions in a vacuum is potentially misleading in
that concessions made by the United States may be balanced by concessions from the
other party in other provisions not discussed herein. Although that circumstance
does not affect the substance of any provision under consideration, it precludes gen-
eralizations about whether one BIT is "stronger" or "weaker" than another without
reviewing the entire BIT.
87. On the other hand, the fact that one state had made a concession sometimes
made that concession more palatable to other states.
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important terms in each of the treaties.88 Article II contains the first of
the substantive provisions analyzed in this Article, standards of treat-
ment for investment.8 9 Article III contains the second substantive pro-
vision analyzed herein, conditions for expropriation. 90 Article IV
concerns compensation for damages due to war.9 ' Article V, the third
substantive provision analyzed here, guarantees free transferability of
currency by investors.9 2 Article VI obliges the parties to engage in con-
sultations and information exchanges.93 Article VII contains the last
substantive provision considered here, settlement of investment dis-
putes.94 Article VIII concerns disputes between the parties over inter-
pretation or application of the treaty.9 5 The subsequent articles, IX to
88. Article I defines the following terms: (a) company; (b) company of a party; (c)
investment; (d) own or control; (e) national of a party; and (f) return.
89. Article II, entitled "Treatment of Investment," covers: (1) the right to MFN
and national treatment with respect to establishing investment; (2) the right to MFN
and national treatment with respect to investment once established; (3) authorization
of exceptions to national treatment in specified sectors; (4) the right to certain abso-
lute standards of treatment of investment; (5) the right of entry of aliens in connec-
tion with investment and for investors to select top managerial personnel; (6) the
right of competitive equality with state-owned investment; (7) prohibition on certain
performance requirements; (8) the right of access to local courts; (9) obligation to
make investment laws public; and (10) definition of national treatment in the case of
a federal republic. See infra notes 107-99 and accompanying text.
90. Article III, "Compensation for Expropriation," provides for: (1) a prohibi-
tion on expropriations unless in accordance with specified conditions; (2) an obliga-
tion to compensate investors of the other party who hold any interest in expropriated
property; and (3) the right of investors to prompt judicial review of any expropria-
tion. See infra notes 200-88 and accompanying text.
91. Article IV, "Compensation for Damages Due to War and Similar Events,"
provides for: (1) the right to MFN and national treatment with respect to damages
caused by armed conflict with third parties or certain internal disturbances; (2) the
right to restitution or prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for such dam-
ages; and (3) the right to free transferability of compensation.
92. Article V, "Transfers," provides for: (1) the right that transfers related to an
investment shall be free; (2) the right of investors to select the currency to be trans-
ferred; and (3) authorization to require currency reports, withhold income taxes, and
enforce judgments. See infra notes 289-380 and accompanying text.
93. Under Article VI, "Consultation and Exchange of Information," parties have
an obligation to: (1) consult on treaty matters; and (2) endeavor to provide invest-
ment information.
94. The provisions of Article VII, "Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
One Party and a National or Company of the Other Party," include: (1) the scope of
the article; (2) an obligation to consult and use previously-agreed procedures to
resolve investment disputes with investors; (3) the procedure for submission of the
dispute to conciliation or binding arbitration; (4) that recovery from collateral
sources will not diminish liability of host state to the investor; (5) the right of compa-
nies to invoke arbitration against state of incorporation; and (6) exclusion from scope
of article of disputes involving official export credit, guarantee, or insurance pro-
grams. See infra notes 381-490 and accompanying text.
95. Article VIII, "Settlement of Disputes Between the Party Concerning Interpre-
tation or Application of This Treaty," covers: (1) a requirement of effort to resolve
disputes through consultations and other diplomatic channels; (2) the right of either
party to submit disputes to binding arbitration; (3) the composition of arbitral tribu-
nal; (4) the right of either party to request the President of the International Court of
Justice to act as appointing authority for the arbitral tribunal; (5) the procedure for
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XIII, cover, respectively, preservation of rights, 9 6 measures not pre-
cluded by the treaty, 97 taxation,9 8 the treaty's applicability to political
subdivisions, 99 and the treaty's entry into force, duration, and
termination.1 0 0
The 1984 draft was similarly organized, but with three principal
changes. First, the drafters merged article IV, concerning property
losses in time of war or civil disturbances, into article III, relating to
expropriation generally. Second, they created a new article VIII,
excluding from the investor-to-state and state-to-state disputes provi-
sions certain disputes arising under government credit, guarantee, or
insurance arrangements. This language had appeared in articles VII
and VIII of the 1983 draft. Third, they eliminated as unnecessary article
XII, concerning application of the BIT to political subdivisions. 10 1 The
replacing arbitrators; (6) the schedule for conduct of arbitration; (7) provisions that
the tribunal shall decide by majority vote, its decisions shall be binding, and expenses
shall be equally borne by the parties unless the tribunal otherwise directs; (8) a
requirement that the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure adopted by the United
Nations International Law Commission be used, unless otherwise agreed; (9) exclu-
sion from the scope of the Article of disputes submitted to investor-to-state concilia-
tion or arbitration; and (10) exclusion from the scope of the Article of disputes
involving official export credit, guarantee, or insurance programs.
96. Under Article IX, "Preservation of Rights," the Treaty shall not derogate
from: (a) the laws of either party; (b) international legal obligations; or (c) contrac-
tual obligations of either party which provide a higher level of protection than that
afforded by the BIT.
97. Article X, entitled, "Measures Not Precluded By This Treaty," contains: (1) a
provision that the BIT shall not preclude measures necessary to maintain public
order, fulfill obligations with respect to the maintenance of international peace or
security, or protect a party's essential security interests; and (2) authorization of spe-
cial formalities involving establishment of investment.
98. Article XI, "Taxation", includes: (1) an obligation to strive for fairness and
equity in a party's tax treatment of investment of the other party's nationals and com-
panies; and (2) a provision that the BIT shall apply to tax matters only with respect to
expropriation, transfers, and the observance of terms of an investment agreement or
authorization, except in the latter case where the matter is subject to the disputes
provision of a convention for the avoidance of double taxation.
99. Article XII, "Application of This Treaty to Political Sub-Divisions of the Par-
ties," provides that the BIT shall apply to political subdivisions of the parties.
100. Article XIII, "Entry Into Force, Duration, and Termination of the BIT," con-
tains: (1) an obligation to exchange ratifications as soon as possible; (2) a provision
that the BIT shall enter into force 30 days after the exchange of ratifications, shall
remain in force for 10 years and thereafter unless terminated, and shall apply to
investments existing at the time of its entry into force; (3) the right of parties to
terminate after ten years upon one-year's written notice; and (4) a provision that the
BIT shall apply for ten years to investments made after entry into force.
101. Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State George P. Shultz to President
Ronald Reagan (Feb. 20, 1986), reprinted in Panama BIT, supra note 2. The following
table correlates the articles of the 1983 and 1984 drafts:
Substance 1983 Draft 1984 Draft
Definitions Article I Article I
Treatment Provision Article II Article II
Expropriation Provision Article III Article III
War/Civil Disturbance Article IV Article III
Transfers Provision Article V Article IV
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1984 draft also modified language and organization within articles. 0 2
Although all of the provisions play some role in the BIT's invest-
ment protections, the United States Government regarded four provi-
sions as the most important: The treatment, expropriation, transfers,
and disputes provisions. The balance of this Article analyzes the content
of these four provisions and assesses the principal modifications made
to each during the course of negotiating the ten signed BITs. 10 3 In part
to illustrate the effects of negotiating sequential treaties from a single
model text,' 0 4 the Article analyzes the BITs in the order in which their
negotiations commenced. 10 5 The 1983 draft is the primary reference
point in analyzing the signed BITs, with the 1984 draft serving as a sec-
ondary reference point.' 0 6
A. Treatment of Investment
The nineteenth century FCN provisions were the earliest antecedents to
the BIT's treatment provision. Early nineteenth century FCNs imposed
absolute standards of investment protection.' 0 7 FCNs of the latter part
of the nineteenth century regularly included relative standards, requir-
ing national treatment of investment, MFN treatment, or both. 10 8
Most modern FCNs lacked a single provision which can be regarded
as the counterpart to the BIT treatment provision. Rather, the modern
FCNs included a number of articles establishing various absolute and
relative standards of treatment for covered investment. 10 9 The most
important of the relative standards of treatment required the host coun-
Consultations Article VI Article V
Disputes Provision Article VII Article VI
State-to-State Disputes Article VIII Article VII
Disputes Exclusion Articles VII,VIII Article VIII
Preservation of Rights Article IX Article IX
Measures Not Precluded Article X Article X
Taxation Article XI Article XI
Political Subdivisions Article XII omitted
Entry/Termination Article XIII Article XII
102. These changes are too numerous to list. They are immaterial to the analysis
herein.
103. The ten signed BITs contain numerous minor wording changes from the
1983 or 1984 drafts, which are of no substantive significance. These generally are
disregarded in the following discussion. Substantive concessions outside these four
provisions also generally are not treated.
104. See supra text accompanying note 86.
105. The comparative analysis of the BITs proceeds in chronological order of
negotiation, primarily because contemporaneous BITs were negotiated from the
same model text, facilitating the comparative process. The utility of this approach is
limited, however, since some BITs required much more time to negotiate than
others. For example, the Egypt BIT was the first on which negotiations commenced,
but the eighth on which they were completed.
106. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
109. For the United States the BIT defines "national treatment" as the treatment
that each of the 50 states accords companies of the other 49 states, rather than that
which it provides to its own citizens. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. II(10).
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try to provide nationals and companies of the other party with national
and MFN treatment when "engaging in" various commercial, industrial,
and financial activities. 110 Other provisions provided MFN treatment,
national treatment, or both with respect to other aspects of doing busi-
ness or investing in the host country, such as obtaining patents,1 1 1 or
acquiring property.' 12
Notwithstanding these general rights to MFN and national treat-
ment, the modem FCNs also contained a provision reserving to either
party the right to limit the legal entitlement of nationals and companies
of the other party to establish, acquire, or carry on enterprises in certain
sectors of the host's economy. 1 13 These limitations were required to be
on an MFN basis. 1 4 New limitations generally were not to apply to
enterprises existing when the limitations became effective. 15
The modem FCNs imposed absolute standards on the treatment of
investment by host countries which foreshadowed BIT provisions. First,
they provided that each party accord "equitable treatment" to the prop-
erty of nationals and companies of the other. 16 Second, such property
was to receive "the most constant protection and security" within the
110. "Engaging in" covered all phases of establishing and operating these enter-
prises. The list of activities varies among the various FCNs. See, e.g., Netherlands
FCN, supra note 60, at art. VII(l) and (4); Nicaragua FCN, supra note 60, at art. VII(I)
and (4);Japan FCN, supra note 60, at art. VII(l) and (4); Israel FCN, supra note 53, at
art. VII(I) and (4); Greece FCN, supra note 60, at art. XII(1); Ireland FCN, supra note
53, at art. VI(1)(a) and (3). Some of the modem FCNs provided only for national
treatment in this regard. See, e.g., Luxembourg FCN, supra note 53, at art. VI(1);
Belgium FCN, supra note 60, at art. VI(2); France FCN, supra note 60, at art. V(1).
111. See, e.g., Luxembourg FCN, supra note 53, at art. 5; Belgium FCN, supra note
60, at art. V; France FCN, supra note 60, at art. VIII(I); Netherlands FCN, supra note
60, at art. X(1); Nicaragua FCN, supra note 60, at art. X(1); Pakistan FCN, supra note
60, at art. X(I); Israel FCN, supra note 53, at art. X; Greece FCN, supra note 60, at art.
X; Japan FCN, supra note 60, at art. X; Ireland FCN, supra note 53, at art. VI(1)(b).
112. See, e.g., Luxembourg FCN, supra note 53, at art. IX; France FCN, supra note
60, at art. VII; Muscat and Oman FCN, supra note 60, at art.VI(1); Netherlands FCN,
supra note 60, at art. IX; Nicaragua FCN, supra note 60, at art. IX; Pakistan FCN, supra
note 60, at art. IX; Japan FCN, supra note 60, at art. IX; Israel FCN, supra note 53, at
art. IX; Ireland FCN, supra note 53, at art. VII(2).
113. See, e.g., Netherlands FCN, supra note 60, at art. VII(2);Japan FCN, supra note
60, at art. VII(2); Israel FCN, supra note 53, at art. VII(2); Nicaragua FCN, supra note
60, at art. VII(2); Belgium FCN, supra note 60, at art. VI(5); Luxembourg FCN, supra
note 53, at art. VI(2).
114. See, e.g., Netherlands FCN, supra note 60, at art. VII(4); Nicaragua FCN, supra
note 60, at art. VII(4);Japan FCN, supra note 60, at art. VII(4); Israel FCN, supra note
53, at art. VII(4). MFN treatment was not always guaranteed. See, e.g., Luxembourg
FCN, supra note 53, at art. VI; Belgium FCN, supra note 60, at art. VI.
115. See, e.g., Luxembourg FCN, supra note 53, at art. VI(2); Belgium FCN, supra
note 60, at art. VI(5); Netherlands FCN, supra note 60, at art. VII(2); Nicaragua FCN,
supra note 60, at art. VII(2); Japan FCN, supra note 60, at art. VII(2).
116. See, e.g., Luxembourg FCN, supra note 53, at art. I; Belgium FCN, supra note
60, at art. I; France FCN, supra note 60, at art. I; Muscat and Oman FCN, supra note
60, at art. IV(1); Netherlands FCN, supra note 60, at art. I(1); Nicaragua FCN, supra
note 60, at art. I; Pakistan FCN, supra note 60, at art. I; Israel FCN, supra note 53, at
art. I; Greece FCN, supra note 60, at art. I; Ireland FCN, supra note 53, at art. VI(1).
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territory of the host party." 17 Third, neither party was permitted to take
"unreasonable and discriminatory measures" that would impair the
legally acquired rights or interests within its territory of nationals and
companies of the other.' 18
With respect to relative standards, the treatment provision of the
1983 draft BIT modified the approach taken by the majority of modern
FCNs. 1" 9 While the modern FCNs enumerated rights to national or
117. See, e.g., Netherlands FCN, supra note 60, at art. VI(1); Nicaragua FCN, supra
note 60, at art. VI(1); Pakistan FCN, supra note 60, at art. VI(1); Japan FCN, supra
note 60, at art. VI(1); Israel FCN, supra note 53, at art. VI(1); Greece FCN, supra note
60, at art. VII(I); Ireland FCN, supra note 53, at art. VIII(2); Italy FCN, supra note 53,
at art. V(1).
118. See, e.g., Luxembourg FCN, supra note 53, at art. IV(2); Belgium FCN, supra
note 60, at art. IV(2); Muscat and Oman FCN, supra note 60, at art. IV(1); Nether-
lands FCN, supra note 60, at art. VI(3); Nicaragua FCN, supra note 60, at art. VI(3);
Pakistan FCN, supra note 60, at art. VI(3); Japan FCN, supra note 60, at art. V(1);
Israel FCN, supra note 53, at art. VI(4); Greece FCN, supra note 60, at art. VIII; Ire-
land FCN, supra note 53, at art. V.
119. The text of article II(l) through (4) of the 1983 draft [hereinafter the 1983
draft treatment provision] is as follows:
ARTICLE II
TREATMENT OF INVESTMENT
1. Each Party shall endeavor to maintain a favorable environment for invest-
ments in its territory by nationals and companies of the other Party and
shall permit such investments to be established and acquired on terms
and conditions that accord treatment no less favorable than the treat-
ment it accords in like situations to investments of its own nationals or
companies or to nationals and companies of any third country, whichever
is the most favorable.
2. Each Party shall accord existing or new investments in its territory of
nationals or companies of the other Party, and associated activities, treat-
ment no less favorable than that which it accords in like situations to
investments and associated activities of its own nationals or companies or
of nationals or companies of any third country, whichever is the most
favorable. [There follows a lengthy definition of associated activities,
omitted here.]
3. (a) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this Article, each Party
reserves the right to maintain limited exceptions to the standard of
treatment otherwise required if such exceptions fall within one of the
sectors or matters listed in the Annex to this Treaty. Each Party
agrees to notify the other Party of all such exceptions at the time this
Treaty enters into force. Moreover, each Party agrees to notify the
other Party of any future exceptions falling within the sectors or mat-
ters listed in the Annex, and to maintain the number of such excep-
tions at a minimum. Other than with respect to ownership of real
property, the treatment accorded pursuant to this subparagraph shall
not be less favorable than that accorded in like situations to invest-
ments and associated activities of nationals or companies of any third
country. However, either Party may require that rights to engage in
mining on the public domain shall be dependent on reciprocity.
(b) No exception introduced after the date of entry into force of this
treaty shall apply to investments of nationals or companies of the
other Party existing in that sector at the time the exception becomes
effective.
4. Investment of nationals and companies of either Party shall at all times
be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection
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MFN treatment for specified investments with respect to certain transac-
tions, paragraph two of the 1983 draft treatment provision requires that
all investment of nationals and companies of the other party, once estab-
lished in the host country, receive the better of MFN or national treat-
ment in all matters generally. 120
Paragraph one of the 1983 draft's treatment provision covers the
right to establish or acquire new investment in the host country. Parties
must provide nationals and companies of the other party with MFN and
national treatment with respect to this right. 121
Paragraph three of the 1983 draft treatment provision permits
exceptions to the general rules in paragraphs one and two. Specifically,
parties have the right to designate certain sectors of their economies in
which they may limit the other party's right to national treatment.1 22
These sectors must be listed in an Annex to the BIT. Such future excep-
tions are to be kept "at a minimum" and shall not apply to any invest-
ment existing at the time the exception is created. 123 Moreover, with
two exceptions, the parties must continue to provide MFN treatment to
nationals and companies with respect to the establishment of investment
in these designated sectors of the economy.124 Each party is required to
and security in the territory of the other Party. The treatment, protection
and security of investment shall be in accordance with applicable national
laws, and shall in no case be less than that required by international law.
Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary and discriminatory
measures the management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment,
acquisition, expansion, or disposal of investment made by nationals or
companies of the other Party. Each Party shall observe any obligation it
may have entered into with regard to investment of nationals or compa-
nies of the other Party.
1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. II(1)-(4).
Article II contained additional material regarding the treatment of investment. For
reasons of space, however, these additional paragraphs will not be considered in this
Article and thus will not be included in references to the treatment provision. Com-
pare 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. II.
120. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. II. The BIT does not require identical treat-
ment, but treatment which is no less favorable. Covered investment may be treated
differently than investment of nationals of the host state or third states, so long as the
difference is not unfavorable. An exception to the general right of MFN and national
treatment is article XI, which exempts taxation from the coverage of article II, but
imposes a general requirement of "fairness" and "equity" in the taxation of covered
investment.
121. Id at art. II(l). Article X(2) of the 1983 and 1984 drafts permits each party to
prescribe special formalities in connection with the establishment of investment by
nationals or companies of the other party, provided that such formalities do not
impair the substance of any treaty rights.
122. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. II(3)(a).
123. Allowifig exceptions to the national treatment standard makes a BIT easier to
negotiate and defuses political objections to foreign investment in especially sensitive
sectors, thereby reducing the risk that the BIT will be violated after entering into
force.
124. First, the obligation to provide MFN treatment does not apply to the owner-
ship of real estate. Certain states within the United States restrict alien ownership of
real property in ways which could be inconsistent with such an obligation. Applying
the BIT MFN obligation to real estate ownership would have, from the United States
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notify the other of existing and future exceptions to national treatment
in the listed sectors.
The 1984 draft merged these first three paragraphs of the 1983
draft treatment provision into a single paragraph, article IH(1), without
changing the substance of the provision.'
25
The BIT requires national and MFN treatment for investment and
"associated activities." Article IH(2) of the 1983 draft contains a lengthy
illustrative, non-exclusive list of such activities to clarify the scope of the
term. 126 The 1984 draft omits the list but defines "associated activities"
in article 1.127 The term is intended to have the same scope in both
viewpoint, the undesirable effect of requiring that American states provide national
treatment to nationals and companies of our BIT partners. But see 1853 Argentina
FCN, supra note 32, at art. XIII, for one FCN agreement that contains national treat-
ment provisions for real estate.
Second, the parties also reserved the right to limit the right of establishment in the
mining industry to strict reciprocity. The Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30
U.S.C. § 181 (1982), necessitates this exception by providing that United States cor-
porations owned by aliens may lease federal land for purposes of mineral exploita-
tion only if the alien's country grants similar or like privileges to United States
citizens and corporations.
125. Article II(1) and (2) of the 1984 draft [hereinafter the 1984 draft treatment
provision] reads as follows:
ARTICLE II
1. Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities associated
therewith, on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situa-
tions to investment or associated activities of its own nationals or compa-
nies, or of nationals or companies of any third country, whichever is the
most favorable, subject to the right of each Party to make or maintain
exceptions falling within one of the sectors or matters listed in the Annex
to this Treaty. Each Party agrees to notify the other Party before or on
the date of entry into force of this Treaty of all such laws and regulations
of which it is aware concerning the sectors or matters listed in the Annex.
Moreover, each Party agrees to notify the other of any future exceptions
with respect to the sectors or matters listed in the Annex, and to limit
such exceptions to a minimum. Any future exceptions by either Party
shall not apply to investment existing in that sector or matter at the time
the exception becomes effective. The treatment accorded pursuant to
any exceptions shall not be less favorable than that accorded in like situa-
tions to investments and associated activities of nationals or companies of
any third country, except with respect to ownership of real property.
Rights to engage in mining on the public domain shall be dependent
upon reciprocity.
2. Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment,
shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in no case be accorded
treatment less than that required by international law. Neither Party
shall in any way impair by arbitrary and discriminatory measures the
management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition,
expansion, or disposal of investments. Each Party shall observe an obli-
gation it may have entered into with regard to investments.
1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. II. Article II of the 1984 draft contains six other
paragraphs relating to the treatment of investment which for reasons of space will
not be analyzed herein or included in reference to the 1984 draft treatment
provision.
126. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. 11(2).
127. Id. at art. I(e).
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drafts. 128
Both drafts' treatment provisions include counterparts to three of
the absolute standards of treatment commonly required by the modem
FCNs. 129 First, investments of companies and nationals of the other
party must be accorded "fair and equitable treatment," the equivalent of
the "equitable treatment" required by the modern FCNs.' 3 0 Second,
this investment must "enjoy full protection and security," equivalent to
the modern FCN's "most constant protection and security" formula-
tion, 3 and similar to the language used in nineteenth century FCNs. 13 2
This clause requires protection from injurious activities by the govern-
ment and by private persons. Third, the BITs provide that neither party
may impair the investment of nationals or companies of the other by
"arbitrary and discriminatory measures."133 This clause recalls the
modern FCN's prohibition of "unreasonable or discriminatory meas-
ures."1 3 4 The 1983 draft further required that treatment of investment
be "in accordance with applicable national laws,"' 3 5 language dropped
from the 1984 draft. 13 6
The 1983 draft included two further requirements. First, the treat-
ment accorded investment must not be "less than that required by inter-
national law,"' 3 7 language that only occasionally appeared in the
modem FCNs with respect to property protection.13 8 Because intema-
tional law binds states even in the absence of this provision,' 3 9 the goal
128. The discussion of "associated activities" is beyond the scope of this Article.
129. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, art. 11(4); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. 11(2).
130. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. Cf art. XI(l), calling for "fairness
and equity" in tax matters.
131. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 31-32, 39 and accompanying text.
133. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. 11(4); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art.
11(2). "Discriminatory" measures include those which are intentionally discrimina-
tory, as well as those which are facially neutral but discriminatory in effect. The use
of "and" in the phrase "arbitrary and discriminatory" permits parties to take certain
actions, such as antitrust enforcement measures, which though arguably discrimina-
tory are not arbitrary.
134. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
135. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. II(4). Both the use of the modifier "appli-
cable" for national laws, and the remainder of the sentence, that such treatment
"shall in no case be less than that required by international law," suggests that if
national laws conflicted with international law, international law would govern.
136. References to national laws are inherently problematic in a treaty such as a
BIT. At best, they offer only limited protection since a state may change its national
laws. At worst, no matter how worded, they may tempt an arbitral tribunal to apply
the law of the host state rather than international law. Given the requirement of
national treatment, and the other absolute guarantees of the BIT, a requirement of
strict conformity with national law adds very little additional protection.
137. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. II(4). Where the BIT requires treatment
exceeding that required by international law, host states must abide by the higher
BIT standard.
138. See, e.g., Ireland FCN, supra note 53, at art. VIII(2).
139. States generally are not bound by customary international law principles to
which they have been persistent objectors. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAw 10-11 (2d ed. 1973). In a given case, however, this provision
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of this clause in part is to render the BIT and international law mutually
reinforcing. The BITs rely on international law to fill gaps and establish
minimum standards of treatment, thereby protecting against misinter-
pretations of the negotiated BIT texts. The incorporation of interna-
tional law into the BITs allows investors or their states to enforce
international legal norms in the investor-to-state arbitral disputes provi-
sion or the state-to-state disputes provision of the BITs. Moreover,
State practice under the BIT could strengthen the United States posi-
tion on international law, especially through the rendering of arbitral
decisions under these disputes provisions.
Second, each party must observe its investment obligations. 140 In
effect, any party's breach of an investment contract with an investor is a
treaty violation as well, for which the disputes provision provides a rem-
edy.i 4 1 This clause had no counterpart in the predecessor FCN
agreements.
Egypt
The treatment provision of the Egypt BIT contains several significant
departures from the language of the 1983 draft. 14 2 A new subparagraph
authorizes the parties to screen investment in accordance with national
plans, but only if the screening is done on an MFN and national-treat-
ment basis.1 43 Because the 1983 draft guaranteed with respect to the
right of establishment only MFN and national treatment, this clause
does not derogate from that draft.
A related clause grants Egypt the right to provide only MFN treat-
ment to United States investors wishing to establish investment in "lim-
ited sensitive geographic areas designated for exclusive Egyptian
investment." 14 4 This clause responded to "Egypt's public order and
could be interpreted as constituting a state's consent to a particular relevant principle
of customary international law to which it previously had objected.
140. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. II(4).
141. Where the BIT provides greater protection than a preexisting investment
agreement, the host state must provide this greater protection. Failure to do so
would not violate the investment agreement but would violate the BIT, which applies
to investment existing at the time it comes into force. Where the preexisting invest-
ment agreement provides greater protection than the BIT, article IX of the BIT spe-
cifically provides that the greater protection of the earlier agreement shall prevail
over any weaker BIT provision. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. IX(c). A failure
to provide the greater protection guaranteed by the investment agreement thus
would violate the investment agreement as well as article IX, providing two separate
bases for invoking the disputes provision. The violation of article IX also could pro-
vide a basis for state-to-state arbitration under article VII of the 1983 draft and article
VI of the 1984 draft.
142. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. II(1)-(4).
143. Id. at art. II(3)(b) (stating that "[e]ach Party retains the discretion to approve
investments according to national plans and priorities on a nondiscriminatory basis
consistent with paragraphs (1) and (3)(a) of this Article").
144. Id. at Protocol para. 3(1). As the text implies, this clause does not authorize
exceptions to national treatment with respect to investment already established at the
time an area is designated for exclusive Egyptian investment.
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national security concerns about foreign investment in certain sensitive
border regions." 145 Such restricted areas are to be kept to a minimum
and may not "substantially impair" the investment opportunities of
United States investors. 146 This approach is consistent with the 1983
draft which allows parties to designate certain sectors as exempt from
the national treatment requirement.
The Egypt BIT excludes from the obligation to provide MFN treat-
ment in excepted sectors any advantage which is provided "by either
party to nationals, or companies of a third country by virtue of a special
security or regional arrangement, including regional customs unions or
free trade areas."' 147 The same clause also excludes from the parties'
obligation to provide MFN treatment with respect to the right of estab-
lishment any benefit extended by virtue of membership in a customs
union. Egypt requested these changes because it is a member of the
Arab League. 148
Several deviations from the 1983 Draft in the final Egypt BIT are
not concessions to Egypt, but rather were based on the language of ear-
lier 1982 model texts which had been used to negotiate the Egypt BIT.
The most noticeable example is the absence of the 1983 draft's provi-
sion requiring certain absolute standards of treatment.1 49 Instead, the
Egypt BIT follows the 1982 drafts in providing that "[t]he treatment,
protection and security of investment shall never be less than that
required by international law and national legislation."' 5 0
Another example is omission of the phrase "in like situations" in
article II, paragraph 1, describing the standard of treatment for permit-
ting the establishment of new investments, although it remains in para-
graph 2, relating to the treatment of investments once established.' 5 1
This was the approach taken in the 1982 drafts, although the phrase was
145. Letter of Submittal to the President from Secretary George P. Shultz (May 20,
1986), reprinted in Egypt BIT, supra note 1 [hereinafter Egypt Submittal Letter] at XI.
This approach is consistent with the overall thrust of the BIT. For example, Article
XI also excludes from BIT coverage measures necessary for the maintenance of pub-
lic order or the protection of a party's security interests. Specifically providing for
Egypt's right to impose geographic restraints on foreign investments reduces the
likelihood of subsequent disagreement concerning whether such restrictions are jus-
tifiably related to the maintenance of public order or national security.
146. Id. at XI.
147. Id. "Regional" arrangements for Egypt would be those in the Mid-East or
Africa, but not Europe.
148. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at Protocol para. 4. Similar exceptions limited to
customs unions and free trade areas appear in the Morocco, Bangladesh, and Haiti
BITs. See infra notes 169, 180, and 184 and accompanying text.
149. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. II(4).
150. Egypt Submittal Letter, supra note 145, at XI. In the event of a conflict
between international and national law, international tribunals will apply the former.
See Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. VIII. See also Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO)
v. Libyan Arab Republic, 20 I.L.M. 1 (1981); TOPCO/CALASIATIC Arbitration, 17
I.L.M. 1 (1978). The use of the conjunction "and" in the phrase "international law
and national legislation" also appears in the Panama and Cameroon BITs.
151. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. II(1)-(2).
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inserted in both paragraphs of the 1983 draft. 15 2 This departure from
the 1983 draft may actually strengthen the article, for the phrase "in like
situations" arguably weakens the provision. Without that phrase, cov-
ered investment could claim the privileges provided to any investment
owned by nationals of the host state or third countries, not merely privi-
leges provided to such enterprises in like situations. Still, some notion
of comparability is implicit in any relative standard and thus it is debata-
ble how much the phrase really adds.
Finally, the negotiators altered the 1983 draft language in para-
graph 1 of article II, which provides that each party "shall ... permit
such investments" to be established on MFN and national treatment
basis. The negotiators instead inserted the phrase "in applying its laws,
regulations, administrative practices and procedures."' 153 This lan-
guage is from earlier 1982 model texts and does not alter the meaning
of the provision.15 4
Panama
The Panama BIT treatment provision is structured largely after the 1984
draft, with text taken from the 1983 draft. 15 5 The principle substantive
change is that the general right of MFN and national treatment is made
subject to laws and regulations in force at the time the parties enter the
Treaty. 15 6 As in the 1983 draft, future exceptions to national treatment
are permissible only in the sectors listed in the Annex, and these must
be on an MFN basis.' 5 7
152. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. II. The Zaire BIT reverses this pattern.
See infra text accompanying note 174.
153. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. 11(1).
154. Similar language appears in the Zaire and Bangladesh BITs. See infra notes
172, 179 and accompanying text. One change in the Egypt BIT treatment provision
not attributable to use of the 1982 drafts was the insertion of language drawn from
an Egypt-West Germany BIPA possibly limiting the applicability of the BIT to
existing investment. See Egypt Submittal Letter, supra note 145, at X. Applicability of
the BIT to existing investment generally is a subject outside the scope of this Article.
Negotiations also strengthened the 1983 draft language requiring parties to
"endeavor to maintain" a favorable environment for investment by rewording it to
read "[e]ach Party undertakes to provide and maintain a favorable environment...
although the word "undertake" was not intended to have the same force as "guaran-
tee" or "ensure." Similar language appears in the Panama, Zaire, and Bangladesh
BITs. See infra notes 157, 171, and 178.
155. Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. II(1)-(2).
156. Id. at art. II(l). The Morocco BIT has a similar exception to the right of MFN
and national treatment with respect to the establishment of new investment only, not
the treatment of investment generally. See infra text at notes 163-64.
157. Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. 11(l). In addition, the clause expressly
authorizing the parties to impose restrictions on the right to engage in mining in the
public domain on a reciprocal basis was deleted, but the BIT effectively retained its
substance through language authorizing exceptions in existence when the BIT enters
into force. The 1983 draft language requiring parties to "endeavor to maintain" a
favorable environment for investment was strengthened by deletion of the words
"endeavor to." Identical language appears in the Bangladesh BIT and similar lan-
guage appears in the Egypt and Zaire BITs. See supra note 154, and see bifra notes 171
and 178.
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Cameroon
The treatment provision of the Cameroon BIT slightly rewords the 1983
draft language in several places, generally without substantive effect. 15 8
Paragraph 3 does contain one change of slight significance: the parties
are not required to notify each other of existing exceptions to the
national-treatment standard, only future ones. 159
Morocco
The Morocco BIT contains one important change. 160 It omits the 1983
draft language authorizing new exceptions to the national-treatment
standard.' 6 1 Additional exceptions by either party thus are permissible
only by Treaty amendment.' 62
Morocco also insisted on qualifying national treatment on entry of
new investment because of ownership provisions contained in its 1983
investment law. 163 Therefore, in the treatment provision of the
Morocco BIT, the right to national treatment regarding establishment of
new investment exists only "within the framework of [each Party's]
existing laws and regulations."'164 The effect of this qualification is to
authorize any exception to national treatment with respect to establish-
ment which is in place on the date of the treaty's entry into force. Any
additional exceptions to national treatment with respect to the right of
establishment would violate the BIT, unless the exception applied to
one of the sectors listed in the Annex. This deviation from the draft
158. Cameroon BIT, supra note 3, at art. II(l)-(4). For example, the phrase
"existing or new," which had modified "investments" in paragraph two, was used to
modify that term in paragraph one as well. The phrase was added to make clear that
the obligation to endeavor to maintain a favorable environment applied to both new
and existing investments. As a result of the insertion, however, a literal reading of
paragraph 1 indicates somewhat nonsensically that investors have a right to establish
"existing" investment. However, because the right of establishment includes the
right to acquire investment, a literal reading does contain some sense. Another non-
substantive change was that the requirement that the parties "maintain at a mini-
mum" the number of exceptions to national treatment in the sectors listed in the
Annex was reworded to require that such exceptions be "limit[ed] as much as
possible."
159. Id. at art. 11(3).
160. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at art. II(1)-(3).
161. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. 11(3).
162. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at art. II. The same is true of the Turkey BIT. See
infra note 198.
163. Letter of Submittal to the President from Secretary George P. Shultz (Febru-
ary 20, 1986), reprinted in Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at IX [hereinafter Morocco Sub-
mittal Letter].
164. See Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at art. II(1). In addition, these exceptions
apply only to the right to national treatment with respect to establishment. Once an
investment is established, the Morocco BIT, like the 1983 draft, requires the better of
MFN or national treatment with respect to such investment. The Panama BIT has a
similar exception which extends to the right of treatment generally and is not limited
to the right of establishment. See supra note 157. The Turkey BIT has a similar
exception which, like the Morocco BIT, is limited to the right of establishment but
which, unlike either the Morocco or Panama BITs, includes both laws in existence
when the BIT enters into force and subsequently enacted laws. See infra note 193.
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language, however, does not represent a concession by the United
States. All of the BITs allow the parties to specify sectors of the econ-
omy excepted from the obligation to provide national treatment.1,6 5
The Morocco BIT merely specifies one set of exceptions by reference to
a body of existing law.
The Morocco BIT moved the clause allowing parties to specify sec-
tors of the economy excepted from the requirement of national treat-
ment to paragraph 2 of the Protocol. 16 6 That clause lists the Moroccan
exceptions to national treatment, omitting the 1983 draft language
expressly providing that United States investors nevertheless retain the
right to MFN treatment with respect to investment in such sectors.16 7
The omission is unimportant, however, for the main text explicitly
grants MFN treatment.' 68 Paragraph 2(a) of the Protocol also autho-
rizes Morocco to exclude from its MFN obligation any advantage offered
to nationals of a third country required by virtue of Morocco's member-
ship in a common market, regional customs union, or free trade
association. 169
Paragraph 2(b) of the Protocol sets forth the sectors of the United
States economy excepted from the obligation to provide national treat-
ment. These include air transportation, banking, insurance, energy and
power production, and ownership of real estate. 170 The language used
is essentially the 1983 draft language and, therefore, includes the
express requirement of MFN treatment in the excepted sectors (as well
as language concerning real estate and mining rights).
The Morocco BIT contains no other significant deviations from the
1983 draft language, despite the numerous wording changes. The BIT
165. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
166. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at Protocol, para. 2.
167. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at Protocol, para. 2(a).
168. The right to MFN treatment in the excepted sectors was made explicit in the
1983 draft because the 1983 draft had subordinated the general right to MFN treat-
ment to paragraph 3 authorizing exceptions to the general obligation. In the case of
the Morocco BIT, the Protocol reserves to Morocco the right to give certain prefer-
ences to its nationals, but without derogating from its general obligation to provide
United States investors with MFN treatment. Cf Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at Proto-
col para. I (b), where the omission of this language effectively cuts off Turkey's obli-
gation to provide MFN treatment in the exception sectors. See infra text at note 194.
169. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at Protocol para. 2(a). Similar language also
appears in the Egypt, Bangladesh, and Haiti BITs. See supra note 147 and infra notes
181, 185. The Morocco Submittal Letter appears to be in error on this point. It
states that "[a]lso exempt from the national treatment requirement are advantages
extended to other countries by virtue of membership in a common market, regional
customs union, or free trade association." Morocco Submittal Letter, supra note 163,
at X. The text of the Morocco provision, however, states that "the Kingdom of
Morocco reserves the right to... extend to nationals or companies of a third country
advantages required by virtue of its participation or association with a common mar-
ket, regional customs union, or free trade area." Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at Pro-
tocol para. 2(a)(ii). By its terms, this would seem to derogate only from the right to
MFN treatment, leaving the right to national treatment intact. Thus, it would seem
that the right to MFN treatment, not national treatment, is what is qualified.
170. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at Protocol para. 2(b).
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omits the clause requiring treatment of investment according to a
party's own laws, which the 1984 draft also omits. The negotiators also
omitted the language requiring parties to endeavor to maintain a
favorable environment for investment.
Zaire
The treatment provision of the Zaire BIT provides that each party shall
"undertake," rather than merely "endeavor," to maintain a favorable
environment for investments by nationals of the other party, a strength-
ening of the provision. 171 The Zaire BIT then adds the qualifier that
this favorable environment is "under its laws, regulations, and adminis-
trative practices and procedures."' 72 This qualifying language presum-
ably makes explicit that, although the parties shall undertake to maintain
a favorable legal environment, they have no specific obligation respect-
ing the economic, social, or cultural environment.
One change to the treatment provision of the Zaire BIT is intrigu-
ing. The 1983 draft required national and MFN treatment of new and
existing investment "in like situations." 1 73 An early 1982 draft, how-
ever, lacked the phrase "in like situations" with respect to the right to
establish new investments, but included it with respect to the treatment
of investment once established, a pattern followed in the Egypt BIT.
174
The Zaire BIT reverses this pattern, omitting the phrase from the para-
graph dealing with the treatment of existing investments, while retaining
it in the earlier section dealing with the right of establishment.' 75
Another notable change was the narrowing of the 1983 draft's
requirement that the parties notify each other of all exceptions to
national treatment existing at the time the Treaty enters into force. The
language was limited to refer only to exceptions "of which [the Party] is
aware," 176 probably to accommodate Zaire's concern that it not be
charged with a treaty violation for any exceptions resulting from having
failed to notify the United States at the time the treaty entered into
171. See Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at art. 11(1). Similar strengthening language also
appears in the Egypt, Panama, and Bangladesh BITs. See supra notes 154, 157 and
infra note 178. The Morocco BIT, however, omits the sentence altogether.
172. Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at art. 11(l). The earlier 1982 model texts used simi-
lar language in the same location. The language was deleted from the 1983 draft. See
supra note 154 and accompanying text. Cf similar language in the Egypt and Bangla-
desh BITs, described supra note 154 and infra note 179, respectively.
173. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. II(1)-(2).
174. See supra text at note 152.
175. See text following note 152, suggesting that omission of the term "in like situ-
ations" arguably strengthens the provision. The Zaire BIT also deleted the word
"full" from the clause requiring that investment of nationals and companies of either
party enjoy "full protection and security." The change is cosmetic, however, since
the most constant protection and security of foreign investment was required by
international law. Treaty Protection of Foreign Investment, 84 DEP'T ST. BULL. 62 (1984)
[hereinafter Treaty Protection]. The next sentence of the Zaire BIT requires that cov-
ered investment be afforded treatment no less than that required by international
law.
176. Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at art. 2(a).
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force. The parties, of course, are obligated to notify each other of
existing exceptions of which they later become aware.
Bangladesh
The Bangladesh BIT somewhat strengthens the opening language of the
treatment provision's 17 7 first paragraph. The BIT stipulates that each
party "shall maintain" favorable conditions for investment by nationals
and companies of the other, rather than the more hortatory "endeavor
to maintain" language used in the 1983 draft. 178
The Bangladesh BIT moved the second paragraph of the treatment
article to the Protocol and amended it slightly. The clause requiring
each party to accord national and MFN treatment to investment of the
nationals of the other party was amended to read "shall accord, under
its laws and regulations," national and MFN treatment to such invest-
ment.179 To ensure that this change did not weaken the MFN require-
ment, the negotiators inserted a new sentence providing that the
"[a]pplication of laws and regulations shall not impair the substance of
the rights guaranteed by this treaty." 18 0 Finally, a further clause in the
Protocol excludes from the MFN obligation in article 11(2) any advan-
tages accorded to nationals of a third country by virtue of a party's bind-
ing obligations derived from membership in a regional customs union
or free trade area. 18
Haiti
The treatment provision of the Haiti BIT contains one significant dero-
gation from the 1983 draft language. It omits the requirement that each
party observe any obligations into which it has already entered with
respect to investments.1 82 The practical consequences of the omission
should be limited, however, because the Haiti BIT still grants investors
the right to third-party arbitration of disputes involving breaches of
investment agreements.' 8 3 Thus, investment agreements are enforcea-
ble under the BIT, notwithstanding the omission of this language. The
177. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 6, at art. II(1)-(3).
178. Id. at art. II(1). Identical language appears in the Panama BIT, see supra note
157. Similar language appears in the Egypt BIT, see supra note 154, and Zaire BIT, see
supra note 171.
179. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 6, at art. II(1); cf. Egypt and Zaire BITs, discussed
in the text at notes 153 and 173, supra.
180. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 6, at Protocol para. 1. The insertion of this sen-
tence is an excellent illustration of the overabundant caution United States negotia-
tors exercised at various points. As discussed supra at note 172, the phrase this
sentence qualifies was contained in an earlier United States draft (albeit in paragraph
I rather than paragraph 2 of the treatment provision) and generally was not regarded
by United States negotiators as prejudicial to United States investor interests.
181. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 6, at Protocol para. 2. Comparable language also
appears in the Egypt, Haiti, and Morocco BITs. See supra notes 148 and 169 and infra
note 186.
182. Haiti BIT, supra note 7, at art. II(1)-(4).
183. Id. at art. VII(2).
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chief consequence of its omission may be that breach of an investment
agreement will not necessarily constitute a breach of the BIT, and thus
the breaching country would not be answerable through the state-to-
state disputes clause.
Two other changes are worth noting. First, the Haiti BIT contains
language providing that neither party is required, except as otherwise
provided in the Treaty, to provide treatment more favorable than MFN
or national treatment to investments of the other party's nationals.1 8 4
That assertion seems to make explicit what was already implicit in the
Treaty. Second, another clause provides that the MFN treatment
requirement for investments in sectors set forth in the Annex would not
apply to advantages accorded to nationals of a third country by virtue of
a party's obligations to a regional customs union.1 85
Senegal
The Senegal BIT's treatment provision slightly rewords the first two
paragraphs of the 1983 draft, omitting the unnecessary phrase "which-
ever is most favorable."' 8 6 The sentence permitting either party to
require that rights to engage in mining on the public domain be condi-
tioned on reciprocity was broadened to "mining activities," 18 7 a phrase
intended to embrace any initial transformation of the mined product.
Finally, in the clause requiring parties to observe any investment com-
mitment, "commitment" was replaced by "engagement" in order to
meet a Senegalese assertion that the modified text would be more clear
in French. 18 8
Turkey
The treatment provision of the Turkey BIT is both narrower and
broader than that in the 1984 draft.' 89 It narrows the draft in two ways.
First, the right to national treatment with respect to establishment exists
only "within the framework of its laws and regulations," effectively sub-
ordinating that right to local law. 190 This concession is of limited
184. Id. at art. 11(11).
185. Id. at art. 11(12). Similar language also appears in the Egypt, Bangladesh, and
Morocco BITs.
186. Senegal BIT, supra note 8, at art. II(1)-(4). The BIT requires parties to afford
both MFN and national treatment to covered investments. Thus, the requirement
that the more favorable be afforded is implicit. The omitted phrase was intended to
clarify the intention of the paragraph, but it is in fact another example of BIT
redundancy.
187. Id. at art. II(3)(a).
188. Id. at art. II(4).
189. Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at art. II(1)-(3).
190. Id. at art. II(l). The President's Message to the Senate asserts that this lan-
guage also was used in the Morocco BIT. See Letter from Secretary of State George
P. Shultz to President Ronald Reagan (Feb. 19, 1986), reprinted in Turkey BIT, supra
note 9 [hereinafter Turkey Submittal Letter]. The Morocco BIT language, however,
is "within the framework of existing laws and regulations," a much narrower exception
(emphasis added). See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
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importance since all of the BITs allow the parties to exclude sectors
from national treatment with respect to establishment, subject to a
promise to maintain such sectors to a minimum.19 1 Second, negotiators
moved to the Protocol the 1984 draft's language permitting discrimina-
tion in certain sectors1 92 and omitted the express language reserving to
United States investors the right to MFN treatment.19 3 Unlike a similar
change in the Morocco BIT, this change represents a substantive
concession. 194
The Turkey BIT broadened the 1984 draft's treatment provision by
omitting the language authorizing the parties to add new sectors to
those excluded from national treatment.19 5 Thus, any new restrictions
on existing investment would require an amendment to the Treaty.
1 9 6
Because of the first limitation on the right of national treatment, ' 97 how-
ever, Turkey may impose new restrictions on the right of establishment
merely by enacting new local laws, as long as those laws do not derogate
from the general right of United States investors to MFN treatment.19 8
Grenada
The treatment provision of the Grenada BIT is identical to that of the
1984 draft.' 99
191. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. II(3)(a); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art.
11(1).
192. Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at Protocol para. 1.
193. Id. at Protocol para. 1(b).
194. The President's Message to the Senate reporting on this provision states,
apparently in error, that the Turkey BIT "permits limited exceptions to the national
treatment standard on an MFN basis for specified economic sectors and activities."
Turkey Submittal Letter, supra note 190, at IX. The language of the Protocol states
that "Turkey reserves the right to limit the extent to which nationals or companies of
the United States or their investments may establish, acquire interests in, or carry on
investment within Turkish territory [in certain listed sectors]. Turkey BIT, supra note
9, at Protocol para. 1(a). The reservation of right clearly is broad enough to permit
derogation from the right to both MFN and national treatment. For a discussion of
the comparable provision in the Morocco BIT, which does not permit derogations to
United States investors' MFN rights, see supra text accompanying note 168. The Tur-
key BIT retained the standard 1984 draft language excluding mining and ownership
of real estate from the MFN obligation with respect to the United States but not
Turkey. Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at Protocol para. 2(a).
195. Hence, the Turkey BIT also omits the language requiring the parties to notify
each other of future exceptions and stipulating that future exceptions shall not apply
to existing investments.
196. Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at art. II. Future exceptions are permissible only by
amendment in the Morocco BIT as well. See supra text accompanying note 162.
197. See supra text accompanying note 190.
198. The Submittal Letter notes that no future changes to the exceptions list are
possible without an amendment to the Treaty. Turkey Submittal Letter, supra note
190, at X. This conclusion is somewhat misleading because Turkey can derogate
from the right of United States investors to national treatment by changing local law.
199. Grenada BIT, supra note 10, at art. II(l)-(2).
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B. Compensation for Expropriation
The BIT, like the modem FCN series, incorporates the traditional
United States view of international law, requiring "prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation" for expropriated property. Secretary of
State Cordell Hull first articulated this standard on behalf of the United
States in a 1938 note to the Government of Mexico. 20 0 The United
States believed this standard to be in accordance with a rule established
by several earlier international arbitral and judicial decisions,2 0 1 as well
as long-standing United States policy.20 2
Other states, principally those of western Europe, were quick to
embrace Secretary Hull's formulation. 20 3 Mexico, however, responded
by denying its obligation to pay prompt, adequate, and effective com-
pensation,20 4 a position adopted by other Latin American and third-
world countries in the post-war period. 20 5
The developed nations have responded to the disagreement over
the customary international law of compensation for expropriation by
seeking to establish their version of the rule as customary state practice
through bilateral treaties with third-world nations. As of 1982, the State
Department had identified more than a hundred bilateral treaties incor-
porating the developed nations' view. 20 6
200. The relevant portion of the note stated that "no government is entitled to
expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without provision for prompt,
adequate, and effective payment." Note of Aug. 22, 1938, reprinted in III G. HACK-
WORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 658-59 (1942).
201. Chorzow Factory (Ger. V. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17; Lena Gold-
fields, Ltd. (1930) (unpublished opinion), discussed in 36 CORNELL L.Q. 42 (1950);
Shufeldt Case (U.S. v. Guat.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1080 (1929); Norwegian Ship-
owners Claim (Nor. v. U.S.), I R. Int'l Arb. Awards 308 (1922); Cape Horn Pigeon
Case (U.S. v. Russia), 9 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 63 (1902). The prompt, adequate, and
effective standard as now interpreted by the United States would seem to require
more than these earlier cases. For early policy statements on the standard, see note
202 infra.
202. Thus, for example, in 1922, Secretary of State Hughes advised the United
States Minister in China that the United States recognized China's right to take
United States nationals' property in China subject to payment of "just compensa-
tion." See III G. HACKWORTH, supra note 200, at 654. This was the formulation used
in the FCNs of that era. See supra text following notes 39-43. Two years later, Secre-
tary Hughes notified the United States embassy in Bucharest that Romania could
nationalize United States nationals' property subject to payment of "adequate com-
pensation." See V G. HACKWORTH, supra note 200, at 702-05. Indeed, as early as
1794, the United States had agreed in the Jay Treaty that it would make "full and
complete compensation" to British nationals for debts that the United States had
prevented them from collecting. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation,
United States-Great Britain, Nov. 19, 1794, at art. V, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105, at
593. The nineteenth century FCNs used the formulation "equitable and sufficient
compensation."
203. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 519 (3d ed. 1979).
204. See III G. HACKWORTH, supra note 200, at 655-65.
205. See generally Dolzer, supra note 70, for objections to the prompt, adequate, and
effective standard.
206. See Brief for the United States as Anicus Curiae, Kalamazoo Spice Extraction
Co. v. The Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th
Cir. 1984) (No. 82-1521).
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Although the requirement of prompt, adequate, and effective com-
pensation is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign investment policy, the United
States view in recent years recognizes an expropriation as lawful only if
it is for a public purpose, nondiscriminatory, and in accordance with due
process of law. 20 7 The BIT's expropriation provision imposes these
four requirements and one further condition on all takings of covered
investment and thus is the most comprehensive and detailed statement
of the United States view of the international law of expropriation ever
included in a United States bilateral treaty.
The BIT sets out the parties' obligations with respect to expropria-
tion or nationalization in article III of both the 1983 and the 1984
drafts.20 8 The BITs apply to both individual acts of expropriation as
well as expropriations that form part of a broad restructuring of the
207. The modem FCNs did not expressly refer to all of these additional require-
ments, but includes them implicitly by requiring that investment be treated in accord-
ance with international law. See, e.g., Israel FCN, supra note 53, at art. VI(3);
Netherlands FCN, supra note 60, at art. VI(4); Pakistan FCN, supra note 60, at art.
VI(4); Luxembourg FCN, supra note 53, at art. IV(3);Japan FCN, supra note 60, at art.
VI(3); Muscat and Oman FCN, supra note 60, at art. IV(2); Greece FCN, supra note
60, at art. VII(3); Belgium FCN, supra note 60, at art. IV(3). See also supra notes 103-
06. They expressed the requirement of prompt, adequate, and effective compensa-
tion generally in the equivalent formulation of "prompt payment of just compensa-
tion ... in an effectively realizable form." See infra note 260.
208. Article III(1) of the 1983 draft [hereinafter the 1983 draft expropriation pro-
vision] provides:
No investment or any part of an investment of a national or company of a
national of either Party shall be expropriated or nationalized by the other
Party or subjected to any other measure or series of measures, direct or indi-
rect tantamount to expropriation (including the levying of taxation, the com-
pulsory sale of all or part of an investment, or the impairment of deprivation
of its management, control or economic value), all such actions hereinafter
referred to as "expropriation," unless the expropriation:
(a) is done for a public purpose;
(b) is accomplished under due process of law;
(c) is not discriminatory;
(d) does not violate any specific provision on contractual stability or expro-
priation contained in an investment agreement between the national or
company concerned and the Party making the expropriation; and
(e) is accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective compensation.
Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated
investment. The calculation of such compensation shall not reflect any reduc-
tion in such fair market value due to either prior public notice or announce-
ment of the expropriatory action, or the occurrence of the events that
constituted or resulted in the expropriatory action. Such compensation shall
be paid without delay, shall be effectively realizable, shall bear current interest
from the date of expropriation at a rate equivalent to current international
rates, and shall be freely transferable at the prevailing market rate of exchange
on the date of expropriation.
1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. III(1). The 1983 draft contained two additional
paragraphs not discussed herein for reasons of space.
The final paragraph of the expropriation provision spelled out in detail certain
elements which the United States regards as implicit in the general standard of
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. See infra text accompanying notes
223-32. The length and obvious redundancy can be attributed to the drafters' desire
to cover every contingency, close every loophole, and remove every ambiguity.
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economy or some sector thereof, such as where a government expropri-
ates all oil companies or all banks. Article II governs those interferences
with property insufficient to amount to a taking.20 9
Article III also applies to indirect expropriation, "creeping expro-
priation," and partial expropriation. Article III defines indirect expro-
priation as including, but not limited to, the levying of taxation, 21 0
compulsory sales, or impairments of the management, control, or eco-
nomic value of a company. 21 1 The test is whether the host state's
actions have an effect tantamount to an expropriation. 2 12 A creeping
expropriation generally is one that a government effects through a series
of measures, each of which may be no more than an interference with
the property but which, taken together, amount to an expropriation. A
partial expropriation is a taking of part of the property.
The BIT implicitly recognizes that expropriation is lawful, provided
that it meets the five requirements. 21 3 First, the expropriation must be
for a public purpose.2 14 "Public purpose" is a broadly-construed
term, 21 5 but the intention is to prohibit expropriations that merely
Article III(1) of the 1984 draft [hereinafter the 1984 draft treatment provision]
contained a much shorter version than the 1983 draft, but provided the same protec-
tion as its counterpart in the 1983 draft:
Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or indi-
rectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization
(expropriation) except for a public purpose; in a nondiscriminatory manner;
upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation; and in
accordance with due process of law and the general principles of treatment
provided for in Article 11(2). Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair
market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the
expropriatory action was taken or became known; include interest at a com-
mercially reasonable rate from the date of expropriation; be made without
delay; be fully realizable; and be freely transferable at the prevailing market
rate of exchange on the date of expropriation.
Article III of the 1984 draft also contained two additional paragraphs that for reasons
of space will not be further considered.
While the BITs do not define the terms "nationalization" and "expropriation,"
they should be regarded for BIT purposes as synonymous with each other and with
the frequently used term "taking." A taking in the international legal context has
been defined as "[c]onduct attributable to a state that is intended to, and does, effec-
tively deprive an alien of substantially all the benefit of his interest in property....
even though the state does not deprive him of his entire legal interest in the prop-
erty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 192 (1965). See generally Christie, What Constitutes A Taking of Property Under
International Law?, 1962 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307. This Article uses the terms "expro-
priation," "nationalization" and "taking" interchangeably.
209. See supra note 126.
210. See, e.g., Corn Products Refining Co., 1955 I.L.R. 333-34, in which the United
States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission found that excessive taxation could
amount to an expropriation.
211. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. III.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. "[Tlhere is little authority in international law establishing any useful criteria
by which a state's own determination of public purpose can be questioned."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 185
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transfer property from one private party to another or which are carried
out as a political reprisal.
Second, the expropriation must be accomplished through due pro-
cess of law. 2 16 This means that the expropriation must be in keeping
with the laws of the expropriating state and the minimum standard of
international due process. The international standard would seem to
include a requirement of non-arbitrariness and of the availability ofjudi-
cial review.2 1
7
Third, the expropriation may not be discriminatory.2 18 That is, the
expropriation may not harm one or more investors solely on the basis of
nationality or some arbitrary basis. The national and MFN treatment
clauses of the treatment provision independently require that United
States investors not be treated in a discriminatory manner with respect
to nationality, 2 19 and the treatment provision also prohibits arbitrary
and discriminatory treatment. 2 20
Fourth, the 1983 draft explicitly provides that the expropriation
may not "violate any specific provision on contractual stability or expro-
priation contained in an investment agreement between the national or
company concerned and the Party making the expropriation. ' 22 1 This
clause prohibits a government from repudiating an investment agree-
ment as part of the act of expropriation. The 1984 draft replaced this
explicit provision with a cross-reference to the general requirement in
article 11(2) of the 1984 draft that "each Party ... observe any obligation
it may have entered into with regard to investments. '2 22
Fifth, the appropriation must be accompanied by prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation. 2 23 As commonly understood, prompt pay-
ment means payment within a reasonable time, i.e., as soon as necessary
formalities can be completed. 2 24 The phrase contemplates that the
expropriating government, at the time of taking, should have the ability
comment b (1965). See generally 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1036-62 (1967).
216. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. III.
217. Article 111(3) of the model BIT imposes an independent requirement that
expropriations be subject to judicial review. See supra note 90.
218. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. III.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 119-36.
220. See supra text accompanying note 133.
221. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. III.
222. 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. III.
223. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. III. For the United States Government's view
of the meaning of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, see Department of
State GIST, July 1978, excerpted in 1978 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 1226-27; Address of Richard Smith, Director of the Office of Invest-
ment Affairs, Department of State, at Vanderbilt University (Apr. 9, 1976), excerpted in
1976 DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 443-44 [hereinafter 1976
DIGEST]; M. WHITEMAN, supra note 215, at 1143-86.
224. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. III. Elsewhere in the expropriation provi-
sion, both the 1983 and the 1984 drafts require payment of compensation "without
delay." See supra note 208.
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to pay for the expropriated property and that actual payment is but a
matter of formality to be effected expeditiously.
Adequate compensation means payment of the fair market value of
the property as of the date of expropriation, 22 5 including interest from
the date of expropriation until the date of payment.2 26 The calculation
of fair market value should disregard any reduction in value caused by
the expropriating government's actions in carrying out the expropria-
tion or by public knowledge of the expropriation. 22 7 Fair market value
may be measured in any of several ways, depending upon the circum-
stances. In the case of an operating commercial enterprise, for example,
the fair market value of the enterprise generally is regarded as its value
as a "going concern."' 228 Fair market value reflects the price that a will-
ing seller and a willing buyer would have reached in a sale of the invest-
ment. Where a market does not exist for the asset, parties must derive a
hypothetical fair market value through indirect means. 229 In practice,
225. The BIT explicitly requires payment of fair market value. See supra note 208.
In addition, the United States regards fair market value as implicit in the prompt,
adequate and effective formulation. See generally Treaty Protection, supra note 175.
226. The BIT explicitly requires payment of interest from the date of expropria-
tion. The 1983 draft specified a rate "equivalent to current international rates." See
1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. III. The 1984 draft called for "a commercially rea-
sonable rate." See 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. III. The United States Govern-
ment regards the requirement of interest as implicit in the standard of prompt,
adequate and effective compensation. See Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 at 47; Norwegian Shipowners (Nor. v. U.S.), 1 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 308 (1922); OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property
[hereinafter OECD Convention], at art. 3, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 117 (1968); Treaty Pro-
tection, supra note 175, at 67 n.52; 8 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 215, at 1186-92.
227. In essence, the property is valued as if the expropriation had not occurred.
This is to prevent the expropriating government from driving down the value of a
company prior to expropriating it so that it can thereby reduce its compensation to
the owner. This requirement is explicit in both the 1983 and 1984 drafts. and is
regarded by the United States Government as implicit in the requirement of prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation. The former provides that the "calculation of
such compensation shall not reflect any reduction in such fair market value due to
either prior public notice or announcement of the expropriatory action, or the occur-
rence of the events that constituted or resulted in the expropriatory action." 1983
draft, supra note 76, at art. III. The 1984 draft uses the equivalent formulation that
compensation be calculated as of the time "immediately before the expropriatory
action was taken or became known." 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. III. This ele-
ment is discussed extensively in Treaty Protection, supra note 175. Authorities relied
upon by the United States Government include Lighthouse Arbitration, (France v.
Greece), 23 I.L.R. 299 (1956); Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.IJ. (ser. A)
No. 17; Norwegian Shipowners, (Nor. v. U.S.), 1 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 308 (1922);
Mariposa Claim, 7 Ann. Dig. 255 (1933); OECD Convention supra note 226, at art. 3
comment 9(a); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 188 comment b (1965).
228. See Treaty Protection, supra note 175, at 62; 1976 DIGEST, supra note 223, at 444
(address of Richard Smith describing the going-concern, replacement cost, and
book-value approaches).
229. One such method is the discounted cash flow method, whereby the total
amount ofan enterprise's future net income is discounted by the time value of money
and the probability that such income will in fact be received, to derive the present
value of the asset's future income. Another method is to value an asset with refer-
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the investor and the expropriating government rarely agree on the value
of the investment, making it necessary to negotiate or arbitrate the issue.
The BIT dispute provision, of course, specifies the procedure for resolv-
ing investor-state disputes. 23 0
Finally, effective compensation is compensation paid in a freely-
convertible currency at the prevailing market exchange rate calculated
on the date of expropriation. 23 l In other words, the investor must be
able to repatriate the compensation payment without delay.23 2
Egypt
The expropriation provision of the Egypt BIT deviates from the 1983
model in minor ways without changing the rights involved. 23 3 A few
changes simply make explicit that which the United States had regarded
as implicit in the 1983 draft.
23 4
ence to other comparable enterprises which have recently been assigned a fair market
value. See Treaty Protection, supra note 175, at n.58.
230. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. III; 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. III.
231. The 1983 draft explicitly requires that compensation be "effectively realizable
... and... freely transferable at the prevailing market rate of exchange on the date
of expropriation." 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. III. The 1984 draft requires that
compensation be "fully realizable; and be freely transferable at the prevailing market
rate of exchange on the date of expropriation." 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. III.
The United States Government regards these requirements as implicit in the require-
ment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. See supra note 223.
232. The transfers provision also establishes the right to transfer payments related
to an investment. See infra text accompanying notes 303-06.
233. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. III(1). One example is that the Egypt BIT
omits the illustrative listing of government actions considered tantamount to expro-
priation (e.g., levying of taxation, compulsory sale, impairment of management).
The general language, however, is broad enough to cover all these elements. The
omission was requested by Egypt to avoid domestic political controversy, but with no
intention of altering the substance of the provision. Second, the phrase "prompt,
adequate and effective compensation" is replaced by "prompt and adequate compen-
sation, freely realizable," a less commonly used but equivalent formulation. See
Egypt Submittal Letter, supra note 145, at XIII. Third, the lengthy 1983 provision
requiring that expropriation not violate any investment agreement's stabilization
provision is replaced by the broader requirement that expropriation not violate any
specific contractual engagement, the approach also used in the 1984 draft. See supra
text accompanying note 221. Fourth, the provision that compensation be freely
transferable at the "prevailing market rate of exchange" was modified to read "at the
prevailing rate of exchange for current transactions." Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art.
III(1). Fifth, the phrase "effectively realizable" is rendered as "freely realizable," an
equivalent formulation. Id. Finally, the Egypt BIT replaces the requirement that
compensation bear interest at a rate equivalent to current international rates with the
equivalent requirement that compensation "shall include payment for delay as may
be considered appropriate under international law." See Egypt Submittal Letter,
supra note 145, at XIII. The Morocco and Turkey BITs have a similar formulation.
See infra notes 263-64, 286 and accompanying text.
234. For example, the Egypt BIT specifies that compensation be calculated as of
the date of expropriation, a provision which the United States regards as implicit in
the 1983 draft. See Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. III(1). See also supra text accompa-
nying note 231. The 1984 draft was explicit: compensation is to be calculated as of a
time "immediately before" the expropriation. 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. III.
That, in effect, is what the Egypt BIT means. The Morocco and Turkey BITs include
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Paragraph nine to the Protocol clarifies that the phrase "events that
constituted or resulted in the expropriatory action" refers to conduct
attributable to the expropriating party and not to conduct of the
national or company. 23 5 That paragraph further stipulates that the
inclusion of article III(1)(e), requiring that expropriation not violate any
contractual provision, is without prejudice to the measure of compensa-
tion due in the event of expropriation. 23 6
By an exchange of letters on March 11, 1985, the parties agreed
that compensation in the event of expropriation "shall be determined in
a manner consistent with international legal norms and standards rather
than norms and standards that are particular to a specific domestic legal
system." 23 7 Although Egypt requested this exchange of letters, they
reflect the United States's intention in entering into the BIT.23 8
Panama
The Panama BIT expropriation provision makes minor modifications to
similar language. See infra text accompanying notes 262, 284. The principle is that
compensation should not reflect any reduction in value caused by the expropriation
or public announcement of it. See supra note 227. Similarly, the Egypt BIT expressly
extends the prohibition on expropriation except under certain circumstances to
include expropriations by political subdivisions of a party, language that makes
express the implicit understanding of the United States. See supra text accompanying
note 101. Also, the Protocol states that "the term 'prompt' does not necessarily
mean instantaneous." Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at Protocol para. 8. The intent is that
the party "diligently and expeditiously carry out any necessary formalities," id., a
formulation consistent with the United States view of the term. See supra text accom-
panying note 224; see also Egypt Submittal Letter, supra note 145, at XIII. The Sene-
gal BIT has a similar provision. See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
235. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at Protocol para. 9. Egypt was concerned that it
would be required to compensate an investor for loss in the value of its investment
caused by the investor's own outrageous conduct. The protocol language makes
clear that each party is chargeable for losses in value only if caused by such party's
own conduct.
236. Id. This clause was added at Egypt's request. Egypt was concerned that the
requirement in article III(l)(e) that expropriation not violate any specific contractual
engagement would, in the event of such expropriation, give rise to a claim by the
investor for additional compensation for breach of the contractual obligation. The
United States replied that any implication for damages would flow from the existence
of a stabilization clause in the investor's contract with Egypt, not from the presence
of article III(1)(e). Accordingly, the parties agreed to the protocol language specify-
ing that article III(1)(e) is without prejudice to the measure of compensation in the
event of an expropriation.
237. See Egypt Submittal Letter, supra note 145, at XIV.
238. This provision is implicit in the BIT requirement that treatment of investment
conform to international law. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. II(4). See Egypt Submit-
tal Letter, supra note 145, at XIV. The exchange of letters resulted from Egypt's
desire to preclude the use of the discounted cash flow method, described supra at
note 229, which Egypt seemed to regard as peculiar to United States law. The United
States contended that the discounted cash flow method is an established part of inter-
national law and accounting practice and must be available in an appropriate case to
an arbitrator for valuing expropriated property. The exchange of letters accom-
plishes the result sought by the United States by providing that compensation be
determined in accordance with international law.
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the 1984 draft provision, but none affect its substance.23 9 First, the
drafters reworded the requirement that expropriations be for a public
purpose to say "public or social purpose. ' 240 The public purpose
clause was already sufficiently broad that the rewording cannot be
regarded as effecting a substantive change. 24 1
Second, the Panama provision states that compensation shall be the
investment's "full value" instead of its "fair market value." 24 2 "Full
value," of course, was the formulation used in the modem FCN treaty
series and is synonymous with fair market value.2 43 In any event, the
Panama language retains the phrase "prompt, adequate, and effec-
tive,"'24 4 which establishes beyond doubt the requirement of fair market
value.24 5
Third, the Panama BIT requires the payment of interest, but omits
the requirement that it be paid from the date of expropriation.2 4 6 This
omission , however, is not substantive. The calculation of interest from
the date of taking until the date of payment is standard practice under
customary international law and, again, is implicit in the requirement of
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. 24 7
Fourth, the Panama BIT omits as unnecessary the requirement that
parties pay compensation at the prevailing market rate of exchange since
Panama uses United States currency. 248
Fifth, paragraph 4 of the Agreed Minutes adds the parties' under-
standing that, depending upon the circumstances, the estimate of full
value can be made using several methods of calculation.2 49 This idea
long has been part of United States expropriation policy and is implicit
in all of the BITs. 25 0
Finally, the Panama BIT provides that compensation shall be com-
puted as of the date immediately before the expropriatory actions
"became known" in place of "became known or was taken." 2 5 1 The
239. Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. IV(1).
240. Id.
241. See supra text accompanying note 215.
242. Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. IV(I).
243. See infra note 260. See generally Treaty Protection, supra note 175 at 62. The
Morocco BIT also uses the "full value" formulation. See infra note 261 and accompa-
nying text.
244. Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. IV(1).
245. Panama Submittal Letter, supra note 101, at X; see also supra text accompanying
note 225.
246. Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. IV(1).
247. See supra text accompanying note 226.
248. Panama Submittal Letter, supra note 101, at X.
249. Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. IV(l).
250. Panama Submittal Letter, supra note 101, at X. See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 228-29. The Haiti BIT has a similar provision. Haiti BIT, supra note 7, at
art. III(1). See infra text accompanying note 274.
251. The Haiti BIT takes a similar approach. See infra text accompanying note 276.
The Morocco BIT does not mention either announcement or occurrence of the
expropriation. See infra text accompanying note 265. The requirement that both ele-
ments be disregarded is implicit in the prompt, adequate, and effective standard. Id.
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change is insignificant since the knowledge of an expropriation is what
affects a property's fair market value. A secret expropriation presuma-
bly would have no effect on fair market value.
Cam roon
The expropriation provision of the Cameroon BIT is based on the 1984
draft, which became available during the negotiations. 25 2 The negotia-
tors made several modifications to the draft language without affecting
its substance. 253 Under the Cameroon expropriation provision, parties
value an investment "as of the date before the measures were taken, or,
as the case may be, as of the day before the measures contemplated were
made public,"'2 54 as opposed to the 1984 draft's conceptually indistin-
guishable standard, "immediately before the expropriatory action was
taken or became known." 25 5 Parties calculate interest at "current inter-
national rates," the phrase used in the 1983 draft.2 56 Parties also use
"the rate of exchange generally used by the IMF on that date." 25 7
Morocco
Negotiation of the Morocco BIT led to a complete redrafting of the
expropriation provision, although the parties' obligations are no differ-
ent from those set forth in the 1983 and 1984 drafts.25 8 The negotiators
The Panama BIT's expropriation provision also incorporates by reference article
11(2), instead of expressly requiring that expropriations not derogate from invest-
ment agreements. This is the 1984 draft's general approach. See supra note 208.
252. Cameroon BIT, supra note 3, at art. III(1).
253. See Unsigned Letter of Submittal from the Department of State to the Presi-
dent (May 6, 1986), reprinted in, Cameroon BIT, supra note 3, at IX [hereinafter Came-
roon Submittal Letter]. For example, the reference to expropriations occurring
"directly or indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation" was short-
ened to read "directly or indirectly" without affecting the provision's meaning. Id.
Similarly, the express prohibition on discriminatory expropriations was deleted, but
the Cameroon provision requires that expropriations be in accordance with article
11(4), which proscribes discriminatory measures and which requires that property be
protected in accordance with international law. Customary international law, in turn,
prohibits discriminatory expropriations. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrrED STATES § 166 (1965) (general prohibition on discrimi-
nation). Also, the Cameroon BIT omits the phrase requiring that compensation be
"fully realizable," but that requirement is embraced in the third component of the
"prompt, adequate, and effective" formula which the BIT retains. See supra notes
223, 231 and accompanying text.
254. Cameroon BIT, supra note 3, at art. III(1).
255. Article III(1) of the 1984 draft.
256. Id.
257. The phrase "that date" refers to the date of expropriation. See Cameroon
Submittal Letter, supra note 253, at IX. The Cameroon BIT transfers provision also
specifies that parties use the IMF rate of exchange. See infra text accompanying note
331.
258. The Morocco BIT's expropriation provision read as follows:
Article III
1. Nationalization or expropriation measures, or any other public measure
having the same effect or nature, which might be taken by either Party
against investments of nationals or companies of the Party, shall be
neither discriminatory nor taken for reasons other than a public purpose.
239
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reworded the requirement of prompt, adequate, and effective compen-
sation to require that an expropriating party "pay promptly just and
effective compensation. ' 259 The term "just compensation" commonly
appeared in the modem FCN treaty series and is widely understood to
be synonymous with the United States's use of "adequate" compensa-
tion. 260 To remove any doubt, the Morocco BIT further provides that
"compensation shall be equivalent to the full value of the expropriated
investment on the date of expropriation." 26 1
The Morocco BIT requires that parties value the investment on the
Any such measures shall only be taken under legal procedures which
afford due process of law.
2. When such measures are taken, each Party shall pay promptly just and
effective compensation to the nationals or companies of the other Party.
3. The compensation shall be equivalent to the full value of the expropri-
ated investment on the date of expropriation.
Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at art. III(l)-(3). Two additional paragraphs of article III
will not be considered here. Also relevant, however, is paragraph 4 of the Morocco
BIT Protocol, which provides:
For purposes of Article 111(3), the full value shall not be affected by prior
notice or public announcement by the government of the expropriatory
action. The compensation shall include, as appropriate, an amount to com-
pensate for any delay in payment that may occur from the date of expropria-
tion. Prompt transfer of the compensation at the rate of exchange used for
commercial purposes shall be guaranteed in order to maintain the value of
the compensation.
Id. at Protocol para. 4.
259. Id. at art. 111(2).
260. Secretary Shultz, in his message transmitting the Morocco BIT from the State
Department to the President, observed that
The Morocco treaty's "just ... compensation" standard is derived from the
language of our Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN). It
has a clear meaning, built up through judicial decision, arbitral awards, and
treaty practice, and has particular constitutional sanction in the United States
inasmuch as it is the term employed in the Fifth Amendment. The treaty's
"full value" standard for evaluating an investment is the same as in the treaty
with Panama and is incorporated in the Hickenlooper Amendment (section
620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) and the International Claims
Settlement Act. In our view, it provides the same protection as a "fair market
value" standard.
Morocco Submittal Letter, supra note 163, at X; see also Treaty Protection, supra note
175, at 62.
For international authorities establishing the equivalence between "just compensa-
tion" and "fair market value," see Norwegian Shipowners (Nor. v. U.S.), I R. Int'l
Arb. Awards 308 (1922); OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Prop-
erty, at art. 3 comment 9(a), reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 117, 127 (1968); Sohn & Baxter,
Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, in RECENT CODI-
FICATION OF THE LAw OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 133, 203 (F.
Garcia-Amador ed. 1974). For United States Supreme Court decisions holding that
"just compensation" means "fair market value," see United States v. 564.54 Acres of
Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979); Almoto Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United
States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973); United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S.
624 (1961); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); Olson v. United States, 292
U.S. 246 (1934).
261. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at art. 111(3). The Panama BIT also uses the "full
value" formulation. See supra note 243.
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date of, instead of immediately before, expropriation. 26 2 To accommo-
date Muslim sensitivities, 263 the Morocco BIT avoids reference to inter-
est payments, but includes the functionally equivalent provision that
"compensation shall include ... an amount to compensate for any delay
in payment that may occur from the date of expropriation. '"264 This
would seem to include an amount sufficient to compensate for any
change in the exchange rate as well. Although the Morocco BIT fails to
specify that compensation not reflect reductions in value caused either
by public announcement of the expropriation or the events that consti-
tuted the expropriation, the requirement is implicit in the standard of
prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. 2 65
Finally, the free transferability requirement is implied in the
requirement of "effective compensation. ' 26 6 More explicitly, paragraph
4 of the Protocol specifies that "[p]rompt transfer of the compensation
at the rate of exchange used for commercial purposes shall be guaran-
teed in order to maintain the value of the compensation." 2 67
Zaire
The expropriation provision of the Zaire BIT contains no modifications
of any importance to the 1983 draft.268
Bangladesh
The expropriation provision of the Bangladesh BIT adopts the 1983
model language on expropriation with two minor changes. 26 9 First, the
drafters modified the clause requiring that compensation be freely trans-
ferable by adding the phrase, "in accordance with the provisions of Arti-
cle V," which is the transfers provision.2 70 As explained below, the
262. The Egypt and Turkey BITs have a similar provision. See supra note 234 and
infra note 285. This is not a substantive deviation from the 1984 draft. See supra note
234.
263. Morocco Submittal Letter, supra note 163, at X.
264. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at Protocol para. 4. The Egypt and Turkey BITs
use a similar approach. See supra note 233 and infra text accompanying note 286.
265. See Treaty Protection, supra note 175, at 63. Compare the Panama BIT, supra note
251 with the Haiti BIT, infra note 276, which omit only the first element, public
knowledge of the expropriation.
266. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at art. 111(2).
267. Id. at Protocol para. 4. The Morocco BIT does not expressly state whether to
apply the exchange rate in effect on the date of expropriation or the date of transfer.
The general principle ofjust and effective compensation, preserving the full value of
the investment on the date of expropriation, however, would require the use of the
exchange rate on the date of expropriation. See supra text accompanying note 231.
268. Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at art. III(1). The parenthetical language following
"measures, direct or indirect, tantamount to expropriation," for instance, was
slightly reworded and moved to paragraph 5 of the Protocol. The requirement that
compensation be paid without delay and be effectively realizable was reworded
slightly and moved to paragraph 1 (c) of the Protocol. The phrase "prompt, ade-
quate, and effective compensation" is rendered as "prompt, adequate, and effectively
realizable compensation."
269. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 6, at art. III(1).
270. Id,
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transfers provision of the Bangladesh BIT requires free transferabil-
ity2 7 1 with certain exceptions applicable to sale or liquidation proceeds,
but not to compensation for expropriation. 27 2 Second, the drafters
changed the requirement that compensation be paid "without delay" to
read "promptly," which conforms with the "prompt, adequate, and
effective" formulation.
Haiti
The expropriation provision of the Haiti BIT contains three noticeable
changes from the 1983 draft.2 7" First, the Haiti BIT expressly provides
that compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the
investment "as determined according to different methods of calcula-
tion as appropriate in each specific case." 2 74 This formulation is consis-
tent with United States expropriation policy.
2 75
Second, although the 1983 draft provided that compensation not
reflect any reduction in the investment's fair market value due to prior
knowledge of the expropriation or the events which constitute the
expropriation, the Haiti BIT excludes only the first element from the
compensation calculus. 27 6 As noted above, it may be impossible to dis-
tinguish between the two elements in practice, and thus the change may
be of little practical significance. 2 77 Finally, the Haiti BIT provides that
compensation shall be freely transferable at the "official market" rate of
exchange, rather than the "prevailing market" rate.2 78
Senegal
The expropriation provision of the Senegal BIT follows the 1983 draft
very closely, 27 9 although new language in the Protocol amplifies the
271. See infra text accompanying notes 359-64.
272. The express reference in the 1983 draft transfers provision to the free trans-
ferability of compensation for expropriation was deleted from the transfers provision
of the Bangladesh BIT because such free transfer was guaranteed by article III. See
infra text accompanying notes 363-64.
273. Haiti BIT, supra note 7, at art. III(1).
274. Id. The Panama BIT has a similar provision. See supra text accompanying
note 249.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 228-29.
276. See Haiti BIT, supra note 7, at art. III(1). The Panama BIT takes a similar
approach. See supra text accompanying note 251. The Morocco BIT omits the refer-
ence to both elements: occurrence and announcement of the expropriation. See
supra text accompanying note 265.
277. See supra text accompanying note 251. During negotiations, Haiti supported
the change on the ground that the prior events language was unnecessary for the
Haiti situation. To the rejoinder that, if the language were not unnecessary Haiti
should not object to its retention, Haiti replied that the Treaty was unique to Haiti.
The point is that Haiti did not show any clear intent to modify the general standard,
but only resisted blind application of boilerplate. Note that the standard of prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation requires that both the occurrence and the
announcement of the expropriation be disregarded in calculating the value of expro-
priated property. See Treaty Protection, supra note 175, at 63.
278. Haiti BIT, supra note 7, at art. III(1).
279. Senegal BIT, supra note 8, at art. III(1).
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1983 draft in two minor respects. 280 First, the Protocol defines the
requirement that payment be made "without delay" to require that
"adequate provision" be made prior to the date of expropriation for
determination and payment of compensation, and that payment actually
be made "within a period of time no longer than is necessary for the
prompt completion of all necessary formalities." 281 Second, the expro-
priating government must pay interest at a "commercially reasonable
rate," defined in case of an expropriation by Senegal as "the discount
rate established by the Central Bank of West African States during
the period between the expropriation and the payment of
compensation .... "282
Turkey
The expropriation provision of the Turkey BIT contains only a few
minor modifications to the 1984 draft, none affecting its substance.283
First, compensation is to be calculated "at the time" of the expropria-
tion rather than "immediately before." 284 The formulation is consistent
with United States investment policy. 28 5
Second, the Turkey BIT modifies the 1984 draft language requiring
payment of interest and use of the market rate of exchange on the date
of expropriation to read: "in the event that payment of compensation is
delayed, such compensation shall be paid in an amount which would put
the investor in a position no less favorable than the position in which he
would have been, had the compensation been paid immediately on the
date of expropriation." 286 Putting the investor in the same position it
would have occupied but for the delay requires compensation for the
time value of money as well as protection against the risk of adverse
changes in the exchange rate. 28 7 The formulation used in the Turkey
280. Id. at Protocol para. 4.
281. Id. at Protocol para. 4. This is consistent with United States expropriation
policy. See Egypt submittal Letter, supra note 145, at IX-X. See also supra text accom-
panying note 224. The Egypt BIT contains similar language. See supra note 235 and
accompanying text.
282. Senegal BIT, supra note 8, at Protocol para. 4. "Commercially reasonable
note" was the phrase used in the 1984 draft. See supra note 208. The 1983 draft had
used the phrase "current international rates." See id.
283. Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at art. III(1)-(2).
284. Id.
285. The Egypt and Morocco BITs have similar language. See supra notes 234, 262.
This language reflects a key concept of the expropriation provision, namely, that val-
uation of the investment should not reflect any events associated with the expropria-
tion that are attributable to the expropriating government.
286. Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at art. III(1). The Egypt and Morocco BITs have a
similar provision. See supra note 233 and supra text accompanying notes 263-64.
287. According to the Turkish negotiators, the Constitution of Turkey requires
payment of interest in the event of expropriation in an amount sufficient, in their
view, to cover the time value of money as well as exchange risk. They proposed that
the constitutional rate be specified in the treaty. This was unacceptable to United
States negotiators, who were concerned that the government rate would prove insuf-
ficient in many circumstances and who, in any event, were unwilling to incorporate
Turkish law on this point into the BIT.
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BIT was preferred by Turkey because it avoided the implication that any
delay at all would occur, but was acceptable to the United States because
it made clear that interest would be paid and exchange risk avoided
where such delay did occur.
Grenada
The expropriation provision of the Grenada BIT is identical to that of
the 1984 draft.2 8 8
C. Currency Transfers
Customary international law does not require that countries permit for-
eign investors to repatriate their earnings freely. Highly burdensome
restrictions on transferability of funds may constitute an expropriation,
which would give rise to a right of prompt, adequate, and effective com-
pensation. 28 9 Nevertheless, investors can suffer considerable losses
from currency restrictions that fall short of expropriation.
Conventional limitations were imposed on a State's freedom to
restrict currency exchanges by the Articles of Agreement of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund.290 Article VIII(2) of the Agreement permits
transfer restrictions for current (as opposed to capital) international
transactions only with prior approval of the Fund, while article VIII(3)
permits discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency
practices only with such approval. 29 ' In recognition, however, of some
members' balance of payments difficulties, especially in the period fol-
lowing the Second World War, article XIV permits members to elect
certain "transitional arrangements" which except them from the opera-
tion of article VIII. 2 92 Such members may "maintain and adapt" the
restrictions that were in force on the date they joined the Fund.29 3
The modern FCN treaty series sought to create independent, bilat-
eral restrictions on states' prerogatives to impose exchange controls.
2 94
One FCN formulation permits a country to enact exchange restrictions
only "to the extent necessary to prevent its monetary reserves from fall-
ing to a very low level or to effect a moderate increase in very low mone-
288. Grenada BIT, supra note 10, at art. III(1).
289. 8 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 215, at 981-82 (1967); B. WORTELY, EXPROPRIA-
TION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 107 (1977).
290. 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, entered into force Dec. 27, 1945,
as amended by Bd. Governors Res. No. 23-5, 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748;
amended effective Apr. 1, 1978, by Bd. Governors Res. No. 31-4, 29 U.S.T. 2203,
T.I.A.S. No. 8937. For a general discussion of the IMF Agreement, see K. DAM, THE
RULES OF THE GAME (1982).
291. Id. at art. VIII(2), (3).
292. Id. at art. XIV.
293. Only a minority of IMF members have come under the article VIII structure;
the majority are governed by article XIV. K. DAM, supra note 290, at 100-01.
294. The modern FCNs' provision on exchange controls generally was
subordinate to the parties' obligations under the IMF agreement. See infra text
accompanying note 300. To this extent, the FCN obligation was not an "independ-
ent" one.
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tary reserves. '"295 Another formulation permits such restrictions only
"to the extent necessary to maintain or restore adequacy to its monetary
reserves .... "296
Both formulations place further constraints upon transfer restric-
tions. Specifically, after assuring the availability of foreign exchange for
goods and services essential to the health and welfare of its people, the
party imposing the transfer restriction must make "reasonable provi-
sions" for the withdrawal, in the currency of the other party, of compen-
sation for expropriation earnings, or amounts for amortization of loans,
depreciation of direct investments, and capital transfers, giving consid-
eration to special needs for other transactions. 29 7 In addition, the treaty
forbids parties to impose exchange controls that unnecessarily harm, or
arbitrarily discriminate against, the investment of nationals and compa-
nies of the other party.2 98 The modem FCNs further require parties to
afford national and MFN treatment to such nationals and companies
with respect to currency transfers. 29 9 Despite the foregoing, the mod-
em FCNs do allow a party to impose IMF-authorized currency
restrictions.3 0 0
Some of the modem FCNs omitted the absolute standards for
exchange controls. These agreements, however, did provide for MFN
and national treatment with respect to financial transactions, 30 1 coupled
with an obligation to administer currency restrictions so as not to "influ-
ence disadvantageously the competitive position" of the other party's
295. See, e.g., Greece FCN, supra note 60, at art. XV(2); Pakistan FCN, supra note
60, at art. XII(2);Japan FCN, supra note 60, at art. XII(2); Nicaragua FCN, supra note
60, at art. XII(2).
296. See, e.g., Luxembourg FCN, supra note 53, at art. XI(2); Belgium FCN, supra
note 60, at art. X(2); Netherlands FCN, supra note 60, at art. XII(2).
297. In the event that more than one rate were available, the rate applicable to the
withdrawals described in the text would be a rate approved by the IMF. If there were
no IMF-approved rate, the parties were to use an "effective rate" that was "just and
reasonable." See, e.g., Greece FCN, supra note 60, at art. XV(3); Pakistan FCN, supra
note 60, at art. XII(3); Luxembourg FCN, supra note 53, at art. XI(3); Belgium FCN,
supra note 60, at art. X(3); Netherlands FCN, supra note 60, at art. XII(3); Nicaragua
FCN, supra note 60, at art. XII(3). The Belgium and Luxembourg FCNs required
"provision to the fullest extent practicable in light of the level of the monetary
reserves and it's balance of payments" rather than "reasonable provision."
298. See, e.g., Greece FCN, supra note 60, at art. XV(4); Pakistan FCN, supra note
60, at art. XII(4); Japan FCN, supra note 60, at art. XII(4); Luxembourg FCN, supra
note 53, at art. XI(4); Belgium FCN, supra note 60, at art. X(4); Netherlands FCN,
supra note 60, at art. XII(4); Nicaragua FCN, supra note 60, at art. XII(4).
299. See, e.g., Greece FCN, supra note 60, at art. XV(1); Pakistan FCN, supra note
60, at art. XII(1); Japan FCN, supra note 60, at art. XII(1); Luxembourg FCN, supra
note 53, at art. XI(l); Belgium FCN, supra note 60, at art. X(I); Netherlands FCN,
supra note 60, at art. XII(1); Nicaragua FCN, supra note 60, at art. XII(1).
300. See, e.g., Greece FCN, supra note 60, at art. XV(2); Pakistan FCN, supra note
60, at art. XII(2); Japan FCN, supra note 60, at art. XII(2); Luxembourg FCN, supra
note 53, at art. XI(2); Belgium FCN, supra note 60, at art. X(2); Netherlands FCN,
supra note 60, at art. XII(2); Nicaragua FCN, supra note 60, at art. XII(2).
301. See, e.g., Italy FCN, supra note 53, at art. XVII(2)-(3); Ireland FCN, supra note
53, at art. XVII(2)-(3). The Ireland FCN also included a requirement of "reasonable
provision" for certain withdrawals. See id. at art. XVII(5).
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investors. 30 2
The transfers provision of the 1983 draft and the 1984 draft go con-
siderably beyond the modem FCN agreements3 0 3 by proscribing all
302. See, e.g., Italy FCN, supra note 53, at art. XVII(4); Ireland FCN, supra note 53,
at art. XVII(4).
303. Article V of the 1983 draft [hereinafter the 1983 draft transfers provision]
provides:
ARTICLE V
TRANSFERS
I. Each Party shall permit all transfers related to an investment in its terri-
tory of a national or company of the other Party to be made freely and
without delay into and out of its territory. Such transfers include the fol-
lowing: returns; compensation; payments made arising out of a dispute
concerning an investment; payments made under a contract, including
amortization of principal and accrued interest; payments made pursuant
to a loan agreement; amounts to cover expenses relating to the manage-
ment of the investment; royalties and other payments derived from
licenses, franchises or other grants of rights from administrative or tech-
nical assistance agreements, including management fees; proceeds from
the sale of all or any part of an investment and from the partial or com-
plete liquidation of the company concerned, including any incremental
value; additional contributions to capital necessary or appropriate for the
maintenance or development of an investment.
2. To the extent that a national or company of either Party has not made
another arrangement with the appropriate authorities of the other Party
in whose territory the investment of such national or company is situated,
currency transfers made pursuant to Paragraph I of this Article shall be
permitted in a currency or currencies to be selected by such national or
company. Except as provided in Article III, such transfers shall be made
at the prevailing market rate of exchange on the date of transfer with
respect to spot transactions in the currency or currencies to be
transferred.
3. Notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs, either Party may maintain
laws and regulations: (a) requiring reports or currency transfer; and (b)
imposing income taxes by such means as a withholding tax applicable to
dividends or other transfers. Furthermore, either Party may protect the
rights of creditors, or ensure the satisfaction of judgments in adjudica-
tory proceedings, through the equitable, nondiscriminatory and good
faith application of its law.
1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. V.
Article IV of the 1984 draft [hereinafter the 1984 draft transfers provision]
provides:
ARTICLE IV
1. Each Party shall permit all transfers related to an investment to be made
freely and without delay into and out of its territory. Such transfers
include: (a) returns; (b) compensation pursuant to Article III; (c) pay-
ments arising out of an investment dispute; (d) payments made under a
contract, including amortization of principal and accrued interest pay-
ments made pursuant to a loan agreement; (e) proceeds from the sale or
liquidation of all or any part of an investment; and (f) additional contri-
butions to capital for the maintenance or development of an investment.
2. Except as provided in Article III paragraph 1, transfers shall be made in a
freely convertible currency at the prevailing market rate of exchange on
the date of transfer with respect to spot transactions in the currency to be
transferred.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs I and 2, either Party may
maintain laws and regulations: (a) requiring reports of currency transfer;
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exchange controls on payments related to investment. Specifically,
these drafts require the parties to permit transfers related to an invest-
ment to be made freely and without delay.3 0 4 The right to free transfers
is essentially unqualified and includes transfers into and out of the host
state.3 0 5 The BIT contains a non-exclusive list of transfers that illustrate
the meaning of the general phrase "transfers related to an
investment."3 0
6
The 1983 draft transfers provision stipulates that foreign exchange
shall be allowed in a currency selected by the investor at the prevailing
market rate of exchange on the date of transfer with respect to spot
transactions in the transferred currency or currencies, unless the host
state and investor have otherwise agreed.30 7 That is, consistent with the
disputes provision,30 8 the 1983 draft defers to alternative arrangements
agreed to by the investor and the host state.
The 1984 draft's transfers provision provides more flexibility to the
host state. It does not require that the host state allow the investor to
select currencies, but requires only that the host country permit trans-
fers in "a freely convertible currency."3 0 9
The transfers provisions of both drafts contain several exceptions to
the general rule of free transferability.3 1 0 Either party may require
reports of currency transfers,3 1 1 impose withholding taxes, and ensure
and (b) imposing income taxes by such means as a withholding tax appli-
cable to dividends or other transfers. Furthermore, either Party may pro-
tect the rights of creditors, or ensure the satisfaction of judgments in
adjudicatory proceedings, through the equitable, nondiscriminatory and
good faith application of its law.
304. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. V(1); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. IV(1).
The phrase "without delay" does not require instantaneous transfer but is intended
to permit a reasonable time for the expeditious completion of formalities. The
phrase is not strictly necessary, since the term "free transfer" contemplates transfer
without unreasonable delay. The phrase illustrates again the BIT's tendency toward
redundancy.
305. The host state's right to limit use of funds once they are in its territory is
governed by the treatment provision. See supra notes 119, 126.
306. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. V(1); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. V(1).
The list is to some extent redundant. For example, the first element, returns, is
defined in article 1(f) to include profits, dividends, interest, capital gains, royalty pay-
ments, management, technical assistance or other fees, and payment in kind, a defini-
tion which overlaps certain of the other items on the list.
307. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. V(2). Note that, under the expropriation
provision, the exchange rate for expropriation compensation is that prevailing on the
date of expropriation, not transfer. See supra note 208.
308. See infra text accompanying notes 404-05.
309. 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. IV(2).
310. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. V(3); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art.
IV(3).
311. This exception for reporting requirements seems largely unnecessary given
that the requirement of free transferability allows time for the expeditious comple-
tion of formalities. See supra note 304.
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the satisfaction ofjudgments.3 12
Egypt
The President's Message to the Senate transmitting the Egypt BIT aptly
describes the first significant deviation from the 1983 draft's transfers
provision:
The current model text specifically states that "transfers related to an
investment" shall be made "freely and without delay into and out of its
territory * * *," and lists examples of types of funds subject to free trans-
fer. This treaty by contrast simply states that each Party "shall in respect
to investments by nationals or companies of the other Party grant to those
nationals or companies the free transfer of," enumerated specific types of
funds subject to free transfer. The types of funds listed are identical in
substance to those in the current model text except that two categories
identified in the current model text are not explicitly listed in the Egypt
text: additional funds for the development (not merely the maintenance
of) an investment and compensation payments arising from an investment
dispute other than an expropriation.3 13
The Egypt BIT requires that transfers covered by the transfers pro-
vision be permitted, not in a currency selected by the investor, as the
1983 draft required, 3 14 but in the currency of the original investment or
in any other freely convertible currency, 3 15 except to the extent that the
investor and host country agree otherwise. Such transfers will be made
at the "prevailing rate of exchange" (as compared to the "prevailing
market rate of exchange" 3 16) with respect to "current" (as compared to
"spot") transactions. 3 17
Finally, the Egypt BIT3 18 permits Egypt, when its foreign exchange
reserves are at a very low level,3 19 to delay temporarily transfers of sale
312. These exceptions were included to ensure that court-imposed restraints on
property, such as liens or attachments, would not be regarded as illegal restrictions
on currency transfers.
313. Egypt Submittal Letter, supra note 145, at XII. The Zaire BIT uses a similar
approach. See infra text accompanying note 345.
314. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. V(2).
315. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. V(2). The Cameroon BIT has a similar provi-
sion. See infra note 334.
316. Egypt BIT, supra note I, at art. V(2). The Zaire BIT also deletes the term
"market." See infra text accompanying note 346.
317. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. V(2). The Egypt BIT omits the phrase which
subordinates this clause to the expropriation provision. The omission is unimportant
since, under the rule of generalibis non derogant specialibis, the expropriation provision
governs the transferability of compensation for expropriation even without the sub-
ordinating clause. The same omission occurs in the Morocco, Zaire, and Turkey
BITs. See infra note 336. Note, however, that in the case of the Zaire BIT, a special
clause in the Protocol assures the primacy of the expropriation provision. See infra
text accompanying note 356. Cf the Bangladesh BIT, infra notes 363-64.
318. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at Protocol para. 10. A similar clause also appears in
the Zaire, Bangladesh, and Turkey BITs. See infra notes 319-23.
319. The term "very low level" originates with art. XII(2)(a)(i) and (ii) of the
GATT which permits certain import restrictions "in the case of a contracting party
with very low monetary reserves .. " GATT, supra note 45, at art. XII(2)(a)(ii). The
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or liquidation proceeds. Egypt may do so, however, only if: (1) the
delay is on an MFN basis;320 (2) the delay is to the extent and for the
time necessary to restore reserves to a minimally acceptable level, 32 1 but
in no case for longer than the time permitted by Egypt's Law 43 as of the
date the BIT was signed;3 22 and (3) Egypt provides the investor an
modem FCN series contained a standard provision permitting exchange restrictions
"necessary to prevent [a Party's] monetary reserves from falling to a very low level."
See supra text accompanying note 295. The transfers provision of the Egypt BIT,
unlike the FCN counterpart, does not allow restrictions to prevent reserves from fall-
ing to very low levels, but only to restore them once they have so fallen. The compa-
rable provision of the Bangladesh BIT has the same language. See infra text
accompanying note 361. The comparable provision of the Zaire BIT is triggered
when Zaire's foreign exchange reserves "do not permit the transfer." See infra text
accompanying note 353. The comparable provision of the Turkey BIT is triggered
by "exceptional financial or economic circumstances relating to foreign exchange."
See infra text accompanying note 370.
320. The actual wording is "in a manner not less favorable than that accorded to
comparable transfers to investors of third countries." Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at
Protocol para. 10. The analogous clause of the Bangladesh BIT has the same lan-
guage. See infra text following note 361. The analogous clause of the Zaire BIT is
similar in substance, although it omits any reference to "comparable transactions,"
an arguable strengthening of the provision. See infra note 349 and accompanying
text. Cf text following note 152 supra. The analogous clause of the Turkey BIT
provides that Turkey shall delay transfers by United States investors only in a manner
consistent with article II, a more restrictive condition since article II also requires
national treatment and imposes a set of absolute standards on treatment of invest-
ment. Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at Protocol para. 2(b). See infra text accompanying
note 371.
321. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at Protocol para. 10. The meaning of "minimally
acceptable level" ultimately will have to be worked out on a case-by-case basis
through the BIT's consultation and arbitration provisions. The counterpart clause of
the Bangladesh BIT has the same language but adds an outer limit of five years,
during each year of which Bangladesh must permit transfer of at least 20% of the
delayed amount, see infra text accompanying note 362. The counterpart clause of the
Turkey BIT also requires that transfers be permitted should reserves return to mini-
mally acceptable levels, but adds an outer limit of three years. See infra text accompa-
nying note 372. The Turkey BIT is slightly less restrictive than the Egypt and
Bangladesh BITs in that it does not limit the scope of the restriction "to the extent"
necessary to restore reserves to minimally acceptable levels. Id. The counterpart
clause of the Zaire BIT allows Zaire three years to permit the transfer in full, regard-
less of the extent to which reserves improve during that time. See infra text accompa-
nying note 353.
322. Under Article 21 of Law 43, an investor may not, except in "exceptional
circumstances," repatriate or dispose of his invested capital in less than five
years after the importation of the capital into Egypt. (Within the statutory
five year period, he may transfer the capital out of the country "at the highest
rate prevailing and declared for freely convertible foreign currency in five
equal annual installments.").
Egypt Submittal Letter, supra note 145, at XIII. The comparable clause of the Ban-
gladesh BIT also requires full transfer within five years, and during each year at least
20% of the proceeds' value must be transferred. See infra text accompanying note
362. The comparable clause of the Zaire BIT requires full transfer over a period not
to exceed three years, during which Zaire must permit an unspecified amount of the
transfer to occur. See infra text accompanying note 353. The Turkey BIT also allows
a delay of three years and does not expressly require Turkey to permit any transfers
during those three years unless reserves return to minimally acceptable levels. See
infra text accompanying note 372.
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opportunity to invest the delayed proceeds in a manner that will pre-
serve their real value free of exchange risk.3 23
Panama
Panama uses United States currency.3 24 The parties decided, therefore,
that detailed guarantees with respect to transferability were unneces-
sary.32 5 The transfers provision of the Panama BIT simply provides that
"current and capital transactions shall remain unrestricted and that pay-
ments and other transfers with respect to such transactions shall con-
tinue to be free."' 326 The Panama BIT incorporates the exceptions to
the general free transfer requirement set forth in paragraph 3 of the
1983 draft with one change: 3 27 the exclusive right to maintain laws
relating to the reporting of currency transactions was reserved by the
United States but not Panama.3 28
Cameroon
The transfers provision of the Cameroon BIT contains only minor devi-
ations from the 1983 draft.3 2 9 First, the Cameroon BIT explicitly recog-
nizes that the provision's illustrative list of transfers is not exhaustive.3 3 0
Second, the Cameroon BIT provides that transfers shall be at the "pre-
vailing rate of exchange used by the IMF" rather than at the "prevailing
market rate of exchange . . . with respect to spot transactions. ' 33 1
Third, the Cameroon BIT provides that Cameroon shall permit trans-
fers in the currency in which the investment was constituted, or, in the
absence of that currency, any other freely convertible currency.33 2 The
United States shall permit transfers in any freely convertible cur-
rency.33 3 This modification brings the Cameroon transfers provision
closer to that of the 1984 draft.3 3 4 Finally, the Cameroon BIT provides
323. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at Protocol para. 10. The analogous clauses of the
Zaire, Bangladesh, and Turkey BITs are similar, but omit the phrase "free of
exchange risk." See infra text accompanying notes 354, 362, and 372. The require-
ment that transfers be permitted "free of exchange risk," however, is implicit in the
preservation of the value of the investment, explicitly required by all three of those
BITs, and thus the omitted phrase is unnecessary.
324. See supra text accompanying note 248.
325. See Panama Submittal Letter, supra note 101, at X.
326. Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. VI.
327. Panama BIT, supra note 2 (Agreed Minute para. 5).
328. Id. This clause was limited to the United States to avoid giving the impression
that Panama, well-known for its bank secrecy laws, might require any disclosure.
329. Cameroon BIT, supra note 3, at art. V.
330. Id. at art. V(1). The 1983 draft had said "[s]uch transfers include the follow-
ing .... " 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. V(1). The Cameroon BIT provides that
"[s]uch transfers include, among others, the following .... Cameroon BIT, supra
note 3, at art. V(1).
331. Cameroon BIT, supra note 3, at art. V(2). The IMF rate also is to be used to
convert compensation for expropriation. See supra text accompanying note 257.
332. Cameroon BIT, supra note 3, at art. V(2).
333. Id. at art. V(2)(a)
334. The 1983 draft permitted transfers in any currency selected by the investor.
1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. V(2). The 1984 draft was modified to require only
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that, notwithstanding the other provisions of the transfers article, either
party may maintain laws and regulations prescribing transfers proce-
dures, provided that such procedures are carried out "expeditiously"
and do not derogate from the transfers provision's other
requirements.33 5
Morocco
Paragraph 1 of the Morocco BIT transfers provision provides only that:
"Each party shall permit prompt transfers of the proceeds of an invest-
ment."'336 The free transfer right thus applies to "proceeds of an invest-
ment" rather than "transfers related to an investment, ' 337 a change
which arguably narrows the provision.
Paragraph 2 modified the language of the 1983 draft to require that
transfers be permitted in a "convertible currency" rather than "a freely
convertible currency," an unimportant distinction given the general
requirement of promptness. The Morocco BIT further provides that
that transfers be permitted in "a freely convertible currency." 1984 draft, supra note
78, at art. V(2). The President's Message to the Senate on this point is potentially
misleading. It states that, "if the free currency of the investor's choice is unavaila-
ble," transfers related to investment will be permitted in the currency in which the
investment was constituted or any freely convertible currency. Cameroon Letter of
Submittal, supra note 3, at X. In fact, the Cameroon BIT does not require Cameroon
to permit transfers in the currency of the investor's choice, if available. Even where
such currency is available, Cameroon may, consistent with the treaty, permit transfer
instead in the currency in which the investment was originally constituted or in any
freely convertible currency. Cameroon BIT, supra note 3, at art. V(2)(a). The Egypt
BIT has a similar provision, although one which applies to Egypt and the United
States equally. See supra text accompanying note 316.
335. Cameroon BIT, supra note 3, at art. V(3)(a). Similar clauses appear in the
Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at article V(3)(a), the Senegal BIT, supra note 8, at article
V(3)(a), and the Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at article IV(3)(a). The latter two clauses
use the term "without delay" instead of "expeditiously." For the definition of "with-
out delay" as used in the Turkey BIT, see infra text accompanying note 379. The
Morocco BIT, at article IV(3)(c), contains analogous language. See Morocco BIT,
supra note 4, at art. IV(3)(c) and text accompanying infra note 336.
336. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at art. IV(l). The remainder of article IV
provides:
2. To the extent that a national or company of either Party has not made
anther [sic] arrangement with the appropriate authorities of the other
Party in whose territory the investment of such national or company is
situated, transfers made pursuant to this Article shall be permitted in a
convertible currency. Such transfers shall be made at the prevailing rate
of exchange used for commercial purposes on the date of transfer in the
country from which such transfers are being made.
3. Notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs, either Party may maintain
laws and regulations (a) requiring reports of currency transfer, (b) impos-
ing income taxes by such means as a withholding tax applicable to divi-
dends or other transfers, and (c) prescribing or maintaining procedural
formalities governing transfers related to investments. Furthermore,
either Party may protect the rights of creditors or ensure the satisfaction
ofjudgment in adjudicatory proceedings, through equitable, nondiscrim-
inatory and good faith application of its laws.
Id. at art. IV(2)-(3).
337. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. V(1).
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transfers "be made at the prevailing rate of exchange used for commer-
cial purposes" rather than "at the prevailing market rate of exchange...
with respect to spot transactions. '3 38 Paragraph 3 authorizes either
party to prescribe or maintain "procedural formalities" with respect to
transfers related to investments. 339
The Protocol to the Morocco BIT qualifies the right of transfers in
three ways not found in other BITs. First, United States investors must
obtain the approval of the Moroccan government before making certain
types of investments.3 40 Otherwise, the proceeds from such invest-
ments will not be freely transferable.3 4 ' Second, certain other invest-
ments may be made freely, but should be reported promptly to the
Moroccan authority in charge of exchange controls.3 42 Finally, transfers
relating to an investment of a United States national resident in
Morocco shall be carried out in accordance with existing Moroccan
law.343
Zaire
The text of the Zaire BIT transfers provision follows the 1983 draft lan-
guage with minor changes.3 4 4 For example, the Zaire transfers provi-
sion guarantees "free transfer" rather than transfers "made freely and
without delay" and applies only to certain enumerated transfers. 3 45
Transfers are to be made at the prevailing (as compared to the "prevail-
ing market") 34 6 rate of exchange with respect to ordinary (as compared
to "spot") transactions in the transferred currency.3 4 7
The Zaire BIT Protocol contains two substantial changes. First, it
allows a delay in the application of the transfers provision for a period
not to exceed three years, during which Zaire is permitted to impose
exchange restrictions, subject to certain conditions. 34 8 These are: (1)
338. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at art. V(2).
339. Cf the analogous clauses in the Cameroon, Zaire, Senegal, and Turkey BITs,
described supra at note 335 and accompanying text. See supra note 317 for an addi-
tional change in the Morocco BIT from the 1983 draft.
340. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at Protocol para. 5.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. "Existing law" refers to that existing on the date the Treaty enters into
force. Note that under article 1(6) of the Morocco BIT, the term "nationals" refers
only to natural persons. Id.
344. Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at art. V. Other deviations from the 1983 draft are
described supra notes 317, 335.
345. Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at art. V(1). The Egypt BIT uses the same language.
See supra text accompanying note 313.
346. Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at art. V(2). The Egypt BIT also deletes the word
"market." See supra text accompanying note 316.
347. Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at art. V(2).
348. Id. at Protocol para. 1. According to the Protocol language, the three years
commences with the date of ratification. The United States intended this to mean the
date of entry into force and was to have sought clarification from Zaire on this point.
See Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State George Shultz to President Ronald
Reagan (Feb. 26, 1986), reprinted in Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at X. The United States
apparently is interpreting this same term in the Panama BIT to mean the exchange of
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United States nationals must receive national and MFN treatment with
respect to all investment transfers; 349 (2) Zaire must make available to
United States nationals "reasonable amounts of foreign exchange,"
defined as "no less than one-third of the amount of profits attributable
to the investment since its establishment or acquisition that have not
been previously transferred;" 350 (3) Zaire must guarantee United States
nationals the opportunity to invest any unconverted currency in a man-
ner that will preserve its value;35' and (4) all transfers must be made at
the market rate of exchange prevailing on the date the application for
transfer is made.3 52
Second, even after the three-year period has elapsed, Zaire may
allow the transfer of sale or liquidation proceeds over a period of three
years if its foreign exchange reserves "do not permit the transfer,"3 53
subject to two conditions: (1) Zaire must give United States nationals
MFN treatment with respect to transfers; and (2) Zaire must ensure that
United States nationals have an opportunity to invest the proceeds in a
manner that will preserve their value.3 54 United States negotiators
expect Zaire to make a good-faith effort to permit meaningful transfers
during each year of the three-year period, but agreed not to insist on a
particular percentage.
Protocol paragraph 1 concludes with a special provision under
which the two Governments "agree to consult at the request of either
one of them concerning the implementation of article V and of this para-
graph."'355 This provision, of course, is in addition to the consultation
and dispute resolution measures set forth in treaty articles VI, VII, and
VIII.
The Protocol further provides that nothing therein shall derogate
from Zaire's obligation to permit compensation for expropriation to be
ratification which triggers entry into force 30 days later. See Panama BIT, supra note
2, at art. XIII(2). See also Panama Submittal Letter, supra note 101, at X.
349. Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at Protocol para. 1 (a)i. The Zaire BIT transfers provi-
sion applies only to enumerated types of payments, not to all transfers related to an
investment. The Protocol's requirement of MFN and national treatment during the
interim period, however, applies to all transfers related to an investment, not just
those enumerated. Id.
350. Id. at Protocol para. l(a)(ii).
351. Id. at Protocol para. l(a)(iii).
352. Id. at Protocol para. 1 (a)(iv). Note that in the transfers provision, the rate of
exchange is that prevailing on the date of transfer. The assumption in the main Treaty
text is that transfer will occur shortly after application is made. Therefore, the
exchange rate on the transfer date, which would vary little from the rate on the appli-
cation date, is to be utilized. The investor bears the risk of any change in the rate that
occurs during this short period. This paragraph of the Protocol applies only during a
three-year period in which a delay in transfers is permissible. During this period, the
exchange rate on the date of application is to be used and Zaire bears the risk of
change in that rate during the delay between application and transfer.
353. Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at Protocol para. 1 (b). The Egypt, Bangladesh, and
Turkey BITs have similar clauses. For a comparison of these clauses, see supra notes
319-23.
354. Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at Protocol para. 1 (b).
355. Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at Protocol para. 1 (e).
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"paid without delay in a form that is effectively realizable and freely and
promptly transferable at the prevailing rate of exchange on the date of
expropriation." 35 6 Thus, Zaire's obligation to pay prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation for expropriated property remains absolute.
If Zaire's foreign exchange reserves are insufficient to allow it to pay
compensation for expropriation in a freely transferable currency, then it
may not expropriate. Similarly, the Protocol provides that nothing
therein shall relieve either party of its obligations under international
law, its own national laws, or any investment agreement, authorization,
or license.3 57
Finally, Zaire shall respect "to the extent possible" the investor's
choice of currency, provided that such currency is available.3 5 8 If not,
then Zaire must permit the transfer in a freely convertible currency.
This clause was a concession to the fact that not all currencies are avail-
able in Zaire.
Bangladesh
The Bangladesh BIT Protocol3 5 9 permits Bangladesh temporarily to
delay transfers of sales or liquidation proceeds3 60 when its foreign
exchange reserves are at "a very low level," 36 1 provided (1) that such
delays are imposed on an MFN basis; (2) that any delay is only to the
extent and for the time period necessary to restore reserves to a mini-
mally acceptable level but in no case for more than five years, during
each year of which Bangladesh shall permit the investor to transfer no
less than 20% of the value of the delayed proceeds;3 6 2 and (3) that the
investor may invest the proceeds in a manner that will preserve their
value until transfer.
The Bangladesh BIT also contains one minor change from the 1983
draft in its transfers provision.3 63 The negotiators deleted "compensa-
tion" from the illustrative list of transfers covered by that provision.
This change reflects the fact that the free transferability of compensation
for expropriation is provided for by the expropriation provision. 364
356. Id. at Protocol para. l(c). That is, the Protocol is a derogation only from
Zaire's obligations under the transfers provision and does not authorize a derogation
from its obligations under the expropriation provision.
357. Id
358. Id. at Protocol para. 1(d).
359. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 6, at Protocol para. 4. The Egypt, Zaire, and Tur-
key BITs have similar clauses. For a comparison, see supra notes 319-23.
360. During negotiations, Bangladesh officials were particularly concerned with
the effect that the liquidation of a substantial investment could have on the country's
foreign exchange reserves. See Letter of Submittal from Under Secretary Michael
Armacost to President Ronald Reagan (May 9, 1986) [hereinafter "Bangladesh Sub-
mittal Letter"] reprinted in Bangladesh BIT, supra note 6, at X.
361. For a discussion of this term, see supra note 319.
362. See supra note 321.
363. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 6, at art. V.
364. Id. at art. III(1). See supra discussion at note 317.
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Haiti
The transfers provision of the Haiti BIT is identical to that of the 1983
draft.3 65
Senegal
The Senegal BIT transfers provision3 6 6 generally follows the 1983 draft.
An additional sentence, however, provides that transfer of liquidation
proceeds shall be permitted "in any freely usable currency"3 6 7 chosen
by the host country, rather than in a currency selected by the investor.
Thus, with respect to liquidation proceeds, the Senegal BIT follows the
1984 draft's more flexible approach.3 68
Turkey
The Turkey BIT contains language in the Protocol 3 69 that allows Turkey
temporarily to delay the transfer of sale or liquidation proceeds "[i]n
exceptional financial or economic circumstances" 370 relating to foreign
exchange. Such delays are permissible, however, only (1) in a manner
that is consistent with the treatment provision;3 7 1 (2) for the time period
necessary for Turkey to restore its foreign exchange reserves to "a mini-
mally acceptable level but in no case more than three years"; 37 2 and (3)
if the investor has an opportunity to invest the proceeds in a manner
which will preserve their value until the transfer occurs.
The transfers provision of the Turkey BIT 3 73 modifies the language
of the 1984 draft in several non-substantive ways. 3 7 4 First, the negotia-
tors deleted two items from the illustrative list of transfers covered by
the transfers provision.3 75 The scope of that provision was not affected,
however, because the general phrase "all transfers related to an invest-
ment" was retained and the list, in any event, is only illustrative. The
first deletion was of the phrase "payments made under a contract".
3 76
365. Haiti BIT, supra note 7, at art. V.
366. Senegal BIT, supra note 8, at art. V.
367. Id. at art. V(2). "Freely usable currency" refers to a currency that may be
freely exchanged for other currencies in the principal foreign exchange markets and
is equivalent to the term "freely convertible currency" used in the 1984 draft.
368. A second change in the Senegal BIT is described supra note 335.
369. Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at Protocol para. 2(b). Similar clauses appear in the
Egypt, Zaire, and Bangladesh BITs. For a comparison of these clauses, see supra notes
319-23.
370. The BIT does not further define this term. Like "minimally acceptable
levels," see supra note 321, it will have to be defined on a case-by-case basis through
the BIT's consultation and arbitration provisions.
371. Thus, for example, such delays must be on an MFN and national treatment
basis and may not violate international law.
372. "Minimally acceptable levels" will need to be defined on a case-by-case basis.
See supra note 321.
373. Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at art. IV.
374. One such modification is described supra text accompanying note 335. A sec-
ond modification is described supra text accompanying note 317.
375. Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at art. IV(l).
376. 1984 draft, at art. IV(1)(d). See supra note 303.
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This deletion was to satisfy Turkey's desire to exclude from the provi-
son's scope payments arising under an ordinary commercial contract
which were not transfers related to an investment. 77 The second dele-
tion was of the phrase "additional contributions to capital for the main-
tenance or development of an investment. ' ' 378 Additional contributions
become part of the investment and, therefore, the Turkish negotiators
contended, the transfers provision need not specifically mention them.
Finally, the Turkey BIT defines "without delay," as used in the
transfers provision, to mean "as rapidly as possible in accordance with
normal commercial transaction procedures and in no case [more than]
two months from the date of application."
379
Grenada
The transfers provision of the Grenada BIT is identical to that of the
1984 draft.38 0
D. The Disputes Provision
One of the most important functions of the BIT series is to encourage
investors and host countries to resolve investment disputes through
binding third-party arbitration. The modem FCNs had no comparable
provisions for investors, but did provide for third-party resolution of
disputes between states arising out of the interpretation or application
of the FCN.3 8 t
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, an investor who has
been expropriated or otherwise injured by a foreign government has few
remedies. First, it can pursue any local administrative or judicial reme-
dies it may have in the host country, in effect seeking redress directly
from the government against which it has a claim. Second, the investor
can appeal to its own government to espouse its claim, i.e., to assume the
investor's claim as its own and to pursue relief through diplomatic chan-
nels. The government could then seek to arbitrate the claim. Neither
international nor United States law requires government espousal of
claims of its citizens. If it chooses espousal, the United States may settle
an espoused claim on any basis it wishes. Proceeds of any settlement
become property of the United States government, though as a matter
of practice, such proceeds generally are distributed to the injured party
377. In place of the deleted item the negotiators placed a new item concerning
principal and interest payments arising under loan agreements. See Turkey BIT,
supra note 9, at art. IV(1)(d). This is one form of payment under a contract that
Turkey was willing to concede was a transfer related to an investment. Whether pay-
ments under any other contracts are guaranteed to be freely transferable will depend
upon whether the transfer is regarded as related to an investment and may require in
some cases resort to the consultation or dispute provisions. The line between the
two, in any event, would seem to be an extremely difficult one to draw in many cases.
378. 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. IV(1)(f).
379. Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at Protocol para. 2(a).
380. Grenada BIT, supra note 10, at art. IV.
381. See supra note 53.
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by an act of Congress. Third, the investor can sue the host state in
United States courts or third party courts, but the act of state doc-
trine38 2 and sovereign immunity3 8 3 will often defeat an investor's claim.
Finally, the investor may try to negotiate a settlement with the host state.
Such an agreement could include investor-to-state arbitration of the dis-
pute by a third party.
The modern FCNs improved the investor's remedies by including a
provision giving the International Court of Justice ("IGJ") jurisdiction
over disputes between the parties arising out of the application or inter-
pretation of the treaty.38 4 Thus, an investor's State could compel ICJ
adjudication of claims that the host country had violated the FCN's
investment provisions.
This remedy nevertheless had three serious disadvantages. First,
and perhaps most important, claims could be brought in the ICJ only by
the investor's state. Resolution of investment disputes thus continued
to be linked to the overall political relationship between the investor's
country and the host country. 38 5 Second, under the customary rules of
international law, a claim generally does not arise until local remedies
have been exhausted. Investors, therefore, could not seek invocation of
the FCN's disputes clause unless they first had exhausted their remedies
in the host country.3 8 6 Finally, ICJjudgments generally are not enforce-
able in domestic courts. 38 7
382. The act of state doctrine as it applies to expropriation cases was articulated by
the United States Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 428 (1964) ("MheJudicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government . . . in the
absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary interna-
tional law"). The BITs provide the "controlling legal principles" necessary to over-
come the act of state bar should the investor choose to pursue its remedies in United
States courts.
383. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1976) (codifying the
law of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States).
384. See supra note 53.
385. For one account of the conflict between United States foreign policy objec-
tives and the interests of United States investors overseas, see A. SCHLESINGER, ROB-
ERT KENNEDY AND His TIMES 625-29 (1978). See generally Vandevelde, Reassessing the
Hickenlooper Amendment, 29 VA. J. INT'L IAw xxx (forthcoming).
386. See generally 8 M. WHrrEMAN, 769-807 supra note 215. A debate exists as to
whether the exhaustion of remedies rule is procedural or substantive. If substantive,
the investor has no claim unless it has first exhausted local remedies, and thus the
investor's host state could not espouse the claim in the absence of exhaustion. If
procedural, failure to exhaust would preclude the investor from pursuing claims only
in forums that require exhaustion as a condition of their jurisdiction. The BITs do
not require exhaustion prior to invoking the disputes provision. Note, however, that
any individual investor may agree to other disputes procedures which may take pre-
cedence over the BIT disputes provision. See infra notes 416, 431 and accompanying
text. Such other procedures may require exhaustion of local remedies. See infra note
441 and accompanying text.
387. Under art. 94(2) of the U.N. Charter, ICJjudgments are enforceable through
action of the Security Council. For a suggestion that ICJ judgments should be
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The BIT drafters sought to eliminate the weaknesses in the modern
FCN disputes clause by providing investors with (1) an absolute right to
binding third-party arbitration of investment disputes with the host gov-
ernment through the International Center for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes ("ICSID"),388 without first having to exhaust local
remedies,38 9 and (2) a judicial mechanism to enforce such arbitral
awards. In this way, the BIT ensures investors a neutral mechanism for
settlement of investment disputes that is wholly insulated from the polit-
ical relationship between the investor's government and the host gov-
ernment.390 In addition, arbitration of disputes over time should result
in further elaboration of the substantive provisions of the BITs.
At the same time, the BITs eliminate none of the traditional reme-
dies. Investors still may pursue local remedies, seek arbitration of the
claim outside the framework of the BIT,391 or pursue espousal of the
claim by their own governments. However, BITs generally require an
election of remedies: an investor who pursues some other disputes
mechanism (except espousal) generally loses its right to arbitration
under a BIT.3 9 2 The BITs also provide for state-to-state arbitration of
disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
agreement.3 93
enforceable in domestic courts, see Francke, Review Essay: The Case of the Vanishing
Treatises, 81 AM.J. INT'L L. 763, 770-71 (1987).
388. 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. 6090 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. ICSID is an
international organization established by an international agreement to which more
than 75 countries, including the United States, are party. ICSID does not itself con-
ciliate or arbitrate disputes, but maintains lists of available conciliators and arbitra-
tors and provides rules for the conduct of proceedings.
389. The BIT avoids the question whether exhaustion of remedies is procedural or
substantive. See supra note 386.
390. This is advantageous for the investor, the investor's state, and the host state.
The investor can pursue its remedies without having to enlist the support of its gov-
ernment, which may not be forthcoming where the investor's government is con-
cerned that espousing the investor's claim will damage otherwise good relations with
the host government or make otherwise bad relations even worse. For a description
of some of the efforts of the Kennedy andJohnson Administrations to prevent expro-
priations of United States investors from interfering with foreign policy generally,
see supra note 385. The investor's government can avoid having its foreign policy
implicated in investment disputes between its nationals and other states, while the
host state faces a reduced likelihood that the expropriation will disrupt its relations
with the investor's state. Moreover, several statutes require the United States to sus-
pend various forms of aid to, or preferences for, governments which have expropri-
ated the property of United States investors without taking steps toward payment of
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1); 22
U.S.C. § 284(); 22 U.S.C. § 283(r); 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(4)(D). The cut-off generally
is not required, however, if the host state is engaged in arbitration directed at resolv-
ing the claim. See generally Vandevelde, supra note 385.
391. See infra notes 406-07 and accompanying text. Indeed, investors may be
required to pursue any previously-agreed dispute resolution mechanisms. See also
infra note 416 and accompanying text.
392. See infra notes 409-13 and accompanying text.
393. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VIII; 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. VII.
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Article VII of the 1983 draft39 4 and article VI of the 1984 draft3 95
contain the disputes provision. Although the 1984 draft's disputes pro-
394. Articles VII(l)-(5) of the 1983 draft [hereinafter referred to collectively as the
1983 draft disputes provision] provides:
ARTICLE VII
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN ONE PARTY AND
A NATIONAL OR COMPANY OF THE OTHER PARTY
1. For purposes of this Article, an investment dispute is defined as a dispute
involving (a) the interpretation or application of an investment agree-
ment between a Party and a national or company of the other Party; (b)
the interpretation or application of any investment authorization granted
by its foreign investment authority to such national or company; or (c) an
alleged breach of any right conferred or created by this Treaty with
respect to an investment.
2. In the event of an investment dispute between a Party and a national or
company of the other Party with respect to an investment of such
national or company in the territory of such Party, the parties to the dis-
pute shall initially seek to resolve the dispute by consultation and negoti-
ation. The parties may, upon the initiative of either of them and as a part
of their consultation and negotiation, agree to rely upon non-binding,
third-party procedures, such as the fact-finding facility available under
the Rules of the Additional Facility ("Additional Facility") of the Interna-
tional Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("Centre"). If
the dispute cannot be resolved through consultation and negotiation,
then the dispute shall be submitted for settlement in accordance with the
applicable dispute-settlement procedures upon which they have previ-
ously agreed. With respect to expropriation by either Party, any dispute-
settlement procedures specified in an investment agreement between
such Party and such national or company shall remain binding and shall
be enforceable in accordance with the terms of the investment agreement
and relevant provisions of domestic laws of such Party and treaties and
other international agreements regarding enforcement of arbitral awards
to which such Party has subscribed.
3. (a) The national or company concerned may choose to consent in writ-
ing to the submission of the dispute to the Centre or the Additional
Facility, for settlement by conciliation or binding arbitration, at any
time after six months from the date upon which the dispute arose,
provided:
(i) the dispute has not, for any reason, been submitted by the
national or company for resolution in accordance with any appli-
cable dispute settlement procedures previously agreed to by the
parties to the dispute; and
(ii) the national or company concerned has not brought the dispute
before the courts of justice or administrative tribunals or agen-
cies of competent jurisdiction of the Party that is a party to the
dispute. Once the national or company concerned has so con-
sented, either party to the dispute may institute proceedings
before the Centre or the Additional Facility. If the parties disa-
gree over whether conciliation or binding arbitration is the more
appropriate procedure to be employed, the opinion of the
national or company concerned shall prevail.
(b) Each Party hereby consents to the submission of an investment dis-
pute to the Centre for settlement by conciliation or binding
arbitration.
(c) Conciliation or binding arbitration of such disputes shall be done in
accordance with the provisions of the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of other States
("Convention") and the Regulations and Rules of the Centre, or, if
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vision is more concise than the 1983 draft's, the substance of the rights
the Convention should, for any reason, be inapplicable, the Rules of
the Additional Facility.
4. In any proceeding, judicial, arbitral or otherwise, concerning an invest-
ment dispute between it an a national or company of the other Party, a
Party shall not assert, as a defense, counter-claim, right of set-off or
otherwise, that the national or company concerned has received or will
receive, pursuant to an insurance contract, indemnification or other com-
pensation for all or part of its alleged damages from any source whatso-
ever, including such other Party and its political subdivisions, agencies
and instrumentalities.
5. For the purpose of any proceedings initiated before the Centre or the
Additional Facility in accordance with this Article, any company duly
incorporated, constituted or otherwise duly organized under the applica-
ble laws and regulations of either Party or a political subdivision thereof
but that, before the occurrence of the event or events giving rise to the
dispute, was owned or controlled by nationals or companies of the other
Party, shall be treated as a national or company of such other Party.
For a discussion of the sixth and final paragraph of art. VII, see infra note 398.
395. Article VI of the 1984 draft [hereinafter "the 1984 draft disputes provision"]
provides:
ARTICLE VI
1. For purposes of this Article, an investment dispute is defined as a dispute
involving (a) the interpretation or application of an investment agree-
ment between a Party and a national or company of the other Party; (b)
the interpretation or application of any investment authorization granted
by a Party's foreign investment authority to such national or company; or
(c) an alleged breach of any right conferred or created by this Treaty with
respect to an investment.
2. In the event of an investment dispute between a Party and a national or
company of the other Party, the parties to the dispute shall initially seek
to resolve the dispute by consultation and negotiation, which may
include the use of non-binding, third-party procedures. If the dispute
cannot be resolved through consultation and negotiation, the dispute
shall be submitted for settlement in accordance with previously agreed,
applicable dispute-settlement procedures. Any dispute-settlement pro-
cedures regarding expropriation and specified in the investment agree-
ment shall remain binding and shall be enforceable in accordance with
the terms of the investment agreement, relevant provisions of domestic
laws, and applicable international agreements regarding enforcement of
arbitral awards.
3. (a) The national or company concerned may choose to consent in writ-
ing to the submission of the dispute to the International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("Centre") or under the rules
of the Additional Facility of the Centre ("Additional Facility"), for
settlement by conciliation or binding arbitration, at any time after six
months from the date upon which the dispute arose. Once the
national or company concerned has so consented, either party to the
dispute may institute proceedings before the Centre or the Addi-
tional Facility provided:
(i) the dispute has not been submitted by the national or company
for resolution in accordance with any applicable previously
agreed dispute settlement procedures; and
(ii) the national or company concerned has not brought the dispute
before the courts of justice or administrative tribunals or agen-
cies of competent jurisdiction of the Party that is a party to the
dispute. If the parties disagree over whether conciliation or bind-
ing arbitration is the more appropriate procedure to be
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afforded is the same.3 9 6
The disputes provision applies only to "investment disputes" which
comprise three categories: (a) the interpretation or application of an
investment agreement between a party and a national or company of the
other party; (b) the interpretation or application of any investment
authorization granted by its "foreign investment authority"3 9 7 to such
national or company; or (c) an alleged breach of a BIT-based right con-
cerning an investment.3 9 8 Under this definition of "investment dis-
putes," the disputes provision does not apply to disputes involving
domestic law, such as antitrust or securities statutes, unless those dis-
putes implicate treaty rights. This prevents foreign investors in the
employed, the opinion of the national or company concerned
shall prevail.
(b) Each Party hereby consents to the submission of an investment dis-
pute to the Centre for settlement by conciliation or binding arbitra-
tion, or, in the event the Centre is not available, to the submission of
the dispute to ad hoc arbitration in accordance with the rules and
procedures of the Center [sic].
(c) Conciliation or binding arbitration of such disputes shall be done in
accordance with the provisions of the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of other States
done at Washington March 18, 1965 ("Convention") and the Regula-
tions and Rules of the Centre or, if the Convention should for any
reason be inapplicable the Rules of the Additional Facility shall
govern.
4. In any proceeding involving an investment dispute, a Party shall not
assert, as a defense, counter-claim, right of set-off or otherwise, that the
national or company concerned has received or will receive, pursuant to
an insurance or guarantee contract, indemnification or other compensa-
tion for all or part of its alleged damages.
5. For the purposes of this Article, any company legally constituted under
the applicable laws and regulations of either Party or a political subdivi-
sion thereof but that, immediately before the occurrence of the event or
events giving rise to the dispute, was an investment of nationals or com-
panies of the other Party, shall, in accordance with Article 25(2)(b) of the
Convention, be treated as a national or company of such other Party.
396. There is a procedural difference between the two drafts. Under the 1983
draft, an investor could not consent to ICSID dispute resolution if the investor had
invoked previously agreed procedures or had submitted the dispute to local remedies
in the host state. Under the 1984 draft, the investor may file its consent but neither
party to the dispute may institute proceedings if the investor has invoked either of
the dispute mechanisms described above. This procedural change has no substantive
significance. See infra notes 398, 400, 403, 424, and 429 for a few minor wording
changes.
397. "Foreign investment authority" is understood to mean a national, central, or
federal investment authority. It does not include investment agreements or authori-
zations issued by political subdivisions.
398. Paragraph 6 of art. VII of the 1983 draft excludes from the coverage of the
Article any dispute arising under the export credit, guarantee or insurance programs
of the Export-Import Bank of the United States or other official credit, guarantee or
insurance arrangement, where the parties have, under such arrangement, provided
for dispute procedures. The BIT was not intended to displace such agreed dispute
procedures. The 1984 draft moved that paragraph to art. VIII. That paragraph will
not be considered further in this essay. In addition, article XI excludes certain dis-
putes involving tax matters from the scope of the disputes provision.
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United States from using the arbitration provision to thwart federal
business regulation. The disputes clause also excludes ordinary com-
mercial disputes, such as an action to recover payment for sale of a
good. 399
One apparently unresolved issue is how the disputes provision
applies to disputes between an investor and a political subdivision of the
host state. The BIT's general presumption is that its undertakings are
binding on the parties' political subdivisions and that the parties are
accountable for violations of the undertakings by such subdivisions.
Article XII of the 1983 draft explicitly provides that the BIT "shall apply
to political subdivisions of the Parties." '400
On the other hAnd, ICSID has jurisdiction over political subdivi-
sions only with their specific consent.40 1 In the absence of consent to
ICSID arbitration by a political subdivision, the investor must seek its
remedy under the disputes provision againt the host State's central gov-
ernment. Where such consent has been given, the investor presumably
has a choice of pursuing its remedy against the subdivision or the central
government, or both.
Once an investment dispute has arisen, the BITs require the inves-
tor and host state to seek initially to resolve it through negotiation and
consultation.40 2 The BIT allows the parties to rely upon non-binding
third-party procedures, such as the Additional Facility of ICSID. 403
If the dispute is not resolved through negotiation and consultations,
the BIT directs the parties to employ any previously agreed-upon dis-
pute settlement procedures. 40 4 The BIT specifies no minimum time
period which must elapse before the parties may abandon negotiations
399. Article II covers the investor's right of access to the host state's courts.
400. The 1984 draft omits this article as unnecessary. Its substance was assumed
by the drafters to be implicit in the BIT.
401. ICSID Convention, supra note 388, at art. 25(3).
402. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(2); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. VI(2).
403. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(2); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. VI(2).
The 1983 draft refers expressly to the Additional Facility, while the 1984 draft does
not. The Additional Facility, created in 1978, is a mechanism for resolving certain
types of disputes outside the jurisdiction of ICSID. The Additional Facility Rules
have less extensive provisions on recognition and enforcement of awards, but do
require that Additional Facility proceedings take place in a state which is a party to
the New York Convention. For information on ICSID enforcement, see infra note
420 and accompanying text. The rules of the Additional Facility are set out in ICSID,
Additional Facility, Doc. No. ICSID/1 1.
404. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(2); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. VI(2).
The BIT provides that the parties "shall" submit the dispute to previously agreed
procedures. This is consistent with art. 11(4) of the 1983 draft (art. 11(2) of the 1984
draft) which provides that host states shall honor agreements with respect to invest-
ment. If the state party refuses to adhere to previously agreed procedures which
have been invoked by the investor, the state's refusal clearly would violate the BIT
and could give rise to a state-to-state arbitration. The investor, however, is not a
party to the BIT and thus is not technically bound by the BIT's provisions. For a
discussion of whether an investor who refuses to submit to previously-agreed dispute
procedures may obtain ICSID arbitration, see infra text accompanying note 416.
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and resort to other settlement mechanisms. 40 5
In the case of expropriation, the BIT provides that any "dispute-
settlement procedures specified in an investment agreement" between
the state and the investor remain binding and enforceable in accordance
with the terms of the investment agreement and applicable law. 40 6 This
provision serves as a stabilization clause intended to ensure that an
investment agreement's dispute settlement procedures survive expro-
priation of the investnent, even in the event of repudiation or nullifica-
tion of the investment agreement.
40 7
The investor ma consent to submission of the dispute to ICSID or
the Additional Facility for conciliation or binding arbitration if three
conditions are met:40 8 the investor must not have submitted the dispute
to previously-agreed dispute settlement procedures; the investor must
not have brought the dispute before the courts or administrative agen-
cies of the host state;40 9 and six months must have elapsed since the
dispute arose.4 10 The BIT does not require exhaustion of local reme-
dies,4 11 but resort by the investor to such remedies will result in forfei-
405. Under ICSID rules, however, the parties to the dispute may not invoke ICSID
arbitration until six months after the dispute arises. See infra note 410 and accompa-
nying text.
406. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(2); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. VI(4).
The reference to "applicable law" is not intended to permit the host state to change
local law so as to render the previously-agreed procedures non-binding or unen-
forceable. Such an interpretation would defeat the purpose of this clause.
407. This clause may be unnecessary in light of the parties' general obligation
under Article II to observe their agreements with respect to investment. Inclusion of
the clause, however, precludes an argument by the host state that, following the
expropriation, there is no agreement to observe.
408. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(3)(a); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art.
VI(3)(a). Under the 1984 draft, the investor technically may file its consent as long as
the third condition is met, but may not institute proceedings unless all three condi-
tions are met. See supra note 396.
409. If the host institutes proceedings regarding the dispute in its domestic courts,
the investor may still pursue ICSID arbitration. Further, article 26 of the ICSID Con-
vention provides that consent to ICSID arbitration, unless otherwise stated, is
deemed consent to the exclusion of any other remedy. Once the investor has submit-
ted the dispute to ICSID, efforts by a host state to adjudicate an investment dispute
in its own courts violates the ICSID Convention and art. VII(3)(c) of the BIT (article
VI(3)(c) in the 1984 draft), requiring the parties to adhere to the ICSID Convention,
Rules, and Regulations. Where a dispute with the United States is submitted to
ICSID, United States courts presumably would have discretion to decide whether to
stay their proceedings pending an ICSID award. See Landis v. North American Co.,
299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) ("[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to both
the power inherent in every court ... the suppliant for a stay must make out a clear
case of hardship or inequity... if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which
he prays will work damage to someone else").
410. The BIT does not provide any formula for determining when a dispute may
be considered to have arisen.
411. Note that if the investor does decide to pursue its remedies in local courts, the
1983 draft (art. 11(8)) guarantees a right of access to the courts of the host state on an
MFN and national treatment basis. Both drafts require the parties to provide inves-
tors with "effective means" of asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect to
investment agreements, investment authorizations, and property. See 1983 draft,
supra note 76, at art. 11(8); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. 11(6). In addition, Article
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ture of its right under the BIT to ICSID arbitration.41 2 The consent to
ICSID arbitration is irrevocable. 41 3 The BITs require further4 14 that
both state parties to the BIT consent to conciliation or arbitration
before the Centre so that, in the event of a dispute, only the investor's
consent is necessary to establish jurisdiction. 4 15
The early model negotiating drafts from 1981 and 1982 had pro-
vided that recourse to ICSID was unavailable if the dispute had been
submitted to previously agreed dispute settlement procedures. In
effect, the host state could preclude resort to ICSID by invoking previ-
ously-agreed procedures. Thus, the procedure for third-party arbitra-
tion before ICSID was not intended to replace any previously-agreed
dispute settlement provisions, but was available in the absence of any
such procedures. Recourse to ICSID presumably was available if
neither the investor nor the host state elected to pursue previously
agreed procedures after six months. This early language is reflected in
four of the BITs.4 1
6
The result whereby an investor might have no right to ICSID arbi-
tration was seen as undesirable by some involved in BIT negotiations for
the United States. They took the position that resort to ICSID should
be available to investors regardless of the existence of previously-agreed
procedures, a view inconsistent with the BIT's general position that con-
tracts between host states and investors should be enforced. Accord-
ingly, in preparing the 1983 and 1984 drafts, BIT negotiators revised
paragraph 3(a) of the disputes provision to provide that recourse to
ICSID is unavailable if the investor has submitted the dispute to previ-
ously agreed procedures, language which found its way into the other
six signed BITs. That is, the investor was to be given the choice of
utilizing previously-agreed procedures or pursuing ICSID arbitration.
This change made the text confusing. The BIT provided, on the
one hand, that the parties "shall" utilize previously-agreed procedures,
while on the other hand suggested that ICSID arbitration remained
available if the investor in fact did not invoke previously-agreed proce-
dures. Such an approach seemed to invite the situation in which the
host state submitted the dispute to previously-agreed procedures only to
111(2) of both drafts gives investors the right to judicial review in the host state of the
sufficiency of compensation for expropriation but does not require the investor to
invoke such a remedy. If the investor does invoke local remedies, it forfeits its right
to ICSID arbitration (except where the local remedy failed to meet the requirements
of the BIT). See infra note 412 and accompanying text.
412. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(3)(a); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art.
VI(3)(a). Dispute settlement procedures to which the parties have previously agreed
may include a requirement that local remedies be exhausted. In such a case, exhaus-
tion presumably would be required before such procedures could be invoked.
413. ICSID Convention, supra note 388, at art. 25(1).
414. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(3)(b); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art.
VI(3)(b).
415. See ICSID Convention, supra note 388, at art. 25.
416. See infra note 431.
Vol. 21
1988 U.S. BIT Program
find that, six months later, the same dispute had been submitted by the
investor to ICSID.
To eliminate the confusion, the U.S. has again revised the clause
relating to ICSID arbitration. The negotiating text to be used in future
BIT negotiations expressly subordinates the requirement that previ-
ously-agreed procedures be invoked to the stipulation that the investor
has a right to ICSID arbitration of the dispute if the investor has not
submitted the dispute to previously-agreed procedures. Thus, assuming
the language is not changed in negotiations, future BITs will make
unequivocally clear that previously-agreed procedures are binding on
the host state if the investor selects them, but the investor has the right
to forego such procedures and submit the dispute to ICSID.
While the BIT establishes the host country's consent to arbitration,
ICSID's jurisdiction is limited by the terms of its own Convention. Arti-
cle 25(4) of the Convention allows a state, by the terms of its accession,
to limit ICSID jurisdiction applicable to it. Thus, the BIT right to ICSID
arbitration could prove illusory where the dispute was excluded from
ICSID's jurisdiction by either the Convention or the host state's acces-
sion. The BIT implicitly obligates the parties not to vitiate the disputes
clause by using reservations in their accession to the ICSID
Convention.41 7
Once the investor's consent has been given, either party to the dis-
pute may institute proceedings before the Centre or Additional Facility,
as appropriate. 4 18 In the event of a disagreement concerning whether
to use conciliation or binding arbitration, the wishes of the investor pre-
vail.4 19 The ICSID Convention requires the parties to recognize and
enforce any resulting awards. 420
The 1983 draft's state-to-state disputes provision prohibits an
investor unsatisfied with an ICSID arbitration from petitioning its own
417. The principle of pacta sunt servanda implicitly obligates a party to a treaty not
to defeat the purpose of the treaty. See, e.g., T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES
41-42 (1974). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies the require-
ment that treaties be performed in good faith. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
418. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(3)(a); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art.
VI(3)(a).
419. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(3)(a); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art.
VI(3)(a). The BIT leaves unclear whether parties to a dispute may first invoke concil-
iation, then binding arbitration. Arbitration before the Centre must be in accordance
with the provisions of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of other States and the rules and regulations of the
Centre. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(3)(c); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art.
VI(3)(c). Arbitration before the Additional Facility shall be in accordance with the
rules and regulations of the Additional Facility. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art.
VII(3)(c); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. VI(3)(c). Thus, the host state's failure to
abide by the Convention or the Rules and Regulations of the Centre or the Addi-
tional Facility would violate the BIT.
420. ICSID Convention, supra note 388, at art. 54.
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government to re-litigate the issue through state-to-state arbitration.4 2'
There are two exceptions to this exclusion: (1) where the host state
failed to abide by the ICSID arbitral award 42 2 or (2) where the issue
arbitrated at a state-to-state level, though arising from the same dispute,
differed from that arbitrated by ICSID.42 3 This paragraph was deleted
from the 1984 draft as unnecessary. 4 24
The BIT contains what is known in United States law as a collateral
source rule.4 25 The BITs prohibit the host party from asserting as a
defense, counterclaim, right of set-off or otherwise, the amount of any
compensation received by the investor pursuant to an investment agree-
ment.4 2 6 This clause also precludes a host state from arguing that a
compensated investor is no longer a real-party-in-interest and thus has
no claim.4 2 7
The BIT also provides that, for purposes of proceedings before
ICSID, a company organized under the laws of one party, but which
prior to the occurrence of the events giving rise to the dispute was
owned or controlled by investors of the other party, shall be considered
a company of that other party.4 28 This clause was necessary because of
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, which provides that companies are
ordinarily deemed to have the nationality of the country of incorpora-
tion and that companies may not initiate proceedings before ICSID or
the Additional Facility against their own states. 4 29 This clause ensures
421. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VIII(9). In addition, art. 27 of the ICSID
Convention specifically precludes diplomatic espousal of a claim once it has been
submitted to the Centre, unless the state party fails to comply with the ICSID award.
422. ICSID Convention, supra note 388, at art. 27(1).
423. Id.
424. See 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. VII. It was deemed unnecessary in light
of article 27 of the ICSID Convention.
425. Under that rule any recovery by a victim from a third-party is not applied to
reduce the liability of the wrongdoer. See generally Gypsum Carrier, Inc. v.
Handelsmann, 307 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1962), 4 A.L.R.3d 517 (1962) (award to sea-
man for maintenance and cure against non-negligent shipowner is not subject to
reduction by disability payments under California Compensation Disability Act); 22
AM. JUR. 2D § 206; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) LAW OF TORTS, § 920A(2).
426. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(4); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. VI(4).
427. This clause assumes the investor can continue to pursue the claim notwith-
standing receipt of compensation through insurance. A question arises, however,
where the investor's insurer is its own government. If the investor refuses to pursue
the claim, may its government then recover the loss? Although a principal purpose
of the BIT disputes provision is to prevent investment disputes from becoming state-
to-state disputes, nothing in the BIT expressly precludes such a result. Note, how-
ever, that when an investor submits a dispute to ICSID, the 1983 draft precludes the
BIT parties from submitting the same dispute to the ICJ, while art. 27 of the ICSID
Convention prohibits espousal of the claim. See supra note 422 and accompanying
text.
428. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(5); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. VI(5).
429. The drafters included this clause to render irrelevant any change in owner-
ship or control effected by an expropriation. The 1984 draft added the qualifier
"immediately" in front of the word "prior" to clarify the intent of the 1983 draft. See
infra notes 435-36 and accompanying text. This provision is contrary to the approach
generally taken elsewhere in the BIT at art. I(b) (art. I(c) of the 1984 draft) which
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that a company will be considered to have the nationality of those who
control it provided that it is incorporated under the laws of either of the
parties.
Egypt
The disputes provision of the Egypt BIT contains several notable devia-
tions from the 1983 draft.4 30
First, whereas under the 1983 draft the investor's right to ICSID
arbitration is cut off if the investor submits the dispute to previously-
agreed procedures, under the Egypt BIT, the right to ICSID arbitration
procedures is cut off if either party to the dispute submits it to previously-
agreed procedures in good faith.4 3 l That is, bad faith invocation of pre-
viously-agreed settlement procedures does not preclude recourse to
ICSID. Although explicit in this instance, the obligation to act in good
faith is implicit in treaties generally.4 3 2
The Egypt BIT contains two important derogations from the collat-
eral source rule. The first qualifies the rule to apply only to compensa-
tion from any "third-party whatsoever" (rather than "any source
whatsoever"). 4 33 Thus, contrary to the 1983 draft,43 4 insurance
received from the host government, its political subdivisions, agencies
provides that, to be considered a national of a state, a company must be incorporated
under the laws of that state.
430. Egypt BIT, supra note I, at art. VII(l)-(5).
431. Cf 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(3)(a)(ii); supra note 394. Specifically,
art. VIII(3)(a) of the Egypt BIT provides:
In the event that the legal investment dispute is not resolved under proce-
dures specified above, the national or company concerned may choose to
submit the dispute to the International Centre for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes ("Centre") for settlement by conciliation or binding arbitra-
tion, if, within six (6) months of the date upon which it arose: (i) the dispute
has not been settled through consultation and negotiation; or (ii) the dispute
has not, for any good faith reason, been submitted for resolution in accord-
ance with any applicable dispute-settlement procedures previously agreed to
by the Parties to the dispute; or (iii) the national or company concerned has
not brought the dispute before the courts ofjustice or administrative tribu-
nals or agencies of competent jurisdiction of the Party that is a Party to the
dispute.
The same change was made in the Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. VII(3)(a), the
Haiti BIT, supra note 7, at art. VII(3)(a)(i), and the Senegal BIT, supra note 8, at art.
VII(3)(a)(i). Note that, in the case of the Haiti BIT, I.C.C. arbitration is specified in
lieu of ICSID arbitration and thus it is a right to I.C.C. arbitration which is cut off by
recourse to previously-agreed procedures. See infra notes 477-80.
432. See Vienna Convention supra note 417, at art. 26. See generally 8 WHrrEMAN,
supra note 215, at 282-85 (1970). The "good faith" language is unique to the Egypt
BIT.
433. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. VII(4). Cf 1983 draft, at art. VII(4). The
capitalization of "Party" in the quoted phrase presumably is an error, since "Party"
with a capital "P" refers to the parties to the BIT, of which there are but two. The
Cameroon BIT, supra note 3, at art. VII(4), contains the same two derogations
described in the text. The Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. VII(4), and the Zaire
BIT, supra note 5, at art. VII(5), also refer to "any third party whatsoever," but do not
contain the second derogation.
434. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(4). Supra note 394.
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and instrumentalities, shall be applied to reduce the host country's liabil-
ity. The second provides that the investor is not entitled to compensa-
tion "for more than the value of its affected assets, taking into account
all sources of compensation from within the territory of the Party liable
for compensation." 435 In other words, compensation from all collateral
sources in the territory of the host state, not merely that from the host
state government, shall be credited against the amount due from the
host state. In effect, this second derogation prevents double recovery
from sources inside the host state.436
The Egypt BIT modified the clause specifying that, for purposes of
the disputes provision, a company would have the nationality of the
party that it had prior to the events giving rise to the dispute.437 It pro-
vides instead that the company would have the nationality which it pos-
sessed "immediately prior" to the occurrence of such events-an
improvement in the text (since it should not matter what nationality a
company had, say, ten years before the dispute arose). The 1984 draft
retained this modification.438 The same paragraph was further modified
to provide that, in order to take its host government to arbitration, a
company must be a "company of the other party," i.e., incorporated
under the laws of the other party as well as substantially owned by
nationals of such other party. The 1983 draft had permitted ICSID arbi-
tration if the company was incorporated under the laws of either party,
so long as it was owned or controlled by nationals of the party not
involved in the dispute.43 9
The Protocol contains a clause acknowledging an understanding
that the parties440 to a dispute may previously agree to submission of
435. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. VII(4).
436. As was explained to the Senate, "[tihe intent of this language, inserted at the
insistence of Egypt, is to protect the Parties against 'double indemnity.' " Egyptian
negotiators were concerned that United States investors not receive payment for the
value of a single claim from both a local Egyptian insurance company (which is likely
to be publicly owned) and the Egyptian Government. The language would not limit a
United States investor from collecting payment on the same claim from a third-party
(non-Egyptian) insurance company. Egypt Submittal Letter, supra note 145, at XIV.
With respect to the Cameroon BIT, the report to the Senate on this point appears to
be in error. It suggests that investors will "not be compensated, through insurance
or otherwise, in excess of the actual losses incurred." Cameroon Submittal Letter,
supra note 253, at X. Clearly what the BIT intends is merely to preclude double
recovery from Cameroon sources. An investor may recover its entire loss one time
from Cameroon sources and a second time from non-Cameroon sources.
437. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. VII(5). Cf 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art.
VII(5); supra note 394. See discussion at supra notes 428-29 and accompanying text.
438. 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. VI(5), supra 398. Cf Bangladesh BIT, supra
note 76, at art. VII(5), infra note 474 which follows the 1984 draft only with respect to
this paragraph of the disputes provision; the balance of the disputes provision of the
Bangladesh BIT follows the 1983 draft. This same change occurred in the Panama
BIT, supra note 2, at art. VII(5), which, like the Egypt BIT, generally follows the 1983
draft. The Morocco, Turkey, and Grenada BITs are based on the 1984 draft and
follow it in this regard. See infra notes 459, 484, 490 and accompanying text.
439. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(5).
440. The word "parties" is incorrectly capitalized in the Treaty. Cf supra note 433.
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the dispute to domestic courts, although the State parties are required
to maintain a nondiscriminatory policy with respect to the inclusion and
implementation of any such provision in an investment contract. This
clause makes explicit what was arguably implicit in the draft BIT.441
The Egypt BIT departs from the 1983 draft in several less "practi-
cally" significant aspects. Its definition of "investment dispute" omits
the express reference to disputes involving the application or interpreta-
tion of an investment authorization. 442 The definition continues to
include disputes involving the interpretation or application of invest-
ment agreements, which would seem sufficiently broad to render the
deletion of little or no significance. 443
The Egypt BIT omits all references to the Additional Facility.444 It
also omits the clause specifying that the investor's preference prevails in
the event of a dispute between the investor and host state over whether
to submit the dispute to conciliation or arbitration. 445 The BIT itself,
however, constitutes consent by the host government to either arbitra-
tion or conciliation before the ICSID, and the investor retains the dis-
cretion to consent to arbitration.446 Presumably, the investor still
controls the choice between conciliation or arbitration by consenting
only to one or the other. Hence, the omission of this language appears
to have no practical effect.
Panama
The disputes provision of the Panama BIT 44 7 contains several changes
441. Although it is implicit in the BIT that investors may agree to exhaust local
remedies and will be bound by that agreement, Egypt's insistence upon inclusion of
this express provision gave rise to the concern that Egypt might insist upon an agree-
ment to exhaust local remedies in every case, in effect requiring investors to waive
the disputes provision across-the board. The inclusion of a requirement that the par-
ties not discriminate in the inclusion and implementation of such waivers in invest-
ment agreements was intended to provide some protection in this regard.
442. Egypt BIT. supra note 1, at art. VII(I). The same change appears in the
Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at art. VI(I). Cf 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(I);
supra note 394.
443. See Egypt Submittal Letter, supra note 145, at XIV. The Egypt BIT refers to
investment disputes as "legal investment disputes," Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art.
VII(I), a change made at Egypt's request which was not intended to affect the scope
of the provision.
444. This change was a partial response to Egyptian complaints that the disputes
provision was too detailed. Reference to the Additional Facility also was omitted
from the disputes provision of the Cameroon, Morocco and Turkey BITs. Cf Pan-
ama BIT, supra note 2 (providing for arbitration by the Additional Facility, but not
ICSID). See infra note 449 and accompanying text. See also the Senegal BIT, supra
note 8, at Protocol § 5, which provides for Additional Facility arbitration of disputes
if either party withdraws from ICSID.
445. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(3)(a); 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art.
VI(3)(a). This language also was omitted from the Panama, Cameroon, Morocco,
and Turkey BITs.
446. Egypt BIT, supra note 1, at art. VII(3)(a).
447. Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. VII(l)-(6).
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in the language of the 1983 draft.4 4 8 First, because Panama is not a
member of ICSID, the draft specifies that conciliation, binding arbitra-
tion, or both is to be conducted before the Additional Facility of
ICSID.44 9 The parties undertake to enforce arbitral awards issued by
the Additional Facility. 450 The Panama BIT also acknowledges that the
"previously-agreed" dispute procedures that take precedence over
ICSID arbitration may include arbitration before the Inter-American
Commercial Arbitration Commission. 4 5 1
Second, the Panama BIT precludes recourse to conciliation or arbi-
tration if the investor, during the six month cooling-off period, submits
the dispute to the courts of either the host government or its own gov-
ernment.4 52 The 1983 draft, by omitting the reference to the investor's
government, had left open the possibility that an investor might file suit
in the courts of its own country as well as institute proceedings before
ICSID. 4 53 The Panama BIT does not, however, preclude investors from
448. Four such changes are described at supra notes 431, 433, 438, and 445 and
accompanying text.
449. Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. VII(3). Cf the Egypt, Cameroon, Morocco,
and Turkey BITs, in which all references to the Additional Facility were omitted. See
supra note 444 and accompanying text. See also Senegal BIT, supra note 8, at Protocol
5, which provides for recourse to the Additional Facility if either party withdraws
from ICSID. See infra text at note 483.
450. Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. VII(3)(d). The rules of the Additional Facil-
ity do not contain provisions for recognition and enforcement of awards, other than
to require that arbitration take place in a state which is a party to the Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. See Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
Enforcement of an Additional Facility award in the United States under the New York
Convention may not always be possible under United States law. In ratifying the
New York Convention, the United States, like a number of other parties, declared
that it would apply the Convention only to "commercial" disputes. See Federal Arbi-
tration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1982). The Additional Facility rules provide that
the Additional Facility is available for resolving other than ordinary commercial dis-
putes. The term "commercial," as used in the Federal Arbitration Act, could be con-
strued broadly enough to include investment disputes, thus allowing enforcement of
awards by the Additional Facility. The United States' reservation to the New York
Convention also limited recognition and enforcement of awards to those "made in
the territory of another contracting state." But see Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp.,
710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983). Thus, an Additional Facility award issued in the United
States may not be enforceable in the United States, even though the same award
would be enforceable in the United States if issued in another state. A comparable
clause relating to the enforcement of ICC awards appears in the Haiti BIT. See infra
note 479 and accompanying text.
451. Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. VII(2). Panama is not a party to the New
York Convention but ICAC Awards are enforceable under the 1975 Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 336(1975), to which Panama and the United States are party. See generally Kearney, Devel-
opments in Private International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 724, 735-738 (1987).
452. Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. VII(3)(a).
453. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(3)(a). See text of 1983 draft disputes
provision, supra note 394. Article 26 of the ICSID Convention, however, requires
that collateral proceedings be suspended during pendency of a case before ICSID.
See supra note 410.
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filing suit in a third country as well as proceeding before ICSID. 45 4
Cameroon
The disputes provision of the Cameroon BIT 4 55 deviates from the 1983
draft in only minor respects. 4 5 6 For example, it omits the 1983 draft
language4 57 expressly limiting the disputes provision to disputes involv-
ing investment in the territory of a party. The omitted language is
unnecessary, however, because the term "investment" is defined to
mean investment within the territory of a party4 58 and thus "investment
dispute" refers only to a dispute involving such investment.
Morocco
The Morocco BIT4 5 9 departs from the 1984 draft4 60 by including a con-
cession to the exhaustion of local remedies doctrine. Specifically, the
Morocco BIT provides that a United States investor may not submit an
investment dispute with Morocco to ICSID unless the investor first sub-
mits it to the appropriate judicial or administrative body of primary
jurisdiction under Moroccan law, and either: (1) a final judgment has
been rendered or (2) one year has elapsed since the local proceedings
were initiated.4 6 1 This clause effectively requires United States inves-
tors to defer to local remedies for a period of one year or until those
local remedies are exhausted, whichever occurs first, before going to
ICSID.
Although this mechanism reintroduces the requirement of exhaust-
ing local remedies, two fundamental points preserve the BIT's guaran-
tee of the investor's right to third-party dispute resolution. First,
regardless of how the dispute is handled by local authorities, the inves-
tor has an absolute right to submit the dispute to ICSID after one year.
Second, once the dispute is referred to ICSID, the local proceedings
must be terminated.
The Morocco BIT also contains several minor deviations from the
454. Nor do the draft BITs. But see supra note 453.
455. Cameroon BIT, supra note 3, at art. VII(1)-(5).
456. Three such deviations are described in supra notes 433, 444, 445 and accom-
panying text. See also supra note 436 for a comparison of Cameroon's collateral
source rule to that of Egypt and the draft BITs.
457. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(2). See text of 1983 draft disputes provi-
sion at supra note 394.
458. Cameroon BIT, supra note 3, at art. I(1)(b).
459. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at art. VI.
460. The Morocco BIT disputes provision follows the 1983 draft in one respect:
including the phrase "for any reason" in art. VII(3)(a)(i), requiring as a condition to
ICSID arbitration that the investor not have submitted the dispute "for any reason"
to previously agreed procedures. The 1984 draft deleted the phrase as unnecessary.
The disputes provision of the Turkey BIT, which similarly was based on the 1984
draft, also reinserts that phrase.
461. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at art. VI(3)(a)(ii)(b). Although structured differ-
ently, the Turkey BIT also imposes a one year delay on investment disputes before
empowering the investor to submit the dispute to ICSID. See infra note 486 and
accompanying text.
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draft language. 46 2 First, the Morocco BIT provides that investor indem-
nification from a third source shall not be a "defense" to a claim for
compensation against the host government.4 63 The 1984 draft had said
"defense, counterclaim, right of set-off or otherwise."' 46 Second, fol-
lowing the provision that the parties shall initially seek to resolve the
dispute by consultation and negotiation, the Morocco BIT omits the
phrase "which may include the use of non-binding third party proce-
dures."'46 5 Since the parties obviously are always free to use non-bind-
ing third-party consultation and negotiation mechanisms, the change is
not substantive.
Zaire
The disputes provision of the Zaire BIT 46 6 reorganizes and slightly
rewords, but does not significantly alter the meaning of, the 1983 draft's
language.4 67 A few changes are particularly noteworthy.
The Zaire BIT omits the language from the 1983 draft specifying
that existing dispute settlement procedures between the investor and
the host government concerning expropriation remain binding and
enforceable. 468 The Zaire BIT, however, does provide that investors
have the right to invoke previously-agreed dispute procedures and con-
tains a stabilization clause. 469 Hence, the specific expropriation provi-
sion is not necessary and its deletion does not diminish the investor's
rights.
The Zaire BIT slightly modifies the sequence for referring an
investment dispute to conciliation or arbitration. The 1983 draft
requires a six month delay before an investor may consent to concilia-
tion or arbitration before ICSID.4 70 Following such consent, either
party may institute ICSID proceedings. The Zaire BIT departs from the
draft and provides that the investor may consent at any time to ICSID
proceedings, 4 71 although the proceedings may not be instituted until six
months after the dispute arises.
462. Three such changes are described in supra notes 442, 444-45.
463. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at art. VI(4). The same change to the 1983 draft
appears in the Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at art. VII(5), and the Senegal BIT, supra note
8, at art. VII(4).
464. 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. VI(4). The 1983 draft language was the same
on this point. See 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(4); supra note 395.
465. Morocco BIT, supra note 4, at art. VI(2).
466. Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at art. VII.
467. Two changes were described in supra notes 433 and 463.
468. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(2). For the text of the 1983 draft dis-
putes provision, see supra note 394. For a discussion of the significance of this provi-
sion, see supra notes 407-08 and accompanying text.
469. See Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at art. VII(3) and art. 11(4).
470. 1983 draft, supra note 76, at art. VII(3). For the text of the 1983 draft dis-
putes provision, see supra note 394.
471. Zaire BIT, supra note 5, at art. VII(4).
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Bangladesh
The disputes provision of the Bangladesh BIT 47 2 generally follows the
1983 draft. Bangladesh was troubled, however, by the section provid-
ing that companies incorporated under the laws of one party, but owned
or controlled by nationals of the other party, possess the nationality of
the latter party for purposes of the disputes provision.4 73 Bangladesh
initially opposed this clause because it effectively allows Bangladesh sub-
sidiaries of United States companies to take Bangladesh to arbitra-
tion.4 74 The United States prevailed on the issue, although the parties
chose to use 1984 draft language. An additional sentence explicitly reaf-
firms that the disputes provision "shall not apply to an investment dis-
pute between a Party and a national of that Party."'4 7 5
Haiti
Unlike the 1983 draft, the Haiti BIT4 76 specifies that investment dis-
putes shall be referred to the International Chamber of Commerce
rather than ICSID, of which Haiti is not a member.4 7 7 To ensure the
enforceability of ICC awards, the Haiti BIT requires the award to be
made in a state which is a party to the New York Convention, 4 78 and
requires that each party provide for the enforcement of ICC awards
within its territory. 4 79 Both Haiti and the United States are parties to
the New York Convention.48 0
472. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 6, at art. VII(I)-(5).
473. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 6, at art. VII(5).
474. See supra notes 428-29 and accompanying text. Their concern was to avoid
treating some Bangladesh companies (those which were subsidiaries of United States
companies) more favorably than other Bangladesh companies. It was necessary that
the matter be resolved explicitly in the treaty since, under ICSID Rule 25(2)(b), a
company is considered a national of the country of incorporation unless that country
has agreed with another state that such companies will be considered nationals of
that other state. Art. VII(5) constitutes that agreement.
475. Bangladesh BIT, supra note 6, at art. VII(5). This sentence is consistent with
the United States view of the treaty, provided that, for purposes of the disputes provi-
sion, companies are regarded as having the nationality of their owners or controllers
rather than of the state of incorporation.
476. Haiti BIT, supra note 7, at art. VII(1)-(5). Another significant departure from
the 1983 draft is described supra at note 431.
477. Since Haiti had not chosen to join ICSID, it did not want to appear to modify
that decision indirectly by acceding to use of the Additional Facility.
478. New York Convention, supra note 450. The United States ratification of the
Convention includes a declaration that United States courts will enforce arbitral deci-
sions only if issued in states which are party to that Convention. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-
208 (1982).
479. Haiti BIT, supra note 7, at art. VII(3)(d). Comparable language with respect
to enforcement of Additional Facility awards appears in the Panama BIT. See supra
note 450 and accompanying text.
480. See New York Convention, supra note 450.
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Senegal
The disputes provision of the Senegal BIT 4 8 1 generally follows the 1983
draft. One difference is that the investor's right to conciliation or bind-
ing arbitration is limited to ICSID and does not extend to the Additional
Facility. 4 82 The Protocol provides, however, that the Additional Facility
shall be used if either party withdraws from the ICSID Convention or
ICSID is unavailable for any other reason.4 83
Turkey
The disputes provision of the Turkey BIT 484 contains one significant
modification of the 1984 draft language. Recourse to ICSID48 5 may not
be had until one year after the dispute arises, rather than six months as
provided by the draft.4 8 6 The Turkish negotiators desired that every
possible opportunity for a bilateral negotiated settlement be made
before escalating the dispute to third-party procedures, whether binding
or non-binding.4 87
The Turkey BIT also provides only for arbitration, not conciliation,
before ICSID.4 8 8 Accordingly, it deletes as unnecessary the provision
that the investor's wishes shall prevail in the event of a dispute over
whether to use conciliation or arbitration.48 9
481. Senegal BIT, supra note 8, at art. VII(l)-(5). Additional changes of note to
the Senegal BIT disputes provision are described supra at notes 431, 463.
482. Senegal BIT, supra note 8, at art. VII(3)(a).
483. Senegal BIT, supra note 8, at Protocol para. 5. The Egypt, Cameroon,
Morocco, and Turkey BITs omit all reference to the Additional Facility. See supra
note 441. See also the Panama BIT, supra note 2, at art. VII(3), which provides for
arbitration before the Additional Facility, but not ICSID. See supra note 449 and
accompanying text.
484. Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at art. VI.
485. Turkey was not a member of ICSID at the time the BIT was signed, but the
Turkish negotiators assured United States negotiators that Turkey intended to join.
The intent of both parties was that Turkey would join ICSID prior to the BIT's entry
into force.
486. Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at art. VI(3)(a). The Morocco BIT also imposes a
one-year delay on United States (but not Moroccan) investors before permitting
recourse to ICSID. See supra note 461 and accompanying text.
487. Consistent with this intent, the Turkey BIT, supra note 9, also provides at art.
VI(2) that parties to an investment dispute must attempt to resolve the dispute
through bilateral negotiations or consultations "in good faith" before resorting to
non-binding third party procedures or previously agreed dispute settlement proce-
dures. Cf art. VI(2) of the 1984 draft, supra note 395, in which the parties are
required initially to resolve the dispute through negotiations and consultations,
which may include third-party procedures.
488. Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at art. VI(3)(a). Other changes from the 1984 draft
are described supra at notes 444, 460. Less noteworthy, the Turkey BIT dropped the
1984 draft's reference to art. 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention without affecting the
substance of the disputes provision. 1984 draft, supra note 78, at art. VI(5). The
reference had not appeared in the 1983 draft. The Turkey BIT also moves the provi-
sion concerning expropriation settlement procedures to a separate paragraph. 1984
draft, supra note 78, at art. VI(2); Turkey BIT, supra note 9, at art. VI(4).
489. A similar change occurs in the Egypt, Panama, Cameroon, and Morocco BITs.
See supra note 442 and accompanying text.
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Grenada
The disputes provision of the Grenada BIT490 is identical to that of the
1984 draft.
IM. Conclusion
Although the BITs are, in many respects, a continuation of United
States practice dating back to the early nineteenth century of securing
bilateral treaty protection for United States investment abroad, they dif-
fer in form from the predecessor FCN agreements in that they are dedi-
cated exclusively to that purpose. The BITs also represent a substantial
advance over the FCNs as a matter of substance in that, for the first time,
the United States has secured for its investors the right to arbitration of
investor-to-state investment disputes.
The provision for third party arbitration of investor-to-state dis-
putes is but one of four core provisions in the BIT. The first of the core
provisions, relating to the general treatment to be provided to investors,
is rooted in United States treaty practice dating back to the last century
and generally was accepted by BIT signatories with only minor conces-
sions. The second core provision, setting forth the compensation stan-
dard for expropriation, also has roots dating back to the nineteenth
century. It is a cornerstone of United States foreign investment policy,
and was incorporated into all ten signed BITs without any substantive
concessions. The third core provision, concerning free transfer of pay-
ments related to an investment, embodies a principle not regularly
included in United States treaty practice until the modem FCNs. This
provision was the only one of the four in which significant concessions
were made, generally in the form of exceptions allowing delays in trans-
fers in exigent circumstances for specified periods or, in one case, an
exception delaying the effective date of the entire provision. The fourth
core provision, the disputes provision, despite its novelty in United
States treaty practice, appears in all ten BITs without any substantive
concessions.
The United States has been remarkably successful in negotiating
agreements that advance the protection accorded to American investors
abroad, especially in third world countries where the threat of hostile
government action against investors generally is the greatest. These
agreements, moreover, both in their substantive provisions and in the
dispute procedures they establish, also may play a significant role in bol-
stering customary international legal protection of foreign investment.
The unwillingness of the United States to compromise on substan-
tive issues (except for allowing certain delays with respect to currency
transfers) will limit significantly the number of additional countries with
which it will be possible to sign BITs. It should be recalled, however,
that the United States engaged in successful FCN negotiation for some
490. Grenada BIT, supra note 10, at art. VI.
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twenty years and the conclusion of additional BITs seem only a matter
of time. Even a program of relatively modest geographic coverage will
have succeeded in extending treaty protection of United States invest-
ment to a number of third world countries that never concluded FCN
treaties, while demonstrating the feasibility of negotiating bilateral
investment protection agreements of unprecedented scope and rigor.
